

FY 2027  
Congressional  
Budget Justification



Defense Nuclear  
Facilities Safety Board

February XX, 2026

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The President's Budget Request for the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board<sup>1</sup> or DNFSB) is \$45 million and 120 full-time equivalents (FTEs) for FY 2027.

The budget request of \$45 million represents no change from the FY 2026 President's Budget Request and represents the Board's<sup>1</sup> commitment to enhancing nuclear safety within the weapons production complex, given the NNSA's significant planned increases in weapons production and weapons refurbishment into the future. To protect defense nuclear facilities, workers, the public, and the Nation's critical weapons production capability, it is imperative that DNFSB carry out its mission of safety oversight and that its activities keep pace with significantly increased NNSA activities. Weapons production can only continue if it is done safely, and DNFSB's oversight functions strengthen public confidence in the safety and security of our Nation's nuclear weapons production infrastructure.

Under the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954, as amended, the Board is charged with providing independent safety oversight of DOE's defense nuclear facilities complex. The mission of the complex is to design, manufacture, test, maintain, and decommission nuclear weapons and weapons production facilities, as well as other national security priorities. The AEA mandates that the Board review the content and implementation of DOE standards, facility and system designs, and events and practices at DOE defense nuclear facilities to provide independent analysis, advice, and recommendations to inform the Secretary of Energy regarding issues of adequate protection of public health and safety at DOE defense nuclear facilities.

DNFSB carries out its critical nuclear safety responsibility through inspection processes, reviews of operations, reviews of DOE requirements and standards and their implementation, reviews of design, construction and decommissioning activities, and reviews of DOE's safety oversight of its defense nuclear operations.

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<sup>1</sup> When referenced in this document, "Board" indicates the five-member, Presidentially appointed and Senate confirmed Board who by statute, exercises authorities delineated in 42 United States Code (USC) § 2286a(b).

Congress granted the Board a suite of statutory tools to carry out its mission. Principal among these is the Board's authority to issue formal recommendations to the Secretary of Energy. Upon acceptance, the AEA requires the Secretary to write and execute an implementation plan for all accepted recommendations that address the safety issues identified by the Board. The Secretary must report any rejection of a formal Board recommendation to the relevant Congressional committees, and this process takes place on the public record.

In addition to recommendations, the Board is empowered to hold public hearings, conduct investigations, and issue reporting requirements to DOE regarding safety issues, which are both sent and responded to on the public record. DNFSB has been and continues to be a valuable nuclear safety investment for the U.S. government. The following are recent examples of these critical activities in FY 2025:

- As a result of Board Recommendation 2019-1, *Uncontrolled Hazard Scenarios and 10 CFR 830 Implementation at the Pantex Plant*, NNSA addressed numerous legacy nuclear safety issues at the Pantex Plant (the defense nuclear facility responsible for the assembly, disassembly, and refurbishment of the nation's nuclear weapons). These safety improvements included upgrading facility infrastructure: for example, the replacement of ceilings in facilities where nuclear explosives are built and taken apart, minimizing the potential for debris to fall on nuclear explosives and cause an explosion. NNSA also added safety controls designed to prevent accidental high explosive detonation and worker loss of life across weapon programs. In January 2025, based on the safety improvements completed to date by NNSA, the Board closed Recommendation 2019-1 but identified some remaining safety issues on the B61 weapon program requiring further action. NNSA plans to formally respond to these safety concerns in 2025.
- The DNFSB identified cast iron fittings in new deluge fire suppression systems for two nuclear explosive cells at the Pantex Plant. Cast iron fittings generally have poor seismic performance, and failure can result in an impaired or mechanically damaged fire suppression system after an earthquake. The DNFSB identified a similar safety concern at Los Alamos National Laboratory in 2016. In a letter dated April 9, 2024, the Board advised DOE to communicate the safety issue

complex-wide to raise awareness and understand the extent of condition. In response, DOE issued an operating experience program document to the complex in January 2025. Following its release, the DNFSB reviewed fire suppression specifications for design and construction projects to identify projects that did not specifically prohibit cast-iron fittings. Upon DNFSB's inquiry, NNSA found that cast-iron fittings were part of the design at the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility (SRPPF). The SRPPF contractors removed the cast-iron fittings from the design. As a result of DNFSB safety oversight, the issue was identified early, prior to installation, which averted a more costly safety issue if identified later.

