Letter, Chairman Conway to Assistant Secretary Reis, dated 11/15/93
[encl]Trip Report of Order Compliance Review at the Nevada Test Site (NTS)
"It appears that inadequate attention was given, in some instances, to the qualification of the personnel coordinating or conducting the [order compliance self- ]assessment. In one example, an undergraduate intern was tasked to coordinate the DOE-NVOO [Nevada Operations Office] self-assessment and compliance with DOE Order 5820.2A, Radioactive Waste Management -- an Order with a significant degree of technical complexity."
Letter, Chairman Conway to Assistant Secretary Grumbly, dated 01/27/94
[encl]Review of K-Basins at Hanford
"In a recent review, the Office of Nuclear Safety (EH-10) indicated that neither DOE-RL [Richland Operations Office] nor WHC [Westinghouse Hanford Company] fully understood the potential problems associated with these [K-Basins] facilities."
Letter, Technical Director Cunningham to Mr. Whitaker, dated 10/21/94
[encl]Report on Development and Implementation of S/RIDs at Hanford High Level Waste Storage Tanks
"DOE-RL [Richland Operations Office] personnel stated that their review of WHC [Westinghouse Hanford Company] S/RIDs [Standards/Requirements Identification Documents] was not necessary to ensure adequacy."
"DOE-RL did not review any S/RIDs.... No plans or specific milestones are in place to ensure DOE-RL personnel review the S/RIDs for technical content and adequacy. DOE-RL personnel stated that their review is not necessary to ensure the S/RIDs are adequate, but could not explain how they will ensure S/RIDs are implemented at the site without benefit of a technical review of the content."
Letter, Technical Director Cunningham to Mr. Whitaker, dated 09/21/94
[encl]Rocky Flats Plant - Trip Report on the Review of Building 371 Seismic and Systems Design Bases, Special Nuclear Material Storage, and Systematic Evaluation Program Status
"However, neither EG&G nor DOE-RFO [Rocky Flats Operations Office] had a sufficient understanding to discuss the details of the site conditions or the analyses performed by the original architect-engineer. It is particularly noted that the foundation design is not understood by DOE-RFO or EG&G. There was not enough information that had been reviewed and understood by EG&G or DOE-RFO to make an independent assessment of the adequacy of the structural analyses."
Letter, Chairman Conway to Assistant Secretary Grumbly, dated 09/05/95
[encl]Implementation of Recommendation 93-4 - Richland Operations Office Technical Management Plan, Report of Site Visit, August 1-3, 1995
"Specifically, the [Technical Management Plan] TMP fails to identify the requirements necessary for DOE's technical management of the environmental restoration contractor, Bechtel Hanford, Inc. (BHI). DOE-RL [Richland Operations Office] Environmental Restoration (DOE-ER) personnel demonstrated a poor understanding of Recommendation 93-4 and have done little to effectively implement the TMP. The Board's staff also found that the technical capabilities and involvement of DOE-ER personnel are inadequate to allow for sound technical management of BHI."
"Weaknesses in the DOE-RL Environmental Restoration organization were evident to the Board's staff in several areas relative to the TMP and the management of the environmental restoration contractor at Hanford. Prominent among these weaknesses were a noted lack of technical and managerial capabilities, a lack of understanding of Recommendation 93-4 and a lack of effective implementation of the assessment program set forth by the TMP."
"The Board's staff noted evidence that the DOE-ER staff lacked the expertise and management involvement to effectively manage BHI."
"DOE-ER field oversight of the contractor was also found to be erratic and infrequent."
"Conversations with Washington State Department of Ecology personnel, DOE-EH Resident Inspectors, DOE-RL internal assessors, and a representative of the Environmental Protection Agency, Region 10 confirmed staff observation s regarding DOE-ER abilities. Based on their personal observations, all of these representatives echoed the concern that DOE-ER personnel lacked program management training and qualifications and technical background to effectively manage the activities of BHI."
"DOE-ER personnel acknowledged a lack of expertise in many of the technical areas to be assessed. Their proposed solution to this problem was to enlist the assistance of BHI to perform combined assessments of BHI activities."
"Examples of Poor DOE-ER Performance:
"... The cognizant DOE-ER Project Manager acknowledged that she did not understand the concern [poor radiological work practices] as she had no prior experience or training in radiological controls."
