DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

October 24, 2014

MEMORANDUM FOR: S.A. Stokes, Technical Director **FROM:** R.K. Verhaagen and J.W. Plaue

SUBJECT: Los Alamos Report for Week Ending October 24, 2014

DNFSB Staff Activity: On Tuesday, D.J. Campbell and R.C. Eul presented their observations on work planning and control to site management.

Field Office: On Monday, the field office reported to NNSA Headquarters the quarterly status on the Technical Qualification Program and associated staffing needs. The analysis, performed in accordance with DOE Order 426.1, *Federal Technical Capability*, indicates an overall staffing capability shortfall of 28. This shortfall includes two Senior Technical Safety Managers, four Nuclear Safety Specialists, six Facility Representatives, one Safety System Oversight engineer, and three Quality Assurance engineers. NNSA is currently allocating staffing based on the Capabilities Based Field Office model, which remains conceptual. As a result, the field office currently has only 11 authorized vacancies.

Emergency Management: Early this month, LANL issued the after action report for the annual full-scale exercise (see 8/29/14 weekly). Their findings included: (1) direct communication between facility incident command and the fire department was never established, (2) the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) was assumed to initially be habitable; however, modeling later showed it to be within the plume and protective actions were not re-evaluated, and (3) field office public affairs was not represented. They also identified 12 opportunities for improvement, including the following of note: (a) additional radiological controls experts should be trained as controller/evaluators, (b) the Emergency Manager needs to communicate protective actions using actionable geographical reference points rather than distances, (c) the full screen monitor in the EOC needs repair, (d) the EOC needs more than one information technology support person, and (e) Los Alamos Medical Center warrants improvements with training on protocols and communications between the decontamination room and emergency room.

Plutonium Strategy: Last Thursday, the NNSA Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs issued a memorandum to the Field Office Manager and LANL Director requesting an analysis to examine the potential to increase the radioactive material inventory in the Radiological Laboratory Utility Office Building (RLUOB) to up to 400 g of Pu-239 equivalent. The analysis is to consider RLUOB as a Hazard Category 3 nuclear facility and is to examine impacts on safety, cost, and schedule. The Deputy Administrator expects results within five months.

Confinement Vessel Disposition (CVD) Project: This week, CVD personnel completed cleanout and robotic wire brushing of the first confinement vessel of the project. Project personnel intend to perform activities to de-mate the glovebox and robotic arm, as well as performing neutron assay of the cleaned out sphere, prior to shipment to Area G for final processing for disposition.

Plutonium Facility–Resumption Activities: The Red Team review of Safety Management Programs (SMP) concluded Friday. The team reported 41 issues and concluded that the programs are generally technically sound, but require improvements in implementation. The most significant of the identified issues concluded that the criticality safety SMP required significant attention, in particular with the development of compliant criticality safety evaluations.