Board staff member P. Meyer was onsite to attend the Consortium for Risk Evaluation with Stakeholder Participation (CRESP) workshop on vessel testing for the Waste Treatment Plant.

**Plutonium Finishing Plant.** Workers decontaminating a tank in the South Canyon Airlock stopped work and exited the area when they smelled a chemical odor while performing housekeeping activities near a tank with indications of past leakage. Five workers, who were wearing respirators without chemical cartridges when the event occurred, were medically evaluated and returned to work without restrictions. The contractor held an effective critique and is evaluating corrective actions. Based on the information obtained during the critique, the contractor suspects the cleanup work activated residual chemicals from the previous leakage.

**Sludge Treatment Project (STP).** The staff and Site Reps reviewed the SER that provides conditional approval of the STP PDSA (see Activity Report 2/6/2015) and noted that some aspects of the document do not fully comply with DOE standards for review and approval of safety basis documents. The observations were discussed with RL senior managers who agreed to follow-up on the concerns.

**Tank Farms.** The contractor is required to perform annual flow testing for double-shell tank primary ventilation systems. They determined flow testing performed last year used an instrument which is not approved for use with tanks capable of large spontaneous gas releases. The contractor determined this instrument is acceptable and is further evaluating the situation.

The contractor issued their implementation plan to address the recommendations issued by the Tank Vapor Assessment Team (see Activity Report 11/7/2014). Contractor management has started briefing the workforce on the plan which will address all recommendations.

**Fire Protection.** The Mission Support Contractor and Central Plateau Contractor, with input from other operating contractors performed a value engineering study on inspection, testing and maintenance (ITM) of fire protection systems. This study was a part of the corrective actions from an improper exit of a Limiting Condition of Operation discovered October last year at the Central Waste Complex (see Activity Report 10/17/2014). The study participants had a number of recommendations to improve the ITM process including standardizing ITM procedures and datasheets, field validating procedures, and consistent interpretation of the NFPA ITM standard among the site contractors.

**Site-Wide Risk Review.** The CRESP Site-Wide Risk Review Project Core Team (see Activity Report 6/20/2014) met with key stakeholders to discuss changes to the risk evaluation approach that resulted from previous interactions with the stakeholders.

**Nuclear Safety.** The site rep attended training sessions on DOE-STD-3009-2014 and DOE-STD-1104-2014. DOE headquarters personnel provided this beneficial training which was attended by personnel from the three local DOE site offices and most of the contractors.