DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

August 15, 2025

TO: Technical Director
FROM: Los Alamos Site Resident Inspectors
SUBJECT: Los Alamos Activity Report for the Week Ending August 15, 2025

Plutonium Facility–Safety Basis: Last week, the NNSA Field Office submitted formal comments to Triad on the Plutonium Facility's new Documented Safety Analysis (DSA), developed using DOE-STD-3009-2014. Triad submitted the revised DSA to the field office for review in May 2025, and the Field Office requested that changes be made and resubmitted to them for review by December 2025.

Plutonium Facility–Glovebox Safety: On July 23, a glove breach occurred in the Plutonium Facility while workers were moving a heavy object to prepare it for removal and disposal. Triad size-reduced the object in situ and moved one of the pieces across multiple trolley connections before unloading it at the final glovebox prior to bag-out. When the operator removed their hands from the box, they detected contamination on their personal protective equipment. There was no skin contamination, and nasal swabs had no detectable activity. During the subsequent fact-finding meeting, the contractor concluded that the object was moved properly, and workers had adequately considered the risks of alternative approaches. Meeting attendees discussed the challenges of decommissioning work involving large and heavy objects, especially when the options for safe removal are limited. The weight and size of the object were likely the main cause of the tear in the glovebox glove; Triad's glovebox safety team will continue working with the programmatic group to identify if any enhancements can be made to prevent reoccurrence.

Ion Beam Facility: Resident inspectors visited the facility with personnel from APTIM, the contractor, and the Environmental Management Field Office. The contractor is performing final radiological categorization of the facility and remediating hazardous materials such as asbestos in preparation for demolition, expected to start within the next year. The primary radiological contamination concerns are low-energy beta emitters.

Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Building (CMR): Last week, resident inspectors performed a routine walkdown of Wings 5 and 7 of CMR. They observed excessive combustible loading in several areas. In one room, combustibles were co-located with gas lecture bottles of dubious provenance. They also found a fire barrier door left open and another that did not close correctly. They provided these observations to Facility Operations Management.

Transuranic Waste Facility (TWF): A resident inspector joined Triad management on a routine facility walkdown of the waste storage buildings at TWF. During the walkdown, one of the managers paused work on a forklift movement of transuranic waste drums. The spotter for the forklift was not wearing a high-visibility vest or safety shoes. The worker obtained the appropriate attire, and management allowed the movement to resume. Use of spotters at TWF is part of the Vehicle and Equipment Safety Management Program in the Safety Basis.

Waste Characterization Reduction and Repackaging Facility: Operations personnel paused work on a ventilation system surveillance after a facility operator discovered the Lockout/Tagout (LOTO) tags had been misapplied. The operator caught the issue during a routine peer check prior to anyone being exposed to hazardous energy. A management review determined this to be an example of the LOTO peer check process working as intended.