- The DNFSB identified a safety concern with the use of large format lithium-ion batteries in the new uninterruptible power supply for the Device Assembly Facility at the Nevada National Security Site. This system presents inherent safety risks related to the difficulty in suppressing and extinguishing lithium-ion battery fires. However, DOE had neither issued requirements nor provided guidance to assess the hazards and identify safety controls necessary for the use of lithium-ion energy storage systems. The Board issued a reporting requirement on August 13, 2024, requesting that DOE brief the Board on its plans to develop or adopt requirements and provide guidance on hazard analysis and controls for lithium-ion battery energy storage systems at defense nuclear facilities. In response, DOE issued an operating experience summary, February 2025, *Consideration of Lithium-Ion Battery Hazards in DOE Nuclear Facilities*, to assist the DOE community in understanding expectations for new systems in nuclear facilities and took actions to improve safety at the Device Assembly Facility.

The global security environment has become more precarious than the United States anticipated in the post-Cold War era. Nuclear competition among the Great Powers persists. While the NNSA's Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program has successfully maintained the safety, security, and effectiveness of the legacy nuclear stockpile, and the nuclear platforms and systems are continuously upgraded for operational readiness, modernization can no longer be delayed.


The nuclear deterrent requires constant vigilance and investment to keep pace with evolving threats. Modernization of our nuclear capabilities is now a strategic imperative, not merely an option. Failure to act risks ceding ground to our rivals and upsetting the delicate balance of global security. However, any

modernization efforts must be undertaken with the utmost priority placed on safety and risk mitigation. A deliberate and pragmatic approach to modernization, underpinned by rigorous safety protocols, is vital to preserving the credibility, reliability, and responsible stewardship of our nation’s nuclear deterrent in the years to come. In this critical endeavor, the role of the DNFSB in providing independent safety oversight and expertise will be invaluable in ensuring the safety and integrity of DOE’s nuclear modernization program.

The President’s Budget Request for FY 2027 will allow DNFSB to continue delivering on its safety mission to the American taxpayer in the most efficient and cost-effective manner.

The following chart provides a summary of the FY 2027 President’s Budget Request of \$45 million.

**Figure 1. Summary of FY 2027 Budget Request**



## REQUEST SUMMARY

**Table 1.** *FY 2027 Budget Request Summary (\$ in millions)*

<b>FY 2025 Actual</b>	<b>FY 2026 President’s Budget</b>	<b>FY 2027 Request</b>
\$42.6	\$45.0	\$45.0

The FY 2027 President’s Budget Request for DNFSB is \$45 million and 120 FTEs. This request represents no change from the FY 2026 President’s Budget. This funding level allows DNFSB to keep pace with NNSA’s significantly increased weapons production schedule and to effectively protect workers, the public, and the Nation’s critical weapons production capability.

## MISSION AND STAFFING REQUEST

### **Mission**

DNFSB is solely focused on the safety of defense nuclear facilities operated by the Department of Energy (DOE) that are covered by the Atomic Energy Act (AEA). The Board’s enabling statute, 42 United States Code (USC) § 2286a(b), delineates its functions.

DNFSB carries out its critical nuclear safety responsibility through inspection processes, reviews of operations, reviews of DOE requirements and standards and their implementation, reviews of design, construction and decommissioning activities, and reviews of DOE’s safety oversight of its defense nuclear operations.

