DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

June 19, 2026

Oak Ridge Resident Inspectors Activity Report for Week Ending June 19, 2026

Building [redacted]: YFO completed the federal readiness assessment (FRA) for the [redacted] project. A resident inspector (RI) attended procedure demonstrations for several parts of the [redacted] process. During a demonstration that included glovebox activities, the RI noted that a hood used for the removal of [redacted] product from a glovebox did not have markings to show the proper position of the adjustable access window. Without these markings or some other reference, operators do not know if the window is in the proper position to maintain a negative airflow for airborne contamination control. Also, while performing a drill for the FRA team, CNS did not have a limiting condition for operation (LCO) and required action for several portions of the [redacted] system that are required for operability in the technical safety requirements (TSR). This resulted in CNS using the general application LCO that requires initiation of activities to transition the process area into warm shutdown within 12 hours when the aspects of the [redacted] process are inoperable. While this is an acceptable use of the TSR, it is not an ideal resolution to operability issues with a piece of equipment or process. The RI discussed issues noted with the FRA team prior to their out brief with the contractor. The FRA team's final report is currently undergoing a factual accuracy review with the contractor.

Building [redacted] Previously, CNS had discovered they unknowingly operated the [redacted] system with approximately [redacted] more [redacted] uranium in the cell than the mass tracking software had accounted for since startup due to errors in the mass tracking software (see 4/3/2026 report). [redacted]. The RI discussed with engineering and facility operations management personnel the path forward that CNS plans to use to validate future values obtained through the mass tracking software. CNS resumed operations of the [redacted] process this week. After harvesting [redacted] uranium dendrites from the cell and moving them into the [redacted] for recovery, the operators received an error from the [redacted] requiring a shutdown of that part of the system. CNS is troubleshooting the cause of the error and will resume operations when resolved.

Building [redacted]: An RI observed the final qualification board for an [redacted] uranium operations production supervisor. The board selected questions for the candidate that adequately covered topics such as nuclear criticality safety, abnormal scenarios, work control, and industrial safety. Make-or-break questions were appropriately identified with specific parts of the answers marked as critical attributes in advance of the board. The attributes informed the board of the minimum amount of knowledge required to pass the question. The questions were scenario based and consisted of multiple subparts that were provided sequentially to the candidate as the previous parts were answered. The RI provided feedback to the board president that one of the question subparts contained the answer to the previous part of the question and should not be provided to the candidate until the candidate fully answers the first part of the question or should be omitted to prevent providing the candidate the answer and influencing the grading. Overall, the RI found the final grading of the board consistent with candidate performance and in accordance with the CNS oral board procedure.