

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

February 6, 2026

**TO:** Technical Director  
**FROM:** Oak Ridge Resident Inspectors  
**SUBJECT:** Oak Ridge Activity Report for Week Ending February 6, 2026

**Building 9720-82:** A resident inspector attended an event investigation on expired lithium-ion batteries in the special nuclear material vehicle (SNMV). CNS failed to complete preventive maintenance to replace installed lithium-ion batteries within the required seven-year periodicity as stated in the fire hazards analysis. The basis for the seven-year replacement is to prevent a fire that would occur due to a thermal runaway event caused by excessive discharge cycles. During the investigation, CNS identified maintenance work orders that accounted for replacement of the batteries, but a subsequent physical inspection found that some of the batteries had not been replaced since 2018. After the physical inspection, the operations manager placed both SNMVs containing lithium-ion batteries on hold due to a lack of confidence in the maintenance paperwork. The resident inspector discussed the safety basis implications of exceeding the required maintenance periodicity with the facility safety chief engineer and whether this battery hazard was bounded by an analyzed hazard event in the facility safety analysis report. Based on the information review, the resident inspector does not have any outlying safety basis or ignition source concerns with the use of these batteries. CNS is evaluating replacement for the expired batteries since the original make and model is no longer available. In addition, CNS currently has no available vehicles to transport special nuclear material due to other maintenance issues. To remedy this situation, CNS is currently working on a non-conformance report that will enable use of the vehicles with the expired batteries for a maximum of six months while replacement batteries can be procured. The engineering justification for continued use will likely leverage data showing the low discharge cycles of the existing batteries as a basis for CNS to accept the risk of continued use of the existing batteries for up to six months.

**Low Equity Vehicle (LEV):** CNS received startup authorization from YFO to commence operations with the LEV. During the federal readiness assessment (FRA), the FRA team identified one pre-start and one post-start finding (see 12/5/2025 report). For the post-start finding, the FRA team identified a deficient emergency notification system (ENS). CNS took actions to repair the existing system in Building 9720-5, test the ENS across the site to identify further deficiencies, and verify the accuracy of existing compensatory measures where they are required for issues with the system. The FRA team wrote the pre-start finding on CNS's inadequate response to abnormal conditions during drills and interviews. CNS responded to the finding by briefing personnel on the correct responses to emergency actions, and further evaluating training for abnormal operations. During the first attempt at a material transfer involving the LEV, material handlers in Building 9720-5 paused the shipment request when the paperwork needed to verify the content of containers was not available as required by the procedure. These actions show that while there were some issues with readiness, workers are maintaining a good questioning attitude when it comes to procedural compliance with normal operations involving the activity.