December 19, 1991

The Honorable James D. Watkins  
Secretary of Energy  
Washington, D.C. 20585

Dear Mr. Secretary:

On December 19, 1991, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, in accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 2286a(5), approved Recommendation 91-6 which is enclosed for your consideration. The Board is aware that the Department has just proposed rules in the Federal Register concerning Radiation Protection for Occupational Workers. 56 Fed. Reg. 64334 (Dec. 9, 1991). Recommendation 91-6 deals with radiation protection issues throughout the DOE defense nuclear facilities complex.

42 U.S.C. § 2286d(a) requires the Board, after receipt by you, to promptly make this recommendation available to the public in the Department of Energy's regional public reading rooms. The Board believes the recommendation contains no information which is classified or otherwise restricted. To the extent this recommendation does not include information restricted by DOE under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2161-68, as amended, please arrange to have this recommendation promptly placed on file in your regional public reading rooms.

The Board intends to publish this recommendation in the Federal Register.

Sincerely,

John T. Conway  
Chairman

Enclosure
RECOMMENDATION TO THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2286a(5)
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.

Dated: December 19, 1991

The Board and its staff have conducted extensive reviews of radiation protection programs at Department of Energy (DOE) Headquarters and several DOE sites in the defense nuclear facilities complex. In particular, the Savannah River Site (SRS) health and radiological protection programs have been reviewed on several occasions.

After an inquiry into worker exposures to tritiated water from a moderator water spill at the site, the Board transmitted a report to the Secretary of Energy on May 31, 1991, which reviewed the management and radiation protection issues, as well as other factors that DOE and its contractor identified as root causes of the spill. Before completion of that report, the Board had directed its staff to continue review of technical radiation protection issues that had been surfaced during the inquiry. In October, 1990, the Board’s staff reviewed the SRS radiation protection program, which is included by SRS within what are commonly referred to as Health Protection (HP) program and Health Physics program. Board staff conducted follow-up reviews in February and April, 1991. Staff reports based on the October, 1990, and February, 1991, trips were provided to DOE’s Defense Programs personnel in letters from the Board dated November 1, 1990, and June 10, 1991, respectively. In its transmittal letter of June 10, 1991, the Board indicated it was giving consideration to the possibility of developing recommendations to the Secretary of Energy in the radiation protection area after further Board review.

On June 20, 1991, representatives from DOE’s Defense Programs, the DOE Savannah River Site Special Projects Office, and the operating contractor at SRS briefed the Board and its staff on radiation protection program issues. As a follow-up to that briefing, the Board conducted a site visit at SRS in July, 1991. During that visit, Board Members interviewed SRS HP personnel and supervisors.

The most recent Board staff assessment of DOE’s radiation protection program and the operating contractor’s HP program at SRS occurred during the period September 27 through October 10, 1991. The Board’s staff reviewed relevant documents, attended briefings and discussions with DOE and operating contractor personnel at DOE Headquarters and at SRS, and observed selected evolutions at reactor and non-reactor facilities.

Other independent organizations and committees have documented required improvements in DOE’s radiation protection program, including the Institute for Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) in December 1990, the Advisory Committee on Nuclear Facility Safety in section 5 of its final report dated November 13, 1991, and the final DOE Operational Readiness Review (ORR) team in its report for Savannah River’s K-reactor dated November, 1991.
Primarily as a result of these assessments at Savannah River, but also because of other reviews at Rocky Flats Plant and elsewhere in the defense nuclear facilities complex, the Board has found a need for increased DOE attention in five major areas: (1) DOE management and leadership in radiation protection programs; (2) radiation protection standards and practices at defense nuclear facilities; (3) training and competence of Health Physics technicians and supervisors; (4) analysis of Reported Occurrences and correction of radiation protection program deficiencies; and (5) understanding and attention to radiation protection issues by individuals in DOE and its contractor organizations.

Therefore, the Board recommends that:

1. The Secretary of the Department of Energy expeditiously issue a formal statement of the Department's radiological health and safety policy. Among the subjects that should be considered for inclusion are:

   a. The goals of the Department's radiation protection program.

   b. Potential sources of guidance and bases for the radiological protection standards adopted by, or to be adopted by, DOE.

   c. A reaffirmation, by the Secretary of Energy, of DOE's full commitment to the "As Low As Reasonably Achievable" (ALARA) principle for both occupationally exposed personnel and the general public, which emphasize the various commitments to radiological protection contained elsewhere in DOE rules, orders, and other requirements.

