

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

April 17, 2026

### **Pantex Plant Resident Inspectors Activity Report for Week Ending April 17, 2026**

**Safety Basis Modernization:** This week, PFO approved—with five directed changes and no conditions of approval—a safety basis change package related to modernizing the controls listed within the safety analysis report for operations performed within certain special purpose facilities. Specifically, some of the PFO directed changes modified language in the safety analysis report related to proximity restrictions for freestanding equipment from certain weapon programs by use of specific administrative controls (see 4/3/2026 report). The effort to modernize the Pantex safety bases fulfills commitments made in response to DNFSB Recommendation 2019-1, as well as PXD's plans to bring the documents into alignment with DOE Standard 3009-2014 and DOE Standard 1186-2016. With this approval, PFO has now approved the modernization of two safety analysis reports and two hazard analysis reports. PXD plans to modernize the remaining safety basis documents—which will extend into at least the next fiscal year—and submit them to PFO for approval.

**Electrical Outage:** This week, PXD is concluding a multi-week planned electrical outage that has affected many facilities, including nuclear explosive bays and cells. During this outage, PXD maintenance and infrastructure personnel conducted extensive maintenance on a portion of the onsite electrical distribution system, as well as on chillers for certain defense nuclear facilities.

**Safety Basis:** Last week, PXD safety analysis engineering (SAE) personnel declared a potential inadequacy of the safety analysis (PISA) after discovering that electrostatic dissipative controls were not established for one aspect of operations for a certain weapon program (see 4/10/2026 report). This week, PXD determined that this PISA represented an unreviewed safety question due to an increase in consequences for a hazard scenario previously evaluated within the safety analysis. PXD has established an operational restriction that requires personnel to electrically bond to certain nuclear explosive components when removing a protective cover to ensure technicians and the unit remain at the same electrical potential. PXD clarified to the resident inspectors that the electrical bonding was already part of the operations, but the PISA and subsequent unreviewed safety question resulted because this bonding was not captured in the safety analysis.

Additionally, PXD SAE personnel previously identified that weapon response information was incorrectly applied on a separate weapon program for operations within certain special purpose facilities (see 4/10/2026 report). This week, after applying the correct weapon response, PXD determined that this PISA also represented an unreviewed safety question; however, PXD did not apply any operational restrictions since controls were already established for the applicable hazard scenario.

Finally, PXD SAE personnel declared a new PISA this week after discovering that the safety basis applied weapon response for an incorrect unit configuration for a certain weapon program. In this case, there are two possible configurations governed by the relative position of a component. When applying weapon response for the correct configuration, PXD noted that consequences for the hazard scenario would increase, but controls already exist for the scenario.