"The DOE-ER Facility Representative... acknowledged he does not have the background or training to readily complete the DOE-RL Facility Representative program in the suggested twelve month period."
"The DOE-RL Assistant Manger for Environmental Restoration... acknowledged that few of her staff understood their jobs adequately."
Letter, Chairman Conway to Assistant Secretary Grumbly, dated 05/11/93
[encl]Fernald Environmental Management Project - UNH Neutralization Project Review Trip Report (April 21-22, 1993)
"The DNFSB staff believe that the Department of Energy Fernald Field Office (DOE-FN) and its new environmental restoration management contractor, Fernald Environmental Restoration Management Corporation (FERMCO), have a serious problem in communicating technical and programmatic information. FERMCO started up the UNH neutralization process without conducting a required readiness review and without informing DOE-FN. The UNH neutralization process operated, without DOE-RN knowing, for one week before the process was shut down. It was apparent that DOE-FN personnel did not understand the FERMCO organization...."
"The lack of DOE Facility Representatives has resulted in a lower level of technical vigilance by DOE and the removal of an important layer of defense."
Letter, Technical Director Cunningham to Mr. Whitaker, dated 05/13/94
[encl]Trip Report - Review of Implementation of DNFSB Recommendation 93-5 at the Hanford Site, March 28-31, 1994
"The Department of Energy (DOE) is not providing adequate technical management oversight of the program. As a result, critical decisions regarding characterization strategy, safety criteria, and required confidence levels for decisions are being made by WHC [Westinghouse Hanford Company] with little input from the Department of Energy Richland Operations Office (DOE-RL) or the responsible headquarters line organization (EM-36, EM-30, or EM-1)."
"DOE-RL is not providing the technical direction required to successfully carry out the characterization program. Subsequent discussion with a representative from the responsible headquarters office (EM-36) confirmed that he was aware of this problem but had not intervened effectively to correct it."
Letter, Chairman Conway to Assistant Secretary Reis, dated 11/25/94
[encl]Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) - Review of Chemistry and Metallurgy Research (CMR) Facility Hot Cell Upgrades and the Fire Resistant Pit (FRP) Test Program
"Based on discussions with LANL [Los Alamos National Laboratory] regarding responsibilities and accountability, it is unclear who at LANL is responsible and accountable for assuring that the hot cell seismic upgrades will perform their stated functions. Other than budgetary responsibility, LANL management responsibility for these upgrades is diffuse."
"The design review process used by LANL to review the hot cell seismic upgrade design was weak and ineffective. Based on DNFSB staff review and discussions with LANL during the presentations concerning the technical substance of a design review, the DNFSB staff observed that the comments generated by LANL personnel were essentially non-technical in nature. They did not focus on whether or not the facility upgrade was adequate to prevent initiation of collapse mechanisms, as well as minimize and mitigate the FRP [Fire Resistant Pit] hazards and consequences. In particular, the comments of the LANL seismic reviewer merely requested that the comments previously prepared by the DOE reviewer be resolved. This suggest that LANL has not provided technical oversight of its contractors."
Letter, Chairman Conway to Acting Assistant Secretary Beckner, dated 05/03/93
[encl]Observations from a Trip to the Albuquerque Field Office, February 22-24, 1993
"For example, there have been only modest advances in the program to identify appropriate training in the areas of nuclear engineering and nuclear safety required for Field Office and Area Office personnel and there is no plan to acquire that training and education. This condition is particularly apparent at the Amarillo Area Office where there is a relative lack of personnel with nuclear engineering experience and training."
Letter, Chairman Conway to Secretary O'Leary, dated 07/20/94
"The Board wishes to call your attention to staffing deficiencies at the Amarillo Area Office (AAO) that are adversely affecting the performance of safety-related functions assigned that office."
"... the Board's letter of May 27, 1994, stated that the current overall DOE technical staffing situation is already ?below a level which the Board believes to be necessary for continued safety.'"
"Even with these [vacant senior manager and engineering positions] filled, it is not evident that sufficient technical and management competence in middle management and staff at the AAO will be available to support the pace of activities at the site."