2. DOE review existing radiation protection training programs, and develop and implement a plan for an expanded training program that includes consideration of the following elements:

   a. Comparison with guidance on training contained in "Guide to Good Practice in Radiation Protection Training," Training Resources and Data Exchange (TRADE) Oak Ridge Associated Universities (ORAU) 88/4-99 and "Guidelines for Training and Qualification of Radiological Protection Technicians," Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), INPO 87-088. While the Board does not necessarily endorse all of the guidance contained in these documents, it believes they are important sources of professional and commercial information on training which can be productively used by DOE in identifying improvements for DOE's programs.

   b. Delineation of the level of knowledge, skills, abilities, and other qualifications necessary for each generic radiation protection personnel position within the DOE complex, based on professional and industry standards and guidance. This should include association and/or interaction with professional health
physics organizations such as the Health Physics Society and American Board of Health Physics certification for appropriate professionals.

c. Determination of the current level of knowledge of radiation protection managers, professionals, supervisors, and technicians, by means of written, oral, and practical examinations.

d. Delineation of the existing and supplemental training necessary to ensure that radiation protection personnel meet the qualifications of their respective positions.

e. Evaluation of individuals after supplemental training to ensure that they meet the qualifications for their positions.

f. Continuing radiation protection training requirements and retention testing.

g. Delineation of existing and supplemental training for workers, contractors, and subcontractors, other than radiation protection personnel, necessary to ensure adequate radiation protection for those workers.

3. The Department critically examine its existing infrastructure for radiation protection program development and implementation at DOE Headquarters to determine if resource, organizational, or managerial changes are needed to (a) emphasize the priority and importance of the radiation protection program to assuring public health and safety; (b) communicate the importance of the radiation protection program from the highest level of management to all appropriate Department personnel; (c) expand the radiation protection program and increase program resources to facilitate the rapid development and implementation of radiological protection standards throughout the defense nuclear facility complex; and (d) make other changes as are warranted.

4. The Department examine the corresponding radiation protection organizational units at DOE's principal Operations and Field Offices and DOE contractor organizations to determine if those organizations' radiation protection programs' infrastructure, responsibilities, and resources can be strengthened to expedite implementation of radiological protection standards. A critical aspect of DOE's review should be an assessment of management's involvement and effectiveness in implementing radiation protection programs and management's ability to communicate the steps to be taken to implement an effective radiation protection program to all levels within relevant DOE and contractor units, particularly within line organizations.

5. DOE focus its efforts relating to reporting of occurrences to enhance the usefulness of the Occurrence Reporting (OR) system as a tool for enhancing radiological health
and safety at DOE facilities, by emphasizing determination of root causes and management follow-up of lessons learned.

6. DOE compare (a) its operating contractor practices and procedures, and (b) DOE radiological protection standards with the guidance used by other government, commercial, and professional organizations. The documents which DOE should use for this study and comparison include, at a minimum, those listed in the attachment to this recommendation. While the Board does not necessarily endorse any of the listed documents in their entirety, it believes they are important sources of government, commercial, and professional opinion on radiological protection standards, procedures, and practices. As such, they serve as valuable tools for identifying improvements needed in DOE's programs.

7. After completion of the study recommended in item 6, DOE identify any supplemental measures that are necessary or appropriate to compensate for the differences identified between practices which conform to the guidance enumerated above and actual operating contractor practices; and between standards and procedures listed and DOE standards and procedures for radiation protection at defense nuclear facilities.

John T. Conway, Chairman
ATTACHMENT

1. 29 CFR 1910 "Occupational Safety and Health Standards"

2. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulatory Guides Division 8 Series "Occupational Health"

3. NUREG-0041 "Manual of Respiratory Protection Against Airborne Radioactive Materials"


9. Other relevant commercial or private standards and practices, including NCRP publications.
CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION

Notification of Request for Approval of Collection of Information, Compliance Survey of the Bicycle Industry

AGENCY: Consumer Product Safety Commission.