Congress granted the Board a suite of statutory tools to carry out its mission. Principal among these is the Board’s authority to issue formal recommendations to the Secretary of Energy. The AEA requires the Secretary to write and execute an implementation plan for all accepted recommendations that addresses the safety issues identified by the DNFSB. In the case of a rejection, the Secretary must report it to the relevant congressional committees. This process takes place on the public record. In addition to recommendations, the Board is empowered to hold public hearings, conduct investigations (and subpoena witnesses, if necessary), obtain information and documents from DOE and its contractors

when requested, and issue reporting requirements regarding safety issues to DOE, which are sent and responded to on the public record.

### **Staffing**

DNFSB must provide safety oversight of defense nuclear facilities in alignment with DOE's modernization efforts, while ensuring that it has the necessary capabilities to support effective Agency operations, which requires sufficient highly qualified staffing and resources.

In establishing the Board, Congress sought to bring the best talent available to focus on health and safety oversight associated with the design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of DOE's defense nuclear facilities. The recruitment and retention of scientific and technical staff with outstanding qualifications are the key components in DNFSB's human capital strategy.

DNFSB has assembled a small and highly talented technical staff with extensive backgrounds in science and engineering disciplines, such as nuclear-chemical processing, conduct of operations, general nuclear safety analysis, conventional and nuclear explosive technology and safety, storage of nuclear materials, nuclear criticality safety, and radioactive waste management. Most of the technical staff have master's degrees in technical disciplines, and many earned doctoral degrees. Many of DNFSB's technical staff members possess practical nuclear experience gained from duty in the U.S. Navy's nuclear propulsion program, the nuclear weapons field, or the civilian nuclear power industry. To accomplish its highly technical mission, DNFSB must effectively recruit and retain a highly qualified staff and receive funds to meet the salary and benefit requirements of the staff.

Safety oversight of nuclear weapons operations requires a high degree of competence in specific, difficult-to-recruit science and engineering fields to effectively evaluate the safety of operations at DOE's defense nuclear weapons facilities. As new facilities and weapons production capabilities come online at an increasing pace, the responsibilities of the DNFSB technical team have increased significantly. It is imperative that DNFSB maintain its technical personnel resources and capabilities to keep up with NNSA's aggressive weapons production schedule and modernization efforts to enable adequate protection of the public and workers. DNFSB's safety oversight role helps to protect the U.S.

national security posture by strengthening public confidence in the safety and security of our Nation’s nuclear weapons production infrastructure.

The 120 FTEs in this FY 2027 budget request includes an estimated 80 FTEs in the Office of the Technical Director (67% of the workforce). This will allow the DNFSB to retain critical technical subject matter expertise needs, maintain field oversight, and support the continued development of staff trained in the oversight of nuclear weapons production. Current key fields of subject matter expertise on the technical staff that will be maintained at this staffing level are fire protection, emergency management, explosives, and ventilation. In addition, the budget request would support maintaining resident inspectors at five priority nuclear sites. Resident inspectors regularly interact with the public, workers, Congressional staff members, and public officials from Federal, State, and local agencies, as well as concerned private citizen organizations. The remaining 40 FTEs (33% of the workforce) consist of the Board, the immediate Office of the Executive Director of Operations, the Office of the General Counsel, and various support service functions. The chart below outlines the staffing request for DNFSB.

**Table 2. FY 2027 Staffing Request**

	<b>FY 2025 Actual</b>	<b>FY 2026 President’s Budget</b>	<b>FY 2027 Request</b>
<b>Positions</b>	106	120	120
<b>FTE</b>	112	120	120
<b>Salaries and Benefits (in millions)</b>	\$29.3	\$31.6	\$31.6

The investment in salaries and benefits represents approximately 70% of the DNFSB funding request for FY 2027.

## Mission Staffing

DNFSB executes its mission through the work of a highly qualified and dedicated technical staff, which makes up approximately 67% of the Agency's full-time workforce.

