

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

December 5, 2025

**TO:** Technical Director  
**FROM:** Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Cognizant Engineer  
**SUBJECT:** INL Report for November 2025

**DNFSB Staff Activity.** The cognizant engineer held weekly meetings to maintain awareness of site activities, including attending event fact-finding, management reviews, integrated project team reviews, and facility plan of the day meetings. The DNFSB staff did not conduct any on-site activities in November.

**Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Project (AMWTP) – Waste Drum Structural Integrity Inspections and Training.** On November 13, 2025, AMWTP operations personnel completed the training titled *Waste Drum Structural Integrity Inspections and Training*. Idaho Environmental Coalition (IEC) created this training to address ongoing waste drum corrosion issues and relevant issues of structural integrity. While conducting a field oversight walkdown in January 2025, DOE Facility Representatives and AMWTP contractor personnel observed a severely corroded Sludge Repackaging Project (SRP) waste drum. The Facility Representatives identified concerns regarding the adequacy of training for handling compromised drums and subsequently discussed them with AMWTP management. In response, AMWTP management developed this training to identify issues and to address the handling, storage, and risk mitigation measures for degraded waste drums.

**Idaho Cleanup Project – Potential Inadequacy of the Safety Analysis (PISA).** On September 16, 2025, AMWTP personnel declared a PISA due to the presence of dichloroacetylene gas in a certified SRP container (see INL Monthly for October 2025). They suspended SRP waste shipments to WIPP pending further evaluation. AMWTP personnel subsequently conducted an analysis that resulted in a negative Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) determination and documented additional technical details in a white paper issued on October 22, 2025, titled *Dichloroacetylene Formation in ICP Drum Headspace*. This supported the resumption of shipments of SRP waste to WIPP on October 23, 2025. The DNFSB staff is engaging with site management to better understand this issue and its resolution.

**Idaho Nuclear Technical and Engineering Center (INTEC)/Irradiated Fuel Storage Facility (IFSF) PISA.** On November 24, 2025, operators at IFSF raised a criticality safety concern regarding whether lighting-access doors in the fuel storage area and the ventilation-system shelter building provide adequate personnel shielding in the event of criticality accident event. These access doors, located at the top of the north exterior wall of the IFSF, are opened when lighting is replaced. The criticality safety team reviewed the concern and performed additional analysis, determining that the shielding is not adequate even when the doors are closed. Additionally, calculations identified an inadequacy in the previously completed hazard analysis, which did not identify this area as susceptible to potentially high radiation doses. Based on this information, the IFSF nuclear facility manager declared a PISA and documented it as a criticality safety noncompliance. Subsequently, IEC personnel completed a positive USQ determination on November 25, 2025, and implemented compensatory measures, which include expanding the areas of prohibited occupancy identified in the facility safety basis and supporting documents.