

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

February 6, 2026

**TO:** Technical Director  
**FROM:** Hanford Site Resident Inspectors  
**SUBJECT:** Hanford Activity Report for the Week Ending February 6, 2026

**DNFSB Staff Activity:** D. Brown and B. Sharpless were onsite observing the Hanford Generator Site Technical Review. This review is conducted in preparation for site certification to ship transuranic waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant.

**Tank Farms:** In 2021, the Board issued TECH-48, *Hanford Tank Farms Safety Basis Review*. In this review the Board found that the Tank Farms Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) was based on a dated methodology and lacked sufficient documentation to support its conclusions regarding risk to the workers and the public from hydrogen combustion events in waste tanks. The Board also found that the analysis for seismic events did not meet the level of rigor set out in DOE Standard 3009-1994, *Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analyses*. Consequently, the Board was concerned that the DSA did not provide DOE with sufficient information to accurately assess the consequences of accidents that could affect the public and encouraged DOE to update the safety analysis methodology concurrent with bringing the DSA into compliance with the 2014 revision of Standard 3009. H2C is in the process of updating the Tank Farms DSA to the revised standard. However, the Board's concerns in TECH-48 were not addressed in the revision plan. Given this, the resident inspectors (RI) discussed this gap with HFO personnel. HFO noted that they are encouraging H2C to expand the DSA revision project's level of effort to include necessary technical improvements. Additionally, the RIs met with H2C nuclear safety personnel to review the issues outlined in TECH-48. They listened to and understood the Board's technical position and agreed to consider inclusion of additional work to address the issues documented in TECH-48 but noted that action would need HFO concurrence. HFO subsequently communicated to the resident inspectors that they expect the H2C upgrade to address TECH-48 content.

**Low Activity Waste (LAW) Facility:** An RI observed an emergency preparedness drill simulating an ammonia leak, followed by a fire alarm that triggered an evacuation of the LAW annex and relocation of the incident command post (ICP). During the drill, a lack of cell phone and radio reception impeded the facility representative and incident commander from effectively communicating. WTCC personnel stated that working landline phones were the only requirement for an alternate ICP, so the lack of reception had not been anticipated.

**Effluent Management Facility (EMF):** While performing maintenance on radiologically contaminated pumps in the EMF, workers used a long hose to vent and flush the pump. After work completion, they attempted to drain the hose manually and then secured the ends with absorbent pads, bags, and tape. Contaminated fluid then leaked out of the hose ends into the radiological buffer area. The resident inspector observed a post-job meeting for the activity. Meeting participants noted that the procedure did not specify techniques to reduce the hazards of draining the contaminated fluid, and workers did not understand the limitations of taping systems to contain liquid over time. Operations and radiological control personnel are investigating work planning improvements and the use of best industry practices for future work.