

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

July 1, 2005

TO: K. Fortenberry, Technical Director
FROM: D. Grover and W. Linzau, Hanford Site Representatives
SUBJ: Activity Report for the Week Ending July 1, 2005

Waste Treatment Plant (WTP): During a site rep walk-down of the Pretreatment Facility (PT), it was noted that all structural welding had been suspended due to failures in the configuration management documentation. Two reoccurring errors were noted in construction packages: (1) the wrong preheat requirements and (2) incorrect revisions of drawings. Initially, Bechtel National Incorporated (BNI) tried to correct the problems with ad-hoc corrective actions but not all the errors were corrected. BNI determined that welding had to be suspended until all affected packages could be checked and corrected.

BNI is currently working to determine which installed structural steel members require a fire-resistant coating in the High Level Waste (HLW) and Pretreatment Facilities (PT). The Board's staff has questioned the methods being used to determine which steel requires fire protection. During a walk-down of the Low Activity Waste Facility, the site rep observed the application of fire-resistant coatings on installed structural steel. In some areas of the facility, elaborate scaffolding and spray protection were required to prevent inadvertently coating installed equipment. Delays in deciding which steel required coating allowed the installation of the collocated equipment. To avoid having the same problems as seen in the LAW, it may be beneficial for BNI to do a more conservative evaluation for HLW and PT and ensure the steel members requiring protection are not overlooked prior to the installation of additional equipment.

K Basin Closure Project (KBC): The contractor conducted a Readiness Assessment (RA) for the restart of the Fuel Transfer System. This RA was necessary because the system has not been operated since last summer. The key operations and radiological control personnel who originally operated the system are still assigned to the system. The procedures associated with the system only needed to be modified slightly due to a change in compressed air supply. The project conducted dry runs of the full operation to verify the operation could be conducted given the change in conditions in the basin. There is expected to be a finding related to the qualification status of an operator to use a hoist. The site rep noted the continued presence of expired hoisting and rigging tags on equipment, as well as the current inspection tags. This was identified in the sludge retrieval ORR but apparently not corrected in the other KBC subprojects. The team also noted a good practice by the KBC vice president who provided the final review and approval for each readiness self assessment form and supporting objective evidence. During several recent startups this approval was performed by the immediate project manager and the level of readiness was not as mature.

Cc: Board Members