DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

December 20, 1996

Randy Robinson, Joe Roarty, Lisa Jellett, and David Drop were onsite reviewing the H-Canyon safety envelope. Rich Tontodonato and Dominic Napolitano were onsite discussing implementation of Recommendation 96-1 and the HLW Tank Farm safety basis.

Functional Classification of SSCs at SRS - DOE-SR has expressed some concern with the WSRC functional classification of structures, systems and components (SSCs). DOE-SR has been considering various improvements, including:

1. Requiring WSRC to demonstrate that accidents have been mitigated to a fraction (probably 10%) of the current evaluation guidelines used by WSRC,
2. Requiring a barrier analyses approach in which all barriers to accidents are identified and are assigned an importance (regardless of whether evaluation guidelines are met),
3. Requiring something like a 6430.1A approach in which certain functions (ventilation, glovebox, radiation monitoring, etc.) are automatically classified as safety class or safety significant regardless of whether evaluation guidelines are met.

DOE-SR has been discussing their concerns with EH-31 (cognizant organization for 5480.21/22/23), but there is not clear direction on this matter.

Impact of ITP on DWPF Flowsheet and Canister Production - About 5,950 glass canisters are currently expected to be produced from the high level waste at SRS. This is based on each canister containing 900 gallons of 10 weight-% precipitate (from ITP) and 800 gallons of washed sludge (from ESP). Based on these loadings and the amount of tank waste, about 650 canisters will have to contain only radioactive sludge (with the precipitate being simulated). Therefore, current DWPF operation under a sludge-only flowsheet is not creating additional canisters. Only if ITP cannot support delivery of precipitate feed to DWPF within approximately 3 years (i.e., after 650 canisters of sludge-only glass) will sludge-only operation result in additional canisters..

Consolidated Incineration Facility Oral Boards - The site reps observed the oral boards for a CIF Control Room Operator (in training). The three Board members included the Engineering Manager, Training Manager, and an Assistant Operations Manager. A DOE Facility Representative was also in attendance.

The operator failed the oral boards. As a result, an action plan will be developed to provide remedial training and the individual will be given up to two more opportunities to pass his oral boards. A shift manager (in training) also failed the oral boards. The site reps will track CIF training and qualification to determine whether this situation continues, and whether a Board staff review of training, qualification, and conduct of operations is merited.

cc: Board Members.