Hand delivered

March 27, 1990

Honorable James D. Watkins
Secretary of Energy
Washington, DC 20585

Dear Mr. Secretary:

On March 27, 1990, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, in accordance with Section 312(5) of Public Law 100-456, approved a number of recommendations which are enclosed for your consideration.

Section 315(A) of Public Law 100-456 requires the Board, after receipt by you, to promptly make these recommendations available to the public in the Department of Energy's regional public reading rooms. Please arrange to have these recommendations placed on file in your regional public reading rooms as soon as possible.

The Board will publish these recommendations in the Federal Register.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

John T. Conway
Chairman

Enclosure
RECOMMENDATION TO THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
pursuant to Section 312(5) of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.

Dated: March 27, 1990

During the visit of members of the Defense Nuclear
Facilities Safety Board to the Hanford site on December 11-12,
1989, one of the topics discussed was the question of the
susceptibility of the old single shell high level waste tanks
to an explosion of a spontaneous nature, with resulting release
of large amounts of radioactive material to the environment.
This potential problem had been brought to the attention of the
Board during its confirmation hearing. The Board members
received a briefing on the subject during their visit and they
were later furnished additional relevant documents.

The Board subsequently obtained the assistance of three
highly qualified experts, who visited the Hanford site on
March 20-21, 1990, to explore questions that had surfaced through
its earlier reviews. The experts developed information on the
chemical contents of the tanks and the implications for the
possibility of a spontaneous explosive reaction. The experts
have now made their preliminary oral report to the Board.

As a result of these activities, the Board concludes that
the probability of an explosion in the old single shell waste
tanks is low. All evidence available indicates that the
conditions that might have contributed to a higher probability of
such an explosion were more prevalent in the past than they are
now, and these conditions are continuing to lessen as time
passes. The principal factor contributing to this moderating of
conditions is the reduction of the radiation field in the tanks
through radioactive decay of their active contents. This serves
to lower both the rate of ionization of the components of the
waste and the heat source that might elevate the temperature.

However, the Board does have some residual concerns
resulting from the uncertainty of information on the details of
composition of the contents of these tanks, the physical
conditions within them, and the recent information concerning
high levels of hydrogen in some of the double-walled waste tanks.
These concerns prompt the Board to recommend the following for
future programs for monitoring the single shell tanks:

• That a study be undertaken of the possible chemical
  reactions that could be the source of heat generation
  locally or globally in the single shell tanks, thereby
  elevating the temperature to a value where explosive
  ferrocyanide reactions can take place rapidly.
• That the Department of Energy develop a program for continuous monitoring of those conditions in the single shell tanks that can serve to indicate development of conditions indicating an onset of instability in their contents. These conditions might include such features as abnormal temperatures in local areas, physical deformation of the surface of the waste, or unusual components (including hydrogen) in the cover gas within the tanks.

• That the instruments used in monitoring the tanks be provided with alarm indicators at a location where decisions can be made and action taken to start a series of measures to neutralize a perceived abnormality.

• That an action plan be developed for the measures to be taken to neutralize the conditions that may be signaled by alarms.

The Board considers the matter of hydrogen generation in the double walled tanks to be potentially more serious than questions related to the single shell tanks, and is pursuing it separately.

[Signature]
John T. Conway, Chairman
SUMMARY:
The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board has made recommendations to the Secretary of Energy pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 2260a concerning DOE's single shell waste tanks at the Hanford Site, WA. This was published on November 3, 1990 (54 FR 48540).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On December 8, 1989, January 2 and February 16, 1990, the Committee for Purchase from the Blind and Other Severely Handicapped published notices (55 FR 5033, 55 FR 51 and 5046) of proposed additions to Procurement List 1990, which was published on November 3, 1990 (54 FR 48540).

After consideration of the material presented to it concerning capability of qualified workshops to produce the commodities and provide the services at a fair market price and impact of the addition on the current or most recent contractors, the Committee has determined that the commodities and services listed below are suitable for procurement by the Federal Government under 41 U.S.C. 46-48C and 41 CFR 51-2.6.

I certify that the following actions will not have a significant impact on a substantial number of small entities. The major factors considered for this certification were:

a. The actions will not result in any additional reporting, recordkeeping or other compliance requirements.

b. The actions will not have a serious economic impact on any contractors for the commodities and services listed.

c. The actions will result in authorizing small entities to produce the commodities and provide the services procured by the Government.

Accordingly, the following commodities and services are hereby added to Procurement List 1990:

**Commodities**

**Textiles, Wovens**
- 8410-01-234-0480
- 8410-01-234-0481
- 8410-01-234-0482
- 8410-01-234-0483
- 8410-01-234-0484
- 8410-01-234-0485

**Cloth, Wiping**
- 8522-12-N83-0490
- 8522-12-N83-0491
- 8410-01-234-0490

**Textiles, Non-Wovens**
- 8410-01-234-0491
- 8410-01-234-0492
- 8410-01-234-0493
- 8410-01-234-0494
- 8410-01-234-0495
- 8410-01-234-0496
- 8410-01-234-0497
- 8410-01-234-0498
- 8410-01-234-0499
- 8410-01-234-0500
- 8410-01-234-0501
- 8410-01-234-0502
- 8410-01-234-0503
- 8410-01-234-0504
- 8410-01-234-0505

**Supplementary Information:**

- **55 FR 5033, 55 FR 51 and 5046**
- **For further information contact:** Beverly Milkman (703) 557-1145

**Procurement List 1990 Proposed Additions**

**Agency:** Committee for Purchase from the Blind and Other Severely Handicapped.

**Action:** Proposed addition to procurement list.

**Summary:** The Committee has received proposals to add to Procurement List 1990 commodities to be produced by workshops for the blind or other severely handicapped.

