FOOTNOTES

Non-time critical remedial action is action which can be deferred temporarily, but which should be completed at the first reasonable opportunity.
Fundamentals for Understanding Standards-Based Safety Management of Department of Energy Defense Nuclear Facilities, DNFSB/TECH-5; and Safety Management and Conduct of Operations at the Department of Energy's Defense Nuclear Facilities, DNFSB/TECH-6.
DOE Order 5480.21 defines "authorization basis" as: "Those aspects of facility design basis and operational requirements relied upon by DOE to authorize operation."
DOE safety orders or S/RIDs, in themselves, do not impose enforceable requirements on DOE contractors, but become enforceable when they are invoked by specific contract provisions, which are legally binding (See Fundamentals for Understanding Standards-Based Safety Management of Department of Energy Defense Nuclear Facilities, DNFSB/TECH-5).
These included DOE 4700.1, Project Management; DOE 6430.1A, General Design Criteria; and DOE 5820.2A, Radioactive Waste Management.
These six new orders covered Emergency Management (151.1), Safety and Health Reporting Requirements (231.1), Startup and Restart of Nuclear Facilities (425.1), Life Cycle Asset Management (430.1), Departmental Materials Transportation and Packaging Management (460.2), and Accident Investigations (225.1).
Six other new orders had been provided to the Board as of the end of the year: Performance Indicators and Analysis of Operational Information ( 210.1); Occurrence Reporting (232.1); Facility Safety (420.1); Worker Safety and Health Program ( 440.1); Packaging and Transportation Safety (460.1); and Directives System (251.1).
Copies of formal Board recommendations issued during 1995 appear in Appendix B.
Facilities in the sample included Buildings 371 and 771 at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site; TA-55 and CMR at LANL; the K-East Basin and the Tank Farms at the Hanford Site; and the DWPF and both canyons at the Savannah River Site. Specific activities included implementation of Recommendation 94-1 at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site; assembly and disassembly operations at the Pantex Plant; and decommissioning work at the Hanford Site.
The priority facilities and activities are presented in tabular form in Appendix A.
Safety-related systems are subject to more stringent requirements regarding quality assurance, surveillance, and redundancy in order to improve reliability of the system function.
Personnel records show that DOE filled more than 900 technical billets in the defense nuclear complex during the 1994-95 period.
This involves extending all reactor shield walls to the same height, and adding a new concrete roof over the reactor; modifying the reactor building to seal all penetrations and most other building access points; removing all ancillary buildings and structures; and allowing only infrequent and limited access to the facility for periodic inspection.
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