MEMO TO: Steven Stokes, Technical Director  
FROM: Thomas Spatz, Pantex Site Representative  
SUBJECT: Pantex Plant Report for Week Ending January 2, 2015

Pause in Operations due to Tooling Issue: Consolidated Nuclear Security, LLC (CNS) paused operations in one facility when the Production Technicians (PTs) could not uncouple a cart from the work stand. The PTs placed the facility in a safe and stable configuration and made the appropriate notifications. CNS nuclear and explosive safety, safety analysis engineering, and process engineering personnel confirmed that the facility was in a safe and stable configuration. CNS tooling engineers discovered that two of the four casters were 4” casters, when the design drawing calls for 5” casters. CNS noted that all dimensions on the cart are measured from the base plate where the casters are fastened, and that the cart could have passed a dimensional inspection with the wrong size casters. CNS has inspected all fifteen copies of this cart and found this copy to be the only cart with 4” casters. This was the first time this copy of the cart was used for nuclear explosive operations. CNS is investigating why the cart was approved for use with the wrong size casters.

Failure to Perform Electro-Static Dissipative (ESD) Flooring In-Service Inspection (ISI): While performing an extent-of-condition review following the missed ISI for one safety-class hoist, CNS discovered they had also missed the ISI annual inspection for one safety-class ESD floor. (See report for 11/28/2014.) CNS performed the ISI on the ESD floor in this facility and the floor passed the ISI.

CNS uses the facility management function of the Enterprise Supply Management System (ESMS) as the primary system to track surveillance requirements, ISIs, and other maintenance orders. The ESMS automatically generates a work order 45 days before the due date for all surveillance requirements and ISIs in the system. CNS found three of the ESD floors did not have the planned maintenance setup in the ESMS, and would not have automatically generated the work order to perform the ISI. CNS Facility Representatives use a backup system to track surveillance requirements, ISIs, and other maintenance orders, called the Facility Status Board. Two of the three facilities not setup in ESMS, were on the Facility Status Board. CNS believes that these two ISIs would have been caught by the Facility Representatives prior to the ISI grace period being expired. There was only one facility, mentioned above, with a credited safety-class ESD floor where the ISI was not setup in ESMS, was not on the Facility Status Board, and was not performed on time. CNS discovered two additional facilities where the ESD floor ISI was not setup in ESMS, was not on the Facility Status Board, and was not performed on time. However, CNS does not yet credit the ESD flooring design feature in the safety basis for these two facilities.

High Pressure Fire Loop (HPFL) Weather Related Events: The Emergency Services Dispatch Center has received several low temperature signals from both of the new HPFL pump houses. During the worst outside ambient temperature of 4.4 °F, the Fire Department recorded a diesel pump room temperature of 42.4 °F, a diesel pump suction temperature of 41.9 °F, an electric room temperature of 49.2 °F, and an electric pump suction temperature of 40.4 °F. The last time these weather-related alarms were observed was during start-up activities of the new pump houses. (See report for 2/7/2014.)