1. A Safety Assessment of Department of Energy Nuclear Reactors, DOE/US-0005, March 1981.
"An important contributing factor [to the lack of adequate attention by DOE Headquarters' organizations to the nuclear safety aspects of its reactors] is the lack of sufficient numbers of highly competent technical people in Headquarters' organizations with nuclear safety responsibilities. Field Office organizations also suffer from this lack."
2. National Research Council Reports:
a.Safety Issues at the Defense Production Reactors, National Academy Press, 1987.
"The committee concludes that the Department, both at headquarters and in its field has relied almost entirely on its contractors to identify safety concerns and to recommend appropriate actions, in part because the imbalance in technical capabilities and experience between the contractors and DOE staff is of sufficient magnitude to preclude DOE from comprehensive DOE involvement in the operation of the production reactors. The committee recommends that the Department acquire and properly assign the resources and talent necessary to ensure that safe operation is being attained."
b.Safety Issues at the DOE Test and Research Reactors, National Academy Press, 1988.
"The suitability of the existing [DOE organizational] arrangement is undermined by the absence of adequate staff in the DOE line management who are sophisticated on safety and operational matters .... In effect, the system relies almost exclusively on the skills and competence of the contractors."
c. The Nuclear Weapons Complex: Management for Health, Safety, and the Environment, National Academy Press, 1989.
"Constant attention must be paid to the maintenance and improvement of technical capabilities. Concerted efforts are needed to recruit competent technical personnel at all levels; and DOE must maintain an environment for the retention of employees by providing challenging assignments, meaningful participation in decision making, and professional advancement. Strong training programs are necessary to build a culture in which health, safety, and environmental considerations are seen as an integral component of operations."
3. Secretary of Energy letter to the President, December 20, 1991.
"... the technical knowledge and skills of many DOE managers and employees are not sufficient to do their jobs."
4. Advisory Committee on Nuclear Facility Safety letter to the Secretary of Energy, March 24, 1989.
"We recommend that you streamline management to make responsibilities clear, that you put knowledgeable people in line positions of responsibility, and that you give them authority. This is important for assurance of nuclear safety. Solving the DOE's problems will require upper management and operating personnel to work together closely and effectively. This will not be possible if the staff must work through buffers of people who are not technically competent."
5. Hazards Ahead: Managing Cleanup Worker Health and Safety at the Nuclear Weapons Complex, Office of Technology Assessment, 1993.
"EM ... lacks adequate numbers of qualified staff to develop occupational health and safety programs suited to EM line operations and has little capacity to assess contractors' performance in health and safety matters."
"The DOE Office of Environment, Safety and Health (EH) does not have enough qualified staff to monitor contractor operations."
6. alternative Futures for the Department of Energy National Laboratories, Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, February 1995.
Section G. Recommendations.
1. "Sustained improvements in DOE management and leadership are needed both at senior levels in the Department and in positions below the Deputy Assistant Secretary level." It is clear from the above material that those portions of the problems that DOE can control stem from managerial deficiencies at the top levels in the Department."