

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

August 15, 2025

TO: Technical Director
FROM: Pantex Plant Resident Inspectors
SUBJECT: Pantex Plant Activity Report for Week Ending August 15, 2025

Fire Alarm Receiving System (FARS): This week, the resident inspectors attended the first causal analysis meeting for a recent inadvertent loss of FARS (see 7/25/2025 and 8/1/2025 reports). PXD identified that after encountering an issue during scheduled maintenance, a PXD fire protection engineer (FPE) returned FARS to its original configuration and performed only a partial post-maintenance test of the system to exit the applicable limiting condition for operations (LCO). The PXD FPE explained that a full post-maintenance test was not needed since they returned the system to its original state. Last year, PFO approved the removal of both the surveillance requirement for the FARS and its designation as a safety-credited support system. A surveillance requirement is listed in the Technical Safety Requirements and is required to ensure compliance with the associated LCO, which is often used as the post-maintenance test to prove system operability. Additionally, the PXD FPE performed troubleshooting activities on FARS without requesting a separate work order, re-entering the LCO, or completing post-maintenance testing. PXD personnel noted that FARS is no longer credited in the safety basis as a support system to the safety-class fire suppression systems. However, the resident inspectors noted two sections within safety basis documents that still list FARS as being required to support safety-class administrative controls. In response, PXD safety analysis engineers stated that they are evaluating whether safety basis change packages are necessary. PXD plans to hold another meeting to continue discussions, and to develop causal factors and corrective actions.

Qualification Board: This week, a resident inspector attended an oral board for the initial qualification of a candidate PXD production section manager for a certain weapon program. This examination focused on various fields of knowledge in which a production section manager is required to maintain proficiency.

Implementation Verification Review (IVR): Last month, PXD discovered that an incomplete IVR was conducted for a safety basis change. The IVR was incomplete because it did not include the associated implementation document for the compensatory measures. During the subsequent fact-finding meetings, PXD noted that the readiness to proceed (RTP) memo did not mention the implementing document and had the sections for control owners, compensatory measures, training, and revised implementing documents marked “N/A.” After the RTP memo was issued, when the IVR began, reviewers were unaware of the implementation document (see 7/18/2025 report). This week, PXD conducted the second part of a causal analysis for this event, which a resident inspector attended. During this part of the causal analysis, PXD personnel discussed potential actions to prevent recurrence, which included updating the RTP and IVR templates, defining potentially subjective terms, updating training curricula for RTP and IVR authors, and formalizing a kickoff meeting between the RTP and IVR teams. The resident inspector noted several, more robust preventive actions were proposed—and reemphasized—during the discussion but not documented in the causal analysis record. These actions included formalizing requirements for what is included in RTPs and IVRs, and clarifying expectations based on how the documents are used by different groups.