As the safety oversight body for the DOE's defense nuclear facilities, DNFSB plays a vital role in ensuring that nuclear weapons production is carried out safely as DOE and NNSA implement key elements of the U.S. nuclear deterrent strategy. Since the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, the scale, growing complexity, and urgency of DOE/NNSA's weapons production efforts have increased significantly. This includes the Administration's priority to produce no fewer than 80 plutonium pits per year—an essential component of modern nuclear weapons.

DNFSB's safety oversight helps ensure these high-risk operations are conducted safely, particularly at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and the Savannah River Site (SRS), where plutonium pit production activities are being expanded. The Board's recommendations address safety risks, including criticality accidents that could halt weapons facility operations.

The Board also oversees uranium processing operations at the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) and weapons assembly and disassembly at the Pantex Plant (Pantex). These facilities are central to meeting national security requirements, and DNFSB's mission staffing must align with the scope and pace of their operations. As DOE's modernization efforts expand across the nuclear weapons complex, DNFSB must maintain a highly skilled workforce to conduct independent technical reviews, identify hazards, and evaluate safety systems and practices. The Agency's staffing plan for FY 2027 prioritizes the retention of engineers, scientists, and technical professionals to support safety oversight of these critical production missions.

As DOE expands its operations in FY 2027 and beyond, DNFSB must retain top engineering and scientific talent to keep pace. The Agency will continue to support safety oversight of high-priority sites like the LANL, Y-12, SRS, and Pantex. This includes maintaining capacity to assess emerging challenges such as nuclear criticality safety, seismic vulnerabilities, reactive materials, emergency preparedness, and infrastructure deterioration.

DOE's infrastructure challenges are particularly pressing. As of September 2024, NNSA reported approximately 60 facilities over 40 years old, with more than half rated in poor condition. DNFSB's safety oversight provides DOE with independent insight into how aging infrastructure impacts public health and safety, helping prioritize risk mitigation actions. DNFSB's statutory mandate also includes review of the design and construction of new DOE defense nuclear facilities. DOE, particularly NNSA, is currently working on a multi-billion dollar portfolio of new defense nuclear facilities that are essential to producing components (i.e., plutonium pits) essential to the nuclear weapons stockpile, as well as cleaning up legacy nuclear wastes that are remnants of the Cold War.

The requested funding level for FY 2027 will support these staffing priorities and ensure DNFSB can meet the increasing volume of safety allegations from facility workers and concerned individuals. DNFSB is evaluating several safety allegations at any given time—many submitted by DOE facility workers—following the formal establishment of its safety allegation program in FY 2023. These reviews place increased demand on DNFSB's technical and legal staff and require sustained resource investment.

As DOE accelerates production across the nuclear weapons complex, DNFSB's safety oversight mission—particularly related to weapons production—must be fully supported through targeted technical staffing to keep pace with national defense needs and ensure safe execution of critical operations.

### **Mission Support Staffing**

In addition to the Board and board operations, DNFSB maintains administrative staff that support mission operations. These agency-level functions include information technology, human resources, operations, financial management, audit liaison, external affairs, security, contracting, and legal services. Administrative and other staffing accounts for approximately 33% of DNFSB's full-time workforce.

## ADMINISTRATIVE OPERATIONS

The FY 2027 President’s Budget Request for DNFSB includes \$13.4 million for total administrative expenses. This amount allows for continued operations necessary to sustain and manage the Agency’s mission support functions.

As a small agency, DNFSB relies on outsourcing select operational functions to maintain compliance with federal mandates and ensure efficient service delivery. In FY 2027, DNFSB will continue partnering with the Interior Business Center (IBC) for human resources and financial management services, while also outsourcing key functions like physical security, health services, background investigations, and IT support. This strategic approach allows the Agency to focus internal resources on core mission responsibilities while maintaining operational efficiency and compliance.

Collectively, these outsourcing activities account for approximately 3% of the total FY 2027 budget request for offering a cost-effective way to meet operational requirements while supporting the Agency’s mission readiness. The remainder of the outsourcing request includes IT & Cybersecurity (12%), rent and building maintenance (7%), mission-related travel (2%), and other (2%). The chart below summarizes DNFSB’s operating expenses estimates by major category.

