

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

April 10, 2026

Pantex Plant Resident Inspectors Activity Report for Week Ending April 10, 2026

Safety Basis: This week, PXD safety analysis engineers declared a potential inadequacy of the safety analysis (PISA) after identifying that electrostatic dissipative controls were not established for one aspect of operations for a certain weapon program. As a result, PXD established personnel electrical bonding requirements for the associated operations to ensure the technicians and material of concern remain at the same electrical potential. This operational restriction will minimize the likelihood of an electrostatic discharge.

Additionally, during a review of electrostatic dissipative controls for a separate weapon program, PXD safety analysis engineers declared a second PISA after identifying that weapon response information was incorrectly applied to operations performed within a certain special-purpose facility. Since existing controls are in place that prevent the hazard, PXD did not apply any operational restrictions due to this discovery.

In-service Inspections: This week, a resident inspector evaluated the PXD engineers performing in-service inspections of facilities within a material access area used for staging and transportation of nuclear explosives and special nuclear material. PXD uses these in-service inspections to assess the current state of the facility structures and internal combustible loading. For the limited facilities examined, the resident inspector observed that the facility structure met expectations for continued use (e.g., limited concrete cracking and no apparent water intrusion) and no excessive combustible materials.

Of note, these facilities are the subject of a recently approved exemption from all requirements within Subpart B, *Safety Basis Requirements*, of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 830, *Nuclear Safety Management* (see 3/13/2026 report). The DNFSB staff are currently reviewing this exemption and its implications, including whether these in-service inspections will continue to be required or if PXD will implement an alternate approach.

Nuclear Explosive Components: Last month, while unpackaging a component during surveillance activities, PXD technicians discovered the serial numbers on an item and the container did not match. Upon discovery, the technicians made notifications to PFO and various PXD organizations to inform them of the occurrence. After further investigation, PXD personnel located the container that matched the component serial number. Upon opening the second container, PXD found that the components had been swapped during a previous surveillance activity. PXD technicians repackaged the components into the correct containers.

PXD discussed in the fact-finding meeting that since the two components were the same design, both items had been stored in approved areas for the duration of the nonconforming condition. Additionally, PXD personnel discussed changes in procedural requirements that were made between the time that the components had been packaged and this discovery, and concluded that these changes would prevent recurrence. Therefore, PXD determined no further corrective actions were needed.