Letter, Technical Director Cunningham to Mr. Whitaker, dated 09/27/95
[encl]Pantex Site - DNFSB Staff Report - Conduct of Operations and Training and Qualification Program Review
"Despite DOE-AAO's [Amarillo Area Office's] recruiting efforts, it has been difficult to attract quality candidates to fill the positions. Even with the issuance of the DOE- HR [Office of Human Resources] manual Manager's Guide to Administrative Flexibilities, DOE-AAO reported difficulty obtaining travel pay, hiring bonuses, "double-dipping" approvals, excepted service authority, and upper steps authorizations for GS pay grades. For example, DOE-AAO submitted a request for one excepted service position. The initial request was rejected (documentation inadequacies); the resubmittal required six weeks for approval. Due to the urgency of the need for an individual in the position, DOE-AAO was forced to fill the billet using the standard personnel system."
Letter, Technical Director Cunningham to Mr. Whitaker, dated 07/05/95
[encl]Review of Implementation of Board Recommendation 92-4 and Hanford Tank Farms Activities
"Improvements in the technical competence of DOE-RL [Richland Operations Office] personnel responsible for TWRS [Tank Waste Remediation System] are also behind schedule and to date have had no effect."
"Upgrading the technical competence of DOE-RL TWRS personnel is required by the 92-4 Implementation Plan and is planned to be coordinated with similar actions taken in response to Recommendation 93-3. DOE-RL Director of the Office of Training stated his office does not have the funding to implement the site specific initiatives of 93-3 at the site level.... Consequently, progress to date at the TWRS level is poor...."
Letter, Technical Director Cunningham to Mr. Whitaker, 07/28/95
[encl]Nuclear Explosives Safety Study: Arming & Firing and Timing & Control (A&F/T&C) System for Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Devices at the Nevada Test Site
"DOE personnel responded to the minority [NESSG report] position by stating that they did not believe that it was valid. This decision was based strictly on the experience of the DOE personnel. Technical justification for the decision was not documented."
Letter, Technical Director Cunningham to Mr. Whitaker, dated 12/15/94
[encl]Pantex Site - DNFSB Staff Trip Report - Emergency Preparedness Exercise Review
"Weaknesses were noted in Pantex's and DOE's ability to evaluate the exercise."
"During a participant's critique held immediately after the exercise, only minor deficiencies were identified and the Emergency Preparedness Manager stated that he felt performance was good. Objective application of the exercise evaluation criteria, prepared by Pantex, indicated that five significant objectives were not met."
"The DNFSB staff reviewed the Pantex and Albuquerque Operations Office After- Action Reports. The reports were superficial, and did not present a critical evaluation of the exercise. Specifically, the reports did not identify the many technical issues raised by the DNFSB staff."
Letter, Technical Director Cunningham to Mr. Whitaker, dated 04/10/94
[encl]Report on the Radiation Protection Case Study of the Dismantlement and Decontamination Project at the Old HB-Line
"although DOE and WSRC [Westinghouse Savannah River Company] admit the efforts in old HB-Line have significant worker risk, WSRC notes that no DOE-SR [Savannah River Operations Office] or DOE Headquarters personnel have actually been in the facility to observe operations. This lack of DOE line management and headquarters oversight attention indicates that DOE has not taken an active role in the resolution of the problems that have occurred."
"DOE and WSRC management have not taken an active role in the completion of the D&D [Decontamination and Decommissioning] of this facility. although the workers performing this D&D are at a significantly higher risk than are most other workers on the site, DOE and WSRC management personnel have not adequately reviewed the work that is being performed to determine what actions could be taken to reduce the risk, or to ensure that future D&D work at the SRS does not result in the same risks to the workers. Despite the fact that work can not be adequately monitored from outside the facility, DOE personnel have reportedly not entered the highly contaminated areas of the facility since the work began 10 years ago."
Letter, Technical Director Cunningham to Mr. Whitaker, dated 07/28/94
[encl]Trip Report for Staff Visit to NTS, April 28-29, 1993
"Key Personnel: The DOE TC [Test Controller] and Lab/DNA TD [Defense Nuclear Agency Test Director] play pivotal roles in coordinating safe and effective test preparation and execution. However, no definite training and qualification requirements were presented for these personnel, or for the members of the Containment Evaluation Panel (CEP). Many of the highly-experienced people currently filling these positions may soon retire. It is unclear how the current level of competence will be maintained without an established program to transfer experience. It is also unclear how competency is being uniformly maintained with the current incumbents."
