

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

September 10, 2004

TO: J. Kent Fortenberry, Technical Director
FROM: R. Todd Davis/Donald Owen, Oak Ridge Site Representatives
SUBJ: Activity Report for Week Ending September 10, 2004

- A. Enriched Uranium Operations Building Safety Basis. This week, BWXT submitted the Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) for this facility to YSO for approval. In their submittal BWXT notes that Administrative Controls included in the package will be evaluated and potentially change in light of Recommendation 2002-3 and the recently issued DOE Standard 1186, *Specific Administrative Controls*. The DSA submittal also identifies seismic deficiencies for this facility based on analysis completed in September 2003. BWXT plans to develop an upgrade plan by the end of this month to address the deficiencies. Following approval of the DSA (i.e., a YSO Safety Evaluation Report), facility implementation is expected to take approximately seven months.
- B. Response to Abnormal Condition. On Tuesday, the site reps. became aware from a YSO Facility Representative (FR) in the enriched uranium operations building that on the prior Friday portions of a casting assembly containing cast items had become stuck in the furnace and could not be removed via the normal method. The YSO FR noted that substantial effort was required to dislodge the casting assembly portions (completed late Friday). The site reps. inquired with YSO management on the matter including safety management/work planning for this removal task. Follow-up discussion with YSO and BWXT management identified the following: several hundred strikes from a rod inserted through a sight glass port in the furnace lid were employed to dislodge the stuck assembly portions; formal, specific hazard analysis and formal work instructions were not developed for the removal task; and, while a variety of technical and management personnel were involved in the response to the condition, required use of the building's Operational Safety Board to perform a formal review function of the work planning was not employed. Critique and investigation of the response is being undertaken by BWXT.
- C. Recommendation 93-6. In response to Board Recommendation 93-6, *Maintaining Access to Nuclear Weapons Expertise in the Defense Nuclear Facilities Complex*, Y-12 had developed and implemented the Knowledge Preservation Program from 1996 to 1997. This program would identify key supervisory, technical and management personnel, interview the individuals to draw out knowledge and experiences on various design and operational issues and document (or archive) that information for future use. The site reps. had inquired about actions under this program since initial implementation. BWXT and YSO personnel informed the site reps. this week that interviews/archiving actions were performed for approximately 230 individuals from an initial list of about 300, but that there are no indications that the program was continued past FY 1997 either in updating the list of personnel to be interviewed/archived or conducting additional interviews. BWXT personnel indicated that further investigation into this matter is planned.
- D. Oxide Conversion Facility. As reported on August 20th, BWXT had performed and concluded their line management Performance Self-Assessment prior to completion of a satisfactory integrated run (hydrogen fluoride loading through product canning). Since then, one integrated run deemed satisfactory by BWXT line management has been performed and another run performed this week is under review. As of this report, BWXT management intends to proceed with their General Manager's Review during the week of September 13th. Line management declaration of readiness and start of the BWXT Operational Readiness Review is still planned for September 20th.