RECOMMENDATION 90-6 TO THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
                   pursuant to Section 312(5) of the
                Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.



Dated:  June 4, 1990



The Board and its experts have carefully considered criticality
safety at the Department of Energy (DOE) Rocky Flats Plant.

The subject of criticality safety at Rocky Flats has been
previously examined by Scientech, Inc., and reported in "An
Assessment of Criticality Safety at the Department of Energy Rocky
Flats Plant" and subsequent follow-up activities and reports. 
Criticality safety has also been examined by the DOE and its Rocky
Flats Plant operating contractor.

It is noted that data used in the preparation of the reports by
Scientech, Inc. and in subsequent plant examinations were developed
through the use of non-destructive assay techniques to determine if
fissile materials have accumulated in ventilation ducts and
associated systems.  These efforts resulted in the determination
that fissile materials have accumulated in certain portions of
these systems.  In addition, other more recent physical studies
have confirmed fissile and other undefined debris exist in the
ducts.  Plant personnel are presently continuing efforts to measure
the quantity and concentration of plutonium and other debris in the
ducts as well as its form and physical consistency.  As of this
time, full characterization of the situation by DOE and its
contractors has not been completed; hence, all specific remediation
measures have not yet been determined.

The Board recommends that prior to resumption of plutonium
operations at the plant that DOE prepare a written program with
commitments to address the accumulation of fissile and other
materials in ventilation ducts and related systems.  The short-term
objective of the program should be to ensure that a criticality
accident would not take place and that the presence of fissile and
other materials in the ducts would not result in an undue risk to
the health and safety of the public, including on site personnel. 
The remainder of the program should ensure that the accumulated
fissile material and other debris in the ventilation and associated
systems will be properly removed or substantially reduced in amount
and concentration in the longer term, but as soon as reasonably
possible.  The program should address priorities of specific
actions and include an assessment of criticality safety for
affected individual lines, systems, or components.  The basis for
the actions and any time-phased programs should be presented.  This
program should address and include the following:


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      o    Description of remediation actions, including the
           scheduling and basis for same, that are deemed necessary
           prior to resumption of plutonium operations by DOE.

      o    Descriptions and justification of non-destructive assay
           techniques, calibration, modeling, and assay methodology.

      o    Estimation of radiation levels in areas of occupancy,
           both from gamma rays and fast neutrons.

      o    Determination of the effects of accumulation of fissile
           and other materials on the functionability of the
           ventilation ducts and related systems which must act to
           protect the health and safety of the public, including
           plant operating personnel.

      o    Description and justification of procedures and
           schedules, both short term and long term, for removal or
           reduction in amount and concentration of existing fissile
           and other unidentified debris in the ventilation ducts
           and related systems, as stated above.

      o    Determination of any design and operational changes in
           the ventilation ducts and related systems necessary to
           prevent further accumulation of significant amounts of
           fissile and other materials therein and to ensure
           continued operability of systems installed to protect the
           health and safety of the public including plant operating
           personnel.  This includes a thorough study of the
           glovebox filters and ventilation and alarm systems.

      o    Establishment of a monitoring program for the ventilation
           ducts and related systems to establish that design and
           operational changes and modifications are effective in
           preventing significant additional accumulation of fissile
           and other materials.



                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   /s/

                                                                                                                                                                                                   John T. Conway
                                                                                                                                                                                                   Chairman