ACTION: Notice.

SUMMARY: In accordance with provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. chapter 35), the Consumer Product Safety Commission has submitted to the Office of Management and Budget a request for approval through September 30, 1992, of a collection of information in the form of a survey of firms which manufacture or import bicycles. The purpose of this survey is to assess the over-all level of compliance with regulations which establish safety requirements for bicycles (16 CFR 1500.18(b), (12) and part 1512). These regulations were issued under provisions of the Federal Hazardous Substances Act (15 U.S.C. 1261, 1261) to eliminate or reduce unreasonable risks of death or serious personal injury associated with bicycles. The regulations are applicable to bicycles introduced into interstate commerce after May 11, 1976, and establish safety requirements for the frame, wheels, front fork, brakes, reflectors, and other components of a bicycle. The survey of the bicycle industry is part of a comprehensive plan to assess compliance by regulated industries with 70 rules enforced by the Commission. The Commission will use the information obtained from the survey of the bicycle industry to establish priorities for enforcement of mandatory standards and regulations which the Commission administers. Information obtained from this survey will also be used to support appropriate legal action against any firm which has manufactured or imported bicycles failing to comply with the requirements of the bicycle safety regulations.

ADDITIONAL DETAILS ABOUT THE REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OF A COLLECTION OF INFORMATION


Title of information collection: Survey of Compliance with the Requirements for Bicycles in 16 CFR 1512.

Type of request: New request.

Frequency of collection: One time.

General description of respondents: Manufacturers and importers of bicycles.

Estimated number of respondents: 65.

Estimated average number of hours per response: 0.8.

Estimated number of hours for all respondents: 50.

Comments: Comments on this request for extension of approval of information collection requirements should be addressed to Elizabeth Harker, Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503; telephone: (202) 385-7340.

Copies of the request for extension of information collection requirements are available from Frances Shacter, Office of Planning and Evaluation, Consumer Product Safety Commission, Washington, DC 20207; telephone: (301) 504-0418.

This is not a proposal to which 44 U.S.C. 3509(h) is applicable.


Sadie E. Dunn,
Secretary, Consumer Product Safety Commission.

[FR Doc. 91-3091 Filed 12-30-91; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4160-01-M

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

[Recommendation 91-6]

Radiation Protection for Workers and the General Public at DOE Defense Nuclear Facilities

AGENCY: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.

ACTION: Notice; recommendation.

SUMMARY: The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board has made a recommendation to the Secretary of Energy pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 2286a concerning radiation protection for workers and the general public at DOE defense nuclear facilities. The Board requests public comments on this recommendation.

DATES: Comments, data, views, or arguments concerning this recommendation are due on or before January 27, 1992.

ADDRESSES: Send comments, data, views, or arguments concerning this recommendation to: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, 625 Indiana Avenue, NW, suite 700, Washington, DC 20004.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Kenneth M. Puateri or Carole J. Council, at the address above or telephone (202) 226-6400.


John T. Conway,
Chairman.

Radiation Protection for Workers and the General Public at DOE Defense Nuclear Facilities


[Recommendation 91-6]

The Board and its staff have conducted extensive reviews of radiation protection programs at
Department of Energy (DOE) Headquarters and several DOE sites in the defense nuclear facilities complex. In particular, the Savannah River Site (SRS) health and radiological protection programs have been reviewed on several occasions.

After an inquiry into worker exposures to irradiated water from a moderator water spill at the site, the Board submitted a report to the Secretary of Energy on May 31, 1991, which reviewed the management and protection issues, as well as other factors that DOE and its contractor identified as root causes of the spill. Before completion of that report, the Board had directed its staff to continue review of technical radiation protection issues that had been surfaced during the inquiry. In October, 1990, the Board's staff reviewed the SRS radiation protection program, which is included by SRS within what are commonly referred to as Health Protection (HP) programs and Health Physics programs. Board staff conducted follow-up reviews in February and April, 1991. Staff reports based on the October, 1990, and February, 1991, trips were provided to DOE's Defense Programs personnel in letters from the Board dated November 3, 1990, and June 10, 1991, respectively.

In its transmittal letter of June 10, 1991, the Board indicated it was giving consideration to the possibility of developing recommendations to the Secretary of Energy in the radiation protection area after further Board review.

