

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

March 14, 2025

**TO:** Technical Director  
**FROM:** Los Alamos Site Resident Inspectors  
**SUBJECT:** Los Alamos Activity Report for the Week Ending March 14, 2025

**Weapons Engineering Tritium Facility (WETF)–Utilities:** Last Thursday, a wind event caused loss of power when a tree fell onto a powerline. The emergency backup generator started and supplied power to the facility during the outage. Triad utility crews were able to restore power to WETF after approximately three hours. The power outage did not impact any work or cause any safety issues.

**Utilities:** Prior to last Thursday's wind event, the Public Service Company of New Mexico notified the laboratory that one of the two redundant power lines supplying the site would be de-energized as a preventive action to reduce wildland fire risk. Triad utilities management was prepared for this contingency and no safety issues occurred on site due to the utility's action.

**Site Communications:** On Tuesday, damage to an offsite communications cable caused network and telecommunications disruptions onsite. Triad nuclear facilities had minimal impacts, and the Emergency Operations Center maintained communications capabilities. However, N3B lost external network connectivity and most telephone communications as it relies on Los Alamos County communications infrastructure. Area G Operations Center personnel physically located all work groups in Area G and ensured only crews with functional radios remained in the area. Facility management subsequently suspended all operations in Area G as a further precaution as the outage continued.

**Chemistry Metallurgy and Research (CMR)–Radiological Control:** On Monday, facility workers discovered that several of their booties were contaminated while self-monitoring. A radiological control technician responded, determined the contamination was limited to the booties, and cleared the individuals after removing the booties. No further contamination spread occurred due to this condition. Due to a communications error, CMR Operations Center personnel had left the facility at the end of their scheduled work shift, approximately 30 minutes prior to the event being resolved. The responding technician satisfactorily covered the contamination event, but the lack of communication during the response could have resulted in minimal or delayed support if required. CMR management intends to provide additional guidance to facility staff including clarifying what reporting, response actions, staffing levels, and notifications are needed for contamination events.

**Area G–Criticality Safety:** On Monday, N3B personnel identified that they had moved sealed sources using a new procedure prior to implementing the nuclear criticality safety evaluation for said activity. The move, which occurred last December, complied with the not-yet-implemented criticality safety controls. The discovery occurred as personnel are preparing to implement the new documented safety analysis for Area G. Management paused further moves of sources until the criticality safety evaluation could be implemented and began evaluating procedure release processes.