Letter, Technical Director Cunningham to Mr. Whitaker, dated 08/10/94
[encl]Training, Qualification, and Conduct of Operations Review at the Fernald Environmental Management Project, April 11-13, 1994
"The DNFSB team reviewed DOE-FN's [Fernald Field Office's] actions associated with DNFSB Recommendation 93-3. It was found that the Field Office is waiting for Headquarters guidance with little action being taken to improve the technical capabilities of the staff."
"In response to Recommendation 91-1, DOE-FN has defined key personnel positions and set forth tentative education and experience recommendations for technical support, oversight and assessment positions. No data were available comparing these recommendations against the background of incumbents. The briefer indicated that no system existed to ensure these recommended requirements were adhered to in current hirings and in fact were frequently not met."
"... Concurrently, the Field Office had developed education, experience and required training for some DOE-FN management positions. As above, DOE-FN personnel expressed uncertainty in enforcing any new education and experience requirements in new hirings."
Letter, Technical Director Cunningham to Mr. Whitaker, dated 07/15/94
[encl]Report on Review of Hanford Facility Representatives Program
"Two Site Representative candidates were observed in the performance of their duties. Neither candidate demonstrated an integrated knowledge of their facility; nor a strong understanding of the concept of nuclear safety inspections. Neither candidate could answer specific questions concerning technical safety requirements (TSRs) for their facilities. One candidate was not familiar with the physical layout of his facility."
"... EM-25 [Office of Operations Assessment] noted that qualification cards were being developed and signed by individual candidates for their own qualification; DOE-RL [Richland Operations Office] personnel stated that the written and oral examination banks currently being used to qualify Site Representatives are inadequate.... Never-the-less, these banks are still being used...."
Letter, Chairman Conway to Secretary O'Leary, dated 05/11/94
[encl]Report on the Radiation Protection Program at the Hanford Site
"... the DOE [Richland Operations Office] contingent supporting Radiation Protection, previously noted by DOE-HQ to be inadequate in size to satisfactorily oversee contractor activities on a day-to-day basis, has not been augmented...."
Letter, Technical Director Cunningham to Mr. Whitaker, dated 04/10/95
[encl]Savannah River Site (SRS) - Review of Preparations for the Decontamination and Decommissioning (D&D) of the Separations Equipment Development (SED) Facility
"The development of the authorization basis for the SED [Separations Equipment Development] D&D [Decontamination and Decommissioning] project, including DOE approval, is less than adequate. There is little evidence that DOE-SR [Savannah River Operations Office] conducted an adequate technical review of the SED D&D safety analysis, including an assessment of technical assumptions, such as Pu release fractions."
Letter, Technical Director Cunningham to Mr. Whitaker, dated 07/15/94
[encl]Defense Waste Processing Facility Trip Report July 6-8, 1993
"... DOE qualification requirements for the position of Fire Protection Engineer are less than those established by the NRC [Nuclear Regulatory Commission]."
Letter, Technical Director Cunningham to Mr. Whitaker, dated 08/14/95
[encl]Trip Report - Review of the Department of Energy - Richland Operations Office (DOE-RL) Oversight of DOE Order 5480.21, Unreviewed Safety Questions, March 28, 1995
"The Board also noted a lack of monitoring and oversight of the USQ [Unresolved Safety Question] process by the Richland Operations Office [DOE-RL]. DOE-RL acknowledged these deficiencies and identified specific actions to correct them. Even so, during the eighteen months since these deficiencies were identified, little progress has been made in strengthening DOE-RL's monitoring and oversight of contractor USQ activities."
Letter, Chairman Conway to Assistant Secretary Grumbly, dated 09/08/95
[encl]Review of Procedures at the Hanford Site
"Richland Operations Office (DOE-RL) involvement in correcting the known Hanford Site procedure problem remains minimal, despite their own program indicating the problem persists."
Letter, Chairman Conway to Secretary O'Leary, dated 09/24/93
"Observations during these visits have led the Board to focus considerable attention on DOE's need to improve the selection, training, and qualification of personnel associated with the defense nuclear facilities, especially the weapons complex, on the premise that properly trained and qualified personnel are essential for the protection of public health and safety. The board has made eight sets of Recommendations since 1989 which address selection, training, and qualification problems...."