**Comments Must Be Received On Or Before:** April 30, 1990.

**Address:** Committee for Purchase from the Blind and Other Severely Handicapped, Crystal Square 5, Suite 1107, 1755 Jefferson Davis Highway, Arlington, Virginia 22202-3509.

**For Further Information Contact:** Beverly Milkman (703) 557-1145

**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**

**USAF Scientific Advisory Board; Meeting**

March 29, 1990.

The USAF Scientific Advisory Board Ad Hoc Committee on Space Power Technology will meet on 17-18 April 1990 from 8:00 AM to 5:00 PM at Headquarters, Air Force Space Command, Peterson AFB, CO.

The purpose of this meeting will be to review Air Force, DOE, SDIO, DARPA, NASA and related industry R&D space power technology development efforts and to recommend the direction(s) of Air Force investment in this technology area. This meeting will involve discussions of classified defense matters listed in section 552(b)(6) of title 5, United States Code, specifically subparagraph (1) thereof, and accordingly will be closed to the public.

For further information, contact the Scientific Advisory Board Secretariat at (202) 673-6049.

Patsy J. Conner,
Air Force Federal Register Liaison Officer
[FR Doc. 90-7358 Filed 3-29-90; 8:45 am]

55 FR 5033, 55 FR 51, 5046
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Kenneth M. Pusateri, at the address above or telephone 202/376-5083, (FTS) 976-5083.

Dated: March 27, 1990.

Kenneth M. Pusateri,
Acting Executive Director.

During the visit of members of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board to the Hanford site on December 11-12, 1989, one of the topics discussed was the question of the susceptibility of the old single shell high level waste tanks to an explosion of a spontaneous nature, with resulting release of large amounts of radioactive material to the environment. This potential problem had been brought to the attention of the Board during its confirmation hearing. The Board members received a briefing on the subject during their visit and they were later furnished additional relevant documents.

The Board subsequently obtained the assistance of three highly qualified experts, who visited the Hanford site on March 20-21, 1990, to explore questions that had surfaced through its earlier reviews. The experts developed information on the chemical contents of the tanks and the implications for the possibility of a spontaneous explosive reaction. The experts have now made their preliminary oral report to the Board.

As a result of these activities, the Board concludes that the probability of an explosion in the old single shell waste tanks is low. All evidence available indicates that the conditions that might have contributed to a higher probability of such an explosion were more prevalent in the past than they are now, and these conditions are continuing to lessen as time passes. The principal factor contributing to this moderating of conditions is the reduction of the radiation field in the tanks through radioactive decay of their active contents. This serves to lower both the rate of ionization of the components of the waste and the heat source that might elevate the temperature.

However, the Board does have some residual concerns resulting from the uncertainty of information on the details of composition of the contents of these tanks, the physical conditions within them, and the recent information concerning high levels of hydrogen in some of the double-walled waste tanks. These concerns prompt the Board to recommend the following for future programs for monitoring the single shell tanks:

* That a study be undertaken of possible chemical reactions that could be the source of heat generation locally or globally in the single shell tanks, thereby elevating the temperature to a value where explosive ferrocyanide reactions can take place rapidly.

* That the Department of Energy develop a program for continuous monitoring of those conditions in the single shell tanks that can serve to indicate development of conditions indicating an onset of the impulsiveness in their contents. These conditions might include such features as abnormal temperatures in local areas, physical deformation of the surface of the waste, or unusual components (including hydrogen) in the cover gas within the tanks.

* That the instruments used in monitoring the tanks be provided with alarm indicators at a location where decisions can be made and action taken to start a series of measures to neutralize a perceived abnormality.

* That an action plan be developed for the measures to be taken to neutralize the conditions that may be signaled by alarms.

The Board considers the matter of hydrogen generation in the double-walled tanks to be potentially more serious than questions related to the single shell tanks, and is pursuing it separately.

John T. Conway, Chairman.

Appendix—Transmittal Letter to the Secretary of Energy

Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
Hand Delivered
March 27, 1990


Dear Mr. Secretary:

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The Board will publish these recommendations in the Federal Register.

Sincerely,

John T. Conway
Chairman.

Enclosure

[FR Doc. 90-7377 Filed 3-29-90; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6420-KD-M

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Office of the Secretary

Foreign Assistance; Determination

Pursuant to section 515(c)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 relating to overseas management of assistance and sales programs, and in accordance with the authority delegated by Executive Order 12163 and redelegated on February 12 and February 24, 1972, to the Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency, or in his absence, the Deputy Director of that agency, the Acting Director, Glenn A. Rudder, has determined that United States national interests require more than six members of the Armed Forces be assigned under section 515 of that Act to carry out international security assistance programs in Bolivia, and therefore waive the limitation that the number of members of the Armed Forces assigned to Bolivia under section 515 of that Act may not exceed six unless specifically authorized by Congress.

The increase from three to eight in the total number of military personnel authorized for the U.S. Military Group, Bolivia, shall be effective thirty days after the date on which this determination is reported to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.


L.M. Bynum, Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, Department of Defense.

[FR Doc. 90-726; Filed 3-29-90; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 3810-01-M

Defense Science Board Task Force on Acquisition Streamlining: Meeting Change

ACTION: Change in date of advisory committee meeting notice.


Linda M. Bynum, Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, Department of Defense.

[FR Doc. 90-726 Filed 3-29-90; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 3810-01-M