DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

TO :	Technical Director
FROM:	Hanford Site Resident Inspectors
SUBJECT:	Hanford Activity Report for the Week Ending March 7, 2025

Central Waste Complex: After determining that the current criticality safety evaluation report is inapplicable for a large waste box in the outside storage area (see 2/28/2025 report), nuclear safety personnel entered the potential inadequacy into the safety analysis screening process to further determine whether existing safety basis controls are adequate for the discovered condition.

Capsule Storage Area (CSA): CPCCo initiated its contractor operational readiness review (CORR) for the CSA. As part of the review, the CORR team observed demonstrations of cask transfer operations to and from the CSA. The team plans to complete their review next week and submit a final report in early April.

West Area Risk Management (WARM): The DOE Principal Deputy Assistant for Environmental Management approved Critical Decision 1, *Approve Alternative Selection and Cost Range*, for the WARM project. The WARM project will provide the capability to remove cesium and suspended particulate from low-activity tank waste located in Hanford Site's 200 West Area tank farms. DOE intends to ship the treated waste offsite for permanent disposal in grout form.

Low-Activity Waste (LAW) Facility: After repairing previously identified leaks (see 12/27/2024 report), contractor personnel safely filled both ammonia reagent system storage vessels. The facility process uses the anhydrous ammonia to treat nitrogen oxides in the melter offgas prior to its release to the environment. Together, the tanks hold several thousand gallons of ammonia, which represents a significant new chemical hazard at the Waste Treatment Plant site. Plant management intends to start the flow of ammonia into the LAW Facility this coming week in preparation for processing nitrated simulant in the melters to support ongoing testing.

324 Building: The CPCCo emergency preparedness organization conducted a drill at the 324 Building, which simulated a seismic event that caused a partial collapse of the 324 Building resulting in a worker injury. A resident inspector observed the drill, noting that the scenario was sufficiently challenging and that facility personnel effectively responded to the event. He also noted that the drill team's evaluation of the response was critical but fair. During the response, facility personnel frequently demonstrated practical decision-making skills to resolve problems. Additionally, the resident inspector observed that response team performance of contamination control at the cold area boundary and fire-fighter equipment doffing were improved compared to previous observations at this facility. However, first-aid treatment and support for the injured worker were deficient, and the transport of the individual to a medical facility was not timely. Lastly, the Building Emergency Director and Incident Commander chose to collocate the Incident Command Post with the Field Emergency Response Organization at the scene. This resulted in some command-and-control overlap, which can cause confusion.