DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

March 28, 1997

Staff members Green, Ralston, Zavadoski and Zull were on-site this week to review a variety of topics including tank farm waste retrieval, cesium capsule integrity and storage, and B- Plant/WESF ventilation filter integrity.

A. Staff Review Highlights: During this week's staff review, the following issues were identified:

1. Canyon Endwall Integrity: Mr. Green identified that the B, T and U-Plant canyons all have unreinforced concrete endwalls. This makes them significantly weaker than the balance of the canyon. This raises questions over their impact on adjacent facility safety (i.e., falling on WESF) and their suitability for long-term waste storage/disposal.

2. Major Projects Planning: Mr. Zull's review prompted recognition that at least three major tank farm projects are being delayed (and their budgets overrun) by safety basis questions. The DOE practice of developing safety basis documentation in parallel with construction appears to merit reexamination.

3. Construction/Configuration Management: WESF management acknowledged that they have taken operational responsibility for a new basin water cooling system without having received the final as-built drawings or the labeling being complete (both are construction contract deliverables). This is another example of poor work completion of new construction projects at Hanford.

We are communicating these matters and related concerns to DOE management.

B. Bechtel Hanford, Inc. (BHI) Conduct of Operations: Recent occurrences in BHI activities at Hanford indicate a negative trend in worker safety. In the past two weeks, at least four off-normal occurrences took place that can be attributed to poor conduct of operations (inadequate maintenance, inadequate procedures, and poor procedural compliance). These incidents are summarized below.

1. On March 14th, the backup diesel generator for exhaust fans at REDOX failed its monthly test due to a dead battery. A maintenance worker had noted low specific gravity for the battery on February 27th, but no action was taken to service the battery.
2. On March 18th, a BHI rigger at N Basin who was operating the N Basin bridge crane, climbed over the safety railing and onto other installed equipment without fall protection. His actions were in clear violation of safety and fall protection procedures.
3. On March 21st, 100-DR remediation workers shipped hazardous waste to the Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility (ERDF) containing lead at concentrations more than twice the ERDF waste acceptance criteria. Poor shipping procedures and violation of procedures were the primary causes of this occurrence.
4. On March 25th, N Basin deactivation workers removing electrical conduit cut through an energized 240 volt line. No one was injured. The workers did not perform a lock-and-tag isolation of the system (as required by the work package) and signed a hold point in the procedure requiring electrical zero energy checks without performing the checks immediately prior to work (the zero energy checks were performed in Fall 1996!).

We are ensuring that DOE and BHI management are familiar with these events and of our concerns with their frequency and severity.

C. N Basin Tour: On March 27th, Mr. Ogg toured the N Basin with the DOE-RL facility representative, a BHI supervisor and several other DOE personnel. The group viewed the work area where an energized electrical conduit was cut (see above), observed a water clarity test, and conducted a general tour of the basin area. Observations are listed below.

1. The water clarity test consists of measuring the distance at which a light or fixed object becomes indistinguishable in the N Basin water. In the horizontal clarity test, a fixed steel beam near the bottom of the basin disappeared from view at distance of 64 inches. This test is conducted using a submerged video camera and television monitor. In the vertical test, a 500 watt light bulb in a small fixture disappeared from direct view (no camera) after being lowered from the surface of the basin to a depth of 54 inches. (The basin is 24 feet deep.)
2. The examination pit area of the basin is posted as an Airborne Radioactivity Area even though the work requiring the postings (cutting and grinding) was no longer in progress and normal access had been restored. Furthermore, the postings were placed where no engineered barriers existed (posted on handrails that surrounded the work area). It is not clear how other workers without respiratory protection would be protected from airborne contamination while in the N Basin area but outside of the handrails.

We are continuing to discuss our concerns at N Basin with DOE and BHI management. We are considering increasing our presence at N Basin significantly.

cc: Board Members