

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

March 27, 2026

**TO:** Technical Director  
**FROM:** Hanford Site Resident Inspectors  
**SUBJECT:** Hanford Activity Report for the Week Ending March 27, 2026

**242-A Evaporator:** The 242-A Evaporator pump room has a sump that collects liquids from leaks and work activities. The liquid in the sump is a facility worker hazard because it could contain radioactively contaminated tank waste, which is also highly caustic. The safety analysis currently uses two specific administrative controls (SACs) to eliminate this hazard. One SAC precludes entry into the pump room unless workers complete the second SAC that specifies a sump rinse sequence to remove any collected tank waste from the sump prior to their entry. Facility workers accomplish the sump rinse SAC remotely using a jet and camera. This is a difficult and time-consuming task. To improve workflow and efficiency, facility personnel proposed a safety basis modification that replaces the SACs with a grating over the sump. They note that the grating is a passive engineered control, which is more reliable than SACs. Consequently, the grating will improve safety as well as improve workflow and efficiency. The plant review committee evaluated the change and recommended submitting the change to the Safety Basis Approval Authority for consideration.

**Tank Farms:** H2C implemented a watchbill tool to verify eligibility of watch standers required to meet minimum staffing requirements for their facilities. This was a corrective action after a failure to verify training caused a technical safety requirements violation (see 6/6/2025 report). H2C training personnel identified a vulnerability in the tool's use of data from the learning management system (LMS) instead of the Hanford Site Worker Eligibility Tool (HSWET) used across the site to verify training. Changes to eligibility requirements in HSWET are not captured in the LMS data and could lead to the tool failing to verify training. A resident inspector observed the event learning meeting to discuss the discovery. Participants noted that operations had requested the tool from the H2C's software developers but had not included input from the relevant training organization personnel who would have identified issues using LMS data, and operations personnel did not understand that the tool didn't correspond to HSWET. The resident inspector asked whether a new tool for general training verification using Power BI software also queried the LMS data and could have the same vulnerability. Following the event learning meeting, both the watchbill tool and Power BI tool were disabled, and the contractor has begun an extent of condition review on the use of LMS data in other software. HSWET is not affected by the results of this event learning meeting and will remain available to verify worker eligibility.

While verifying that an H2C lockout/tagout (LOTO) tag matched the corresponding tag placed by HMIS Electrical Utilities (EU) personnel, a discrepancy was observed between the tags. In the subsequent event learning meeting, participants discussed multiple errors in the development of the LOTO, including an incorrect description of the switch position, the number of the item locked out, and a failure to follow the interface agreement when H2C performs a LOTO on EU equipment. This interface agreement is necessary because EU maintains configuration management for its systems, and H2C is required to provide the isolation documents to EU when developing the LOTO to ensure their adequacy.