**Table 4. Operating Expenses by Major Category (\$ in millions)**

Major Category	FY 2025 Actual	FY 2026 President’s Budget	FY 2027 Request
IT & Cybersecurity	\$5.2	\$5.3	\$5.3
Outsourcing	\$3.4	\$3.2	\$3.2
Rent and Building Maintenance	\$3.1	\$3.2	\$3.2
Travel	\$0.9	\$1.1	\$1.0
Other	\$0.7	\$0.6	\$0.7
<b>TOTAL ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES</b>	<b>\$13.3</b>	<b>\$13.4</b>	<b>\$13.4</b>

## **Information Technology and Cybersecurity**

The FY 2027 President's Budget Request for DNFSB includes \$5.3 million to support information technology and cybersecurity efforts. DNFSB cannot effectively execute its mission, which is data driven and highly analytical, without reliable information technology systems and services. DNFSB contracts for a range of these information technology services and retains its federal staff for inherently governmental and mission-critical functions. This hybrid model ensures continuity, compliance, and efficient and effective service delivery across all support areas.

The requested FY 2027 funding level would allow DNFSB to continue to invest in capabilities to improve its cybersecurity, physical security, secure communications, information technology, technical efficiencies, and organizational effectiveness. This funding will enable DNFSB to continue tackling critical information technology projects aligned with the fast pace of changing technology and is consistent with the Agency's strategic plan

In FY 2027, DNFSB will continue to sustain its network administration, user monitoring, and secure cloud-based assets and services. Continuous investment in solutions such as Zero Trust Architecture are needed to address issues related to Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA) compliance. DNFSB will continue to invest in its security solutions, as well as enhance automation throughout the Agency, which in turn achieves higher levels of compliance with the Zero Trust mandate.

The requested FY 2027 funding level will also sustain ongoing efforts to accelerate responsible deployment of American artificial intelligence technology to support mission delivery and promote operational efficiency.

## **Outsourcing**

Outsourcing select operational functions remains a critical component of DNFSB's overall strategy. As a small agency, limited internal capacity makes it impractical to efficiently maintain the full range of capabilities required to comply with Federal mandates, Administration direction, and best practices in areas such as human resources and financial management without external support.

To address this, the DNFSB will continue outsourcing select operational functions in FY 2027. Specifically, it will maintain its partnership with the U.S. Department of the Interior's IBC, a certified federal shared services provider. IBC delivers critical support in human resources, financial management, and eTravel services. This arrangement improves administrative efficiency, enhances internal controls, supports data-driven decision-making, and aligns with government-wide shared services objectives.

Beyond its relationship with IBC, DNFSB will continue to outsource additional essential services—including physical security, health unit operations, and employee background investigations for security clearances—through a combination of interagency agreements and contractual arrangements. Through continued use of enterprise-wide shared services and targeted outsourcing, DNFSB ensures it can meet its mission demands efficiently and responsibly and allows the Agency to concentrate its limited internal resources on core mission activities. A total of \$3.2 million is requested to sustain these capabilities in FY 2027.

### **Rent and Building Maintenance**

The budget request includes \$3.2 million to cover expenses related to rent, utilities, and building maintenance, based on GSA guidance reflecting lease costs at its current location. This represents approximately 7% of the FY 2027 President's Budget Request for DNFSB.

DNFSB's lease expires in March of 2026, and we are currently working with GSA to determine next steps to reduce space and cost. Once those next steps are determined, DNFSB will share its real property capital plan with OMB. Therefore, the FY 2027 budget request includes rent at the same level as FY 2026.

While GSA previously provided DNFSB with an estimate of \$25.8 million associated with its relocation upon lease expiration, it is unclear whether the costs of rightsizing will be incurred in FY 2026 or FY 2027, as well as when the savings from rightsizing will be realized. While the full relocation cost is unknown at this time, the current estimate for moving the Agency's IT infrastructure is at least \$250K, and GSA has not yet provided an estimated new annual rent cost.

