

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

September 19, 2025

**TO:** Technical Director  
**FROM:** Pantex Plant Resident Inspectors  
**SUBJECT:** Pantex Plant Activity Report for Week Ending September 19, 2025

**Staff Activity:** This week, the Board's cognizant engineer for the Pantex Plant was on site to attend a fact-finding meeting, receive a briefing on upcoming changes to readiness assurance processes, and provide resident inspector support.

**Prohibited Use Procedure:** This week, PXD convened a fact-finding meeting for an event in which a PXD quality manager identified that a *prohibited use procedure* had been utilized by technicians to qualify shipping containers for special nuclear material. Months prior to this event, PXD process engineering had conducted a validation of a new revision of the associated procedure. The PXD personnel involved in this effort used copies of the unreleased revision to verify that the procedure was adequate to direct the operations. These documents were designated as *prohibited use procedures* and had large, red capital letters printed along the sides of each page. Earlier this month, prior to starting actual operations, a PXD technician scanned the barcode on the front of one of these procedures and received notification on the computer that the procedure was the correct revision. The technicians completed the operations, and forwarded the completed paperwork to their production supervisor, who also overlooked the *prohibited use* markings. The following week, a PXD quality manager discovered the error during a subsequent quality hold point.

Prior to convening the fact-finding meeting, PXD operations personnel paused special nuclear material operations until a brief was provided to all technicians on the importance of proper pre-operational checks, limitations associated with *prohibited use procedures*, and expectation for clearing the facility of all such procedures when not in use. Additionally, PXD has required additional training for the technicians and supervisor involved in this event, prior to performing any further operations. Furthermore, PXD personnel concluded there were no differences between the *prohibited use* and production use revisions. During the fact-finding meeting, PXD participants questioned the presence of the procedure within the facility since the validation efforts occurred months prior to this event. Other PXD personnel did not agree that this warranted a gap, stating there is no current requirement to remove them following procedure validation. Of note, PXD documentation states that a gap may exist whether the undesirable condition is currently addressed by a requirement or not. Additionally, participants questioned why the barcode on a *prohibited use procedure* would scan as if it could be used for production activities. PXD also did not capture this as a gap requiring action.

**Facility Engineering:** Last week, PXD facility engineering personnel discovered that after upgrading a facility for explosives-only operations, the contractor did not follow site requirements to enter the facility structure into the configuration management program (see 9/12/2025 report). In the fact-finding meeting, PXD personnel stated the structure was the only required feature of the facility not captured in the configuration management program. PXD stated that not all documentation may have been provided for the associated implementation verification review for this change, which may have contributed to this occurrence.