On June 20, 1991, representatives from DOE's Defense Programs, the DOE Savannah River Site Special Projects Office, and the operating contractor at SRS briefed the Board and its staff on radiation protection program issues. As a followup to that briefing, the Board conducted a site visit at SRS in July, 1991. During that visit, Board Members interviewed SRS HP personnel and supervisors.

The most recent Board staff assessment of DOE's radiation protection program and the operating contractor's HP program at SRS occurred during the period September 27 through October 10, 1991. The Board's staff reviewed relevant documents, attended briefings and discussions with DOE and operating contractor personnel at DOE Headquarters and at SRS, and observed selected evolutions at reactor and nonreactor facilities.


Primarily as a result of these assessments at Savannah River, but also because of other reviews at Rocky Flats Plant and elsewhere in the defense nuclear facilities complex, the Board has found a need for increased DOE attention in five major areas: (1) DOE management and leadership in radiation protection programs; (2) radiation protection standards and practices at defense nuclear facilities; (3) training and competence of Health Physics technicians and supervisors; (4) analysis of Reported Occurrences and correction of radiation protection program deficiencies; and (5) understanding and attention to radiation protection issues by individuals in DOE and its contractor organizations.

Therefore, the Board recommends that:

1. The Secretary of the Department of Energy expediteously issue a formal statement of the Department's radiological health and safety policy. Among the subjects that should be considered for inclusion are:
   a. The goals of the Department's radiation protection program.
   b. Potential sources of guidance and bases for the radiological protection standards adopted by, or to be adopted by, DOE.
   c. A reaffirmation, by the Secretary of Energy, of DOE's full commitment to the "As Low As Reasonably Achievable" (ALARA) principle for both occupationally exposed personnel and the general public, which emphasizes the various commitments to radiological protection contained elsewhere in DOE rules, orders, and other requirements.
   2. DOE review existing radiation protection training programs, and develop and implement a plan for an expanded training program that includes consideration of the following elements:
      a. Comparison with guidance on training contained in "Guide to Good Practice in Radiation Protection Training," Training Resources and Data Exchange (TRADE) Oak Ridge Associated Universities (ORAU) 80/4-99 and "Guidelines for Training and Qualification of Radiological Protection Technicians," Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), INPO 87-086. While the Board does not necessarily endorse all of the guidance contained in these documents, it believes they are important sources of professional and commercial information on training which can be productively used by DOE in identifying improvements for DOE's programs.
   b. Determination of the level of knowledge, skills, abilities, and other qualifications necessary for each generic radiation protection personnel position within the DOE complex, based on professional and industry standards and guidance. This should include association and/or interaction with professional health physics organizations such as the Health Physics Society and American Board of Health Physics certification for appropriate personnel and managers.
   c. Determination of the current level of knowledge of radiation protection managers, professionals, supervisors, and technicians, by means of written, oral, and practical examinations.
   d. Design of the training and supplemental training necessary to ensure that radiation protection personnel meet the qualifications of their respective positions.
   e. Evaluation of individuals after supplemental training to ensure that they meet the qualifications for their positions.
   f. Continuing radiation protection training requirements and retention testing.
   g. Design of existing and supplemental training for workers, contractors, and subcontractors, other than radiation protection personnel, necessary to ensure adequate radiation protection for those workers.
   h. The Department critically examine its existing infrastructure for radiation protection program development and implementation at DOE Headquarters to determine if resource, organizational, or managerial changes are needed to (a) emphasize the priority and importance of the radiation protection program to assuring public health and safety; (b) communicate the importance of the radiation protection program from the highest level of management to all appropriate Department personnel; (c) expand the radiation protection program and increase program resources to facilitate the rapid development and implementation of radiological protection standards throughout the defense nuclear facility complex; and (d) make other changes as are warranted.
   4. The Department examine the corresponding radiation protection organizational units at DOE's principal Operations and Field Offices and DOE contractor organizations to determine if those organizations' radiation protection programs' infrastructure, responsibilities, and resources can be strengthened to expedite implementation of radiological
protection standards. A critical aspect of DOE’s review should be an assessment of management’s involvement and effectiveness in implementing radiation protection programs and management’s ability to communicate the steps to be taken to implement an effective radiation protection program to all levels within relevant DOE and contractor units, particularly within line organizations.