## **Travel Expenses**

The President's Budget Request includes \$1 million to support the official travel of Board members and staff. Operational travel to the various DOE defense nuclear facilities located throughout the United States is critical for Board members and staff to conduct first-hand onsite safety assessments of operations and associated health and safety issues. To fulfill its mission, DNFSB assigns technical staff teams to near-continuous monitoring of major startup, testing, restart, or other activities at various DOE sites. Travel funds are also used to pay for expenses associated with public hearings and meetings at or near DOE defense nuclear sites, where interested persons or groups may present comments, technical information, or data concerning health and safety issues under DNFSB's purview.

## **Other Expenses**

The President's Budget Request includes \$0.7 million in other expenses, including funds to purchase supplies, and maintain other Agency services. This represents approximately 2% of the budget request.

## PROPOSED APPROPRIATIONS LANGUAGE

### Salaries and Expenses

*For expenses necessary for the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board in carrying out activities authorized by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended by Public Law 100-456, section 1441, \$45,000,000, to remain available until September 30, 2028, of which not to exceed \$1,000 shall be available for official reception and representation expenses.*

## Appendix A. REPORT ON OUTSTANDING GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE AND INSPECTOR GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS

### Good Accounting Obligation in Government Act

The Good Accounting Obligation in Government Act ("GAO-IG Act" or "Act"), P.L. 115-414, requires agencies to include, in their congressional budget justifications, reports on (1) public recommendations from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) including whether the recommendation has been deemed "open" or "closed, unimplemented" for a period of not less than one year before the date on which the annual budget justification is submitted; (2) public recommendations of the Office of Inspector General (OIG) of the agency that was published not less than one year before the date on which the annual budget justification is submitted, and for which no final action has been taken; and (3) the implementation status of each recommendation

DNFSB takes all OIG and GAO reports and recommendations seriously and has an excellent record of implementing and closing out recommendations. DNFSB has no OIG recommendations with which it disagreed and is working on implementing all open recommendations. DNFSB currently has 8 open OIG recommendations that were issued prior to Feb 2025. DNFSB has no open GAO recommendations that were issued prior to Feb 2025.

The following chart provides the implementation status for more than one year (i.e., all open recommendations except for those issued after May 6, 2024), as required by the Act.

<b>OIG and GAO Recommendation Summary</b>			
<b>Auditor</b>	<b>Open</b>	<b>Closed/Unimplemented</b>	<b>Total</b>
GAO	0	0	0
OIG	8	29	37

