DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD


March 11, 1994


MEMORANDUM FOR:          G. W. Cunningham, Technical Director

COPIES:                  Board Members

FROM:                    Dan Burnfield

SUBJECT:                 Hanford Site Spent Fuel Storage Trip Report,
                         February 8-11, 1994

1.   Purpose:  On February 8-11, 1994, two Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety
     Board (DNFSB) members and a member of the DNFSB Staff visited the Hanford
     Site to review the status of actions to alleviate problems observed during
     previous trips by the DNFSB Staff (as well as those vulnerabilities
     recently identified by the Department of Energy (DOE) and Westinghouse
     Hanford Corporation (WHC)) regarding spent fuel storage.

2.   Summary:  The planned corrective action program for the K-East Basin spent
     fuel lacks clear direction from the DOE-Richland Operations Office (DOE-
     RL) and is in its infancy.  The Staff is concerned that the program lacks
     a system engineered basis and that aggressive action is not being taken to
     improve the many problems associated with the storage of spent fuel at the
     Hanford Site.  

3.   Background:  During reviews performed by the DNFSB Staff and DOE's Office
     of Environment, Safety and Health during 1993, several observations were
     made regarding the wet storage of spent nuclear fuel at the Hanford spent
     fuel storage basins. These observations were classified by DOE according
     to the degree of vulnerability each posed to the safety of the public, the
     worker, or the environment.   The purpose of this trip was to determine
     the status of actions taken at Hanford to alleviate the most serious
     vulnerabilities.  In this light, discussions centered on WHC activities at
     the K-East Basin, which was noted as having the most serious
     vulnerabilities (corrosion of fuel and the potential release of
     radionuclides from this facility to the environment).  The activities at
     the PUREX Basin, the T-Plant Basin and the dry storage locations were also
     discussed to determine what corrective actions are being considered at
     these facilities.

4.   Discussion:  As reported in the January 12, 1994 Staff report (forwarded
     to DOE via letter dated January 27, 1994), WHC has not taken a systems
     engineering approach to determine the best approach to resolve the
     problems associated with the storage of spent fuel at the K-East Basin.

     During this latest visit it was noted by the Staff that the apparent lack
     of a systems engineering approach is more of a concern than previously
     thought.  WHC's lack of an adequate training program and several conduct
     of operations concerns were identified in a Staff Report on Training and
     Qualification at the Hanford Site, dated December 22, 1994.  WHC is being
     driven by DOE to meet a commitment made to the State of Washington in the
     Tri-Party Agreement to begin encapsulation by June 1994.  Although DOE and
     WHC have been planning to encapsulate the fuel for four years, the actions
     required to successfully complete this operation are in their infancy. 
     Further, DOE had taken no real actions to ensure the successful completion
     of this project until ten days prior to the Board's visit, when a much
     stronger DOE-RL project office was established.  This organization
     mirrored a new organization set up by WHC on the same day. In discussions
     with the Board, DOE-RL and WHC acknowledged, however, that they had not
     used the systems engineering approach when forming these new
     organizations.  In fact, there was a strong indication in the structure of
     the organizations and the discussions about the organizations that the
     project organizations do not understand the systems engineering approach.

     As identified in the January report, it is not clear to the Staff that an
     adequate review has been completed to ensure that the encapsulation
     process is the best option available from an engineering and health and
     safety perspective.  

5.   Future Staff Actions:  The DNFSB Staff will continue to follow the
     activities at K-East Basin to provide the necessary corrective actions
     regarding spent fuel storage.  Future planned reviews include a review of
     the electrical systems and more detailed reviews of the programmatic
     aspects of the encapsulation project.