

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

May 8, 2026

### Oak Ridge Resident Inspectors Activity Report for Week Ending May 8, 2026

**Building 9204-2E:** CNS completed a reduction of the Building 9204-2E criticality accident alarm system (CAAS) annunciation area. Originally, the CAAS annunciation area included the entire footprint of Building 9204-2 due to its configuration for material storage and proximity to Building 9204-2E. Several years ago, CNS reconfigured the storage and usage of Building 9204-2, eliminating the need for a safety basis and safety significant systems apart from the CAAS. CNS did not reevaluate the CAAS annunciation area at the time, resulting in the need to maintain an aging and problematic system (see 4/5/2024 report). After CNS replaced the CAAS in Building 9204-2E, the expansive annunciation system in Building 9204-2 became an added maintenance burden with safety basis implications for Building 9204-2E. This resulted in multiple occurrence reports and limiting condition for operations (LCO) entries. The new coverage map shows a specific portion of Building 9204-2 included with coverage extending approximately 50 feet from Building 9204-2E. Although CNS reduced the coverage map and annunciation area for surveillance purposes, the existing horns in the rest of Building 9204-2 will remain in place although they are no longer required. The dedicated CAAS electrician crew will benefit from the annunciation area reduction and it will also reduce the maintenance burden on several groups.

**Building 9212:** This week CNS conducted an event investigation related to a conduct of operations error during a fire department maintenance activity. Late last month, the fire department conducted a maintenance activity on a credited wet pipe sprinkler system in Building 9212. Prior to the activity, the shift manager declared the system inoperable and entered the appropriate LCO condition, which requires periodic fire patrols, to allow the maintenance to proceed. Upon completion of the activity by the fire department, the shift manager declared the system operable and exited the LCO. Shortly afterwards, the shift technical advisor discovered a required check of system pressure had not been completed prior to the shift manager declaring the system operable. Per the Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for Building 9212, operability for the system is demonstrated by meeting or exceeding the minimum required system pressure and having an unobstructed flow path for water. As a result, the shift manager rescinded the action of exiting the LCO. The fire department subsequently determined the system pressure met the minimum required by the TSR and the shift manager once again declared the system operable and exited the LCO. CNS determined that a TSR violation had not occurred because none of the required actions, such as fire patrols, had been missed and the system met its pressure and flow path requirements.

The event investigation identified that the pre-job briefing for the activity failed to explicitly include the shift manager's required actions to verify operability of the system. Also, while an operational limit status check sheet in use for the activity includes a step for review by the shift technical advisor or operations manager, it does not explicitly require the shift manager to secure that review signature prior to declaring the system operable. As a corrective action, the event investigation participants proposed a modified pre-job briefing form for fire department maintenance activities that would include greater specificity on required steps and sequencing for demonstrating restored system operability prior to exiting the relevant LCO.