**FY 2027 Congressional Budget Justification  
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board**

Report No.	Issuance Date	Recommendation	Timeline of Implementation
<b>DNFSB-20-A-05</b>	March 31, 2020	<p>Using the results of recommendations one (1) and two (2) above: Implement an automated solution to help maintain an up-to-date, complete, accurate, and readily available Agency-wide view of the security configurations for all its GSS components; Cybersecurity Team exports metrics and vulnerability reports and sends them to the CISO and CIO’s Office monthly for review. Develop a centralized dashboard that Cybersecurity Team and the CISO can populate for</p> <p>real-time assessments of compliance and security policies. Collaborate with DNFSB Cybersecurity Team Support to establish performance metrics in service level agreements to measure, report on, and monitor the risks related to contractor systems and services</p> <p>being monitored by Cybersecurity Team. Establish performance metrics to more effectively manage and optimize all domains of the DNFSB information security program. Implement a centralized view of risk across the organization.</p>	4th Quarter, FY 2026
<b>DNFSB-21-A-04</b>	March 25, 2021	<p>Use the fully defined ISA to: a) Assess enterprise, business process, and information system level risks; b) Formally define enterprise, business process, and information system level risk tolerance and appetite levels necessary for prioritizing and guiding risk management decisions; c) Conduct an organization wide security and privacy risk assessment; and, d) Conduct a supply chain risk assessment.</p>	4th Quarter, FY 2026
<b>DNFSB-21-A-04</b>	March 25, 2021	<p>Using the results of recommendations in bullets one (1) and two</p> <p>(2) above: a) Collaborate with the DNFSB’s Cybersecurity Team to establish performance metrics in service level agreements to measure, report on, and monitor the risks related to contractor systems and services being monitored by IT Operations; b) Utilize</p> <p>guidance from the National Institute of Standards in Technology (NIST) Special Publication (SP) 800-55 (Rev. 1) – Performance Measurement Guide for Information Security to establish performance metrics to more effectively manage and optimize all domains of the DNFSB information security program; c) Implement</p> <p>a centralized view of risk across the organization; and, d) Implement formal procedures for prioritizing and tracking POA&amp;M to remediate vulnerabilities.</p>	4th Quarter, FY 2026
<b>DNFSB-21-A-04</b>	March 25, 2021	<p>Implement automated mechanisms (e.g. machine-based, or user-based enforcement) to support the management of privileged accounts, including for the automatic removal/disabling of temporary, emergency, and inactive accounts, as appropriate.</p>	4th Quarter, FY 2026
<b>DNFSB-22-A-04</b>	December 17, 2021	<p>Continue efforts to develop and implement role-based privacy training for users with significant privacy or data protection related duties.</p>	4th Quarter, FY 2026

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Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board**

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<b>Report No.</b>	<b>Issuance Date</b>	<b>Recommendation</b>	<b>Timeline of Implementation</b>
<b>DNFSB-22-A-04</b>	December 17, 2021	Conduct a business impact assessment within every two years to assess mission essential functions and incorporate the results into strategy and mitigation planning activities.	4th Quarter, FY 2026
<b>DNFSB-24-A-04</b>	August 13, 2024	Revise its FOIA regulations to capture substantive changes from the FOIA Improvement Act of 2016.	4th Quarter, FY 2026
<b>DNFSB-24-A-04</b>	August 13, 2024	Update its internal FOIA guidance for statutory timelines,	4th Quarter, FY 2026

## Appendix B. Government Performance and Results Act Modernization Act

### **GPRA Strategic Planning Reporting Requirements**

The Government Performance and Results Act Modernization Act of 2010 requires each agency to make available on its website a strategic plan establishing general strategic goals and objectives for a period of not less than four years. DNFSB's most recent Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2022–2026 is available on the Internet at [www.dnfsb.gov](http://www.dnfsb.gov). DNFSB is currently working on its FY 2026-2030 Strategic Plan, which will be posted on the DNFSB website when it is completed.

In addition, agencies are required to develop an Annual Performance Report that provides information on the agency's progress toward achieving the goals and objectives described in the Strategic Plan and Annual Performance Plan.

DNFSB will publish the *FY 2025 Annual Performance Report* and the *FY 2027 Annual Performance Plan* later this year. Both GPRA documents will be available on DNFSB's website.

## Appendix C. Organizational Structure

The five-member Board<sup>2</sup> leads the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) in accomplishing its mission and determines actions regarding safety aspects of the design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of the Department of Energy's defense nuclear facilities.



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### BOARD MEMBER

Dr. Patricia L. Lee

Term Expiring October 18, 2027

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<sup>2</sup> There are currently four vacancies on the Board.

### Organizational Chart

DNFSB is statutorily capped at 130 Federal full-time equivalents (FTE) and is currently arranged in two offices that report to the Chairperson and fall under the five-member board. The Office of the Executive Director of Operations oversees DNFSB’s technical and administrative operations, provides direct Board support, and directs external affairs, among other duties. Most of the Agency’s staff are assigned to the Office of the Technical Director, which carries out DNFSB’s nuclear safety mission. The Office of the General Counsel manages DNFSB’s compliance with all legal requirements and provides direct legal support to the Board and Agency staff.

