DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

January 31, 1997

1. DNFSB Activity Summary: Harry Waugh was on site all week. Jim McConnell was present through Wednesday and spent Thursday and Friday at DOE/AL. Board Members Conway, Eggenberger, and Kouts, accompanied by Steve Krahn were here on Wednesday.

2. Issue Follow-Up:

a. Pantex Integrated Safety Task Team:The Pantex Integrated Safety Task Team held its second meeting on January 30-31. The team, comprised of representatives from DOE-HQ, DOE-AL, DOE-AAO, Mason and Hanger, LANL, LLNL, and SNL, is tasked with developing a process to integrate the various systems at Pantex currently used to assure safety. The processes and products used today at Pantex to analyze hazards, develop controls, approve authorization basis documents, and confirm readiness include SARs and TSRs (which focus on common attributes such as facilities), HARs, NESRs, and OSCs (which focus on unique attributes such as specific weapon systems), NES Studies, ORRs, and Safety Evaluations. DOE-NV has a representative on the team to identify those aspects of the integrated process that may be applicable to NTS.

The team chose to attack the task by first developing an ideal approach to integrated safety at Pantex based on the tenets of the Seamless Safety process. Once this idealized process is developed, the team intends to map the requirements of the current processes onto it to determine which current requirements should be retained, which should be eliminated, and what original requirements need to be developed. It appears that this effort, if successful, should produce the Mason and Hanger process-level S/RID for the nuclear explosive mission. Hopefully, the effort will also eventually result in (at a minimum) a rewrite of the DOE-AL Supplemental Directive on Safety of Nuclear Explosive Operations to codify the DOE and Design Agency responsibilities for integrated safety at Pantex. The team hopes to have a draft report of its revised process to the Management Team led by Gene Ives by the end of February.

b. B61 Mod 5 Receiving Inspection: As reported last week, a Nuclear Explosive Safety Rule requires that a receiving inspection be performed on the B61-5 to verify that the MC2969 Intent Strong Link Switch is in the safe (open) position. It was determined that this check can no longer be performed as intended because an internal connecting cable was removed as part of an alt performed in the field. This check can be performed if the tester is connected directly to the J2 Connecter on the Cover Plate of the Center Bomb. The necessary cables, procedures, and approvals are being prepared to allow performing the required test in an early stage of the dismantlement process in a Zone 12 Bay.

c. W79 Rocket Motor Testing: Preliminary results have been received from ARDEC on the tests performed on the propellant from one of the six W79 Rocket Motors sent to them. The 2-NDPA stabilizer level was reported to be 0.6%. This level is encouraging; well above the 0.2% level of concern. Results of the tests on the other five rocket motors should be available in the near future.

d. LINAC and Dynamic Balancer: A LINAC and Dynamic Balancer Restart Project Team has been formed at the direction of Kathy Carlson, Assistant Manager, National Defense Programs, DOE/AL. The team, composed of DOE, Mason & Hanger, and Design Agency personnel, is headed by Dave Finley, Director of the Nuclear Explosive Safety Division, DOE/AL. The team held their organizational meeting here on Thursday and will actually start their activity in Zone 12 on Tuesday February 4. The team estimates that it will take two to three weeks to complete its review. The goal is to restart the linacs by the end of February.

3. Additional Information:

a. Loss of Mason & Hanger Safety Personnel: As a result of the Voluntary Separation Incentive Program (VSIP), the Nuclear Explosive Safety and the Explosive Safety Departments are losing a total of nine people (six from Nuclear Explosive Safety and three from Explosive Safety) who have a total of 313 years of experience. This does not include the recent departure of the Nuclear Explosive Safety Department manager who has gone to work for LANL. At the present time there is no mechanism in place that will allow M&H to make use of these people on a case by case basis.

4. Future Activities:

1. February 4-28 - W69 Dismantlement NESS
2. February 11 - W80 NESS Revalidation begins
3. February 17 - W87 WPRR begins
4. March 3 - W87 Safety Evaluation for Production begins
5. March 25 - W79 MC3395 Removal begins (change)
6. May 15 - M&H AT-400A Corporate ORR begins (estimate by reliable source)
7. June ? - DOE AT-400A ORR (tentative, based on conclusion of M&H ORR)