

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

April 3, 2026

Savannah River Site Resident Inspectors Activity Report for Week Ending April 3, 2026

DNFSB Staff Activity: Members of the DNFSB staff and the resident inspector (RI) conducted a teleconference with contractor and NNSA personnel to discuss the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility's criticality accident alarm system coverage.

HB-Line: SRNS conducted an implementation verification review (IVR) for implementing the revised safety basis at HB-Line. This included a re-evaluation of administrative controls to achieve compliance with DOE Standard 1186-2016. The revision changed the wording of various specific administrative controls (SACs), added a SAC for the energetic container program, and upgraded the transuranic (TRU) waste container vents to a credited design feature. The IVR team identified one finding because the identification numbers on filter vents installed on eight TRU waste containers stored in the facility did not match the identification numbers documented in the backfit analysis performed to upgrade the vents to safety significant. During a walkdown of the vented TRU waste containers, the RI questioned whether stacking vented TRU waste pails would negatively affect the vent's credited safety function to provide a passive vent path capable of releasing internal gases at a rate sufficient to prevent the accumulation of flammable gases from reaching flammability limits. The facility did not have any documented evaluation that addressed this concern. Facility and engineering management stated that they do not believe the stacked configuration would impair the vent's credited function, but they did enter this issue into their corrective action program and are in the process of performing an engineering studies report to evaluate and document a basis for the allowable stacked configuration of TRU waste pails in the next revision of the safety basis.

Effluent Treatment Facility (ETF): The RI toured the ETF, which collects and treats process wastewater that may be contaminated with small quantities of radionuclides and process chemicals. At an ETF laboratory, the RI noted that the sash on a radioactive material containment unit (RMCU) was 100% open. The acceptable range for the sash height is marked on the RMCU, and procedures require the sash not to be opened or closed further than the posted markings to ensure proper airflow. This issue was subsequently corrected on the spot by a laboratory technician. The RI noted that two fire doors did not meet DOE requirements in that they did not close automatically without human intervention. The RI also noted that material protruded past the established barrier of a radioactive material storage area. Additionally, the RI observed that there were no posted instructions on how to shut down ventilation systems if a protective action is required to remain indoors and shut down ventilation systems in the event of a radiological or chemical release, which is an issue that has been identified at other facilities at SRS (see 12/19/2025, 12/26/2025, 1/9/2026, and 2/13/2026 reports). The RI shared these issues and concerns with the shift operations manager and a DOE facility representative for disposition.

Management Review Board (MRB): The RI attended an MRB for the DOE-SR, Savannah River Laboratory Office, at which the group reviewed and discussed issues identified within their recent assessments. They also discussed their quarterly tracking and trending analysis and one area on which to continue focusing when performing their observations and assessments.