5. DOE focuses its efforts relating to the reporting of occurrences to enhance the usefulness of the Occurrence Reporting (OR) system as a tool for enhancing radiological health and safety at DOE facilities, by emphasizing determination of root causes and management follow-up of lessons learned.

6. DOE compares (a) its operating contractor practices and procedures, and (b) DOE radiological protection standards with the guidance used by other government, commercial, and professional organizations. The documents which DOE should use for this study and comparison include, at a minimum, this list in the attachment to those recommendations. While the Board does not necessarily endorse any of the listed documents in their entirety, it believes they are important sources of government, commercial, and professional opinion on radiological protection standards, procedures, and practices. As such, they serve as valuable tools for identifying improvements needed in DOE’s programs.

7. After completion of the study recommended in item 6, DOE identify any supplemental measures that are necessary or appropriate to compensate for the differences identified between practices which conform to the guidance enumerated above and actual operating contractor practices; and between standards and procedures listed and DOE standards and procedures for radiation protection at defense nuclear facilities.

John T. Conway
Chairman

Attachment

1. 29 CFR part 1910 “Occupational Safety and Health Standards”.

Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), INPO 88–010
9. Other relevant commercial or private standards and practices, including NCRP publications.

Appendix—Transmittal Letter to the Secretary of Energy


The Honorable James D. Watkins, Secretary of Energy, Washington, DC 20585.

Dear Mr. Secretary: On December 19, 1991, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, in accordance with 42 U.S.C. 2260a, approved Recommendation 91–6 which is enclosed for your consideration. The Board believes that the Department has just proposed rules in the Federal Register concerning Radiation Protection for Occupational Workers. 52 FR 34343 (Dec. 9, 1991). Recommendation 91–6 deals with radiation protection issues throughout the DOE defense nuclear facilities complex.

42 U.S.C. 2260a(a) requires the Board, after receipt by you, to promptly make this recommendation available to the public in the Department of Energy’s national public reading rooms. The Board believes the recommendation contains no information which is classified or otherwise restricted. To the extent this recommendation does not include information restricted by DOE under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. 2161–89, as amended, please arrange to have this recommendation promptly placed on file in your regional public reading rooms.

The Board intends to publish this recommendation in the Federal Register.

Sincerely,

John T. Conway
Chairman

Summary: The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board has made a recommendation to the Secretary of Energy pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 2260a concerning power limits for K–Reactor Operation at the Savannah River Site.

The Board requests public comments on this recommendation.

Oates: Comments, data, views, or arguments concerning this recommendation are due on or before January 27, 1992.

Address: Send comments, data, views, or arguments concerning this recommendation to: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, 625 Indiana Avenue, N.W., suite 700, Washington, DC 20004.

For further information contact: Kenneth F. Pugel or Carol J. Council, at the address above or telephone (202) 204–6400.


John T. Conway
Chairman.

Power Limits for K–Reactor Operations at the Savannah River Site


The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (the Board) has been conducting an ongoing review of the bases and criteria for the operational plans for the K–reactor at the Savannah River Site. These plans currently include limitation of the power of the reactor to 30 percent of the historical full power, or to approximately 200 megawatts (MW).

The information reviewed has been provided to the Board in numerous briefings and documents, including the Savannah River K–Production Reactor Safety Analysis Report (WSRC-SA–10003).

The Board concluded on the basis of this information that operation of the K–reactor at a power level not exceeding 30 percent of the nominal historical maximum power would impose no undue risk to public health and safety assuming that all other improvement measures established as necessary for startup have been completed and effectively implemented. In this connection, the Board has been coordinating with DOE’s staff and some of its outside experts at the Savannah River Site during the period of reactor start to monitor the activities during restart and initial power ascension of the K–reactor with the initial reactor configuration. Information in the K–14–1 Core Operations Report (September, 1991) and some of the Reactor Operations Management Plan (ROMP) closure

[Recommendation 91–5]

Power Limits for K–Reactor Operation at the Savannah River Site

Agency: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

ACTION: Notice; recommendation.

[Recommendation 91–5]