DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD SAFETY CULTURE PUBLIC MEETING AND HEARING OCTOBER 7, 2014 DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD 625 INDIANA AVENUE, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20004

Safety Culture Public Meeting and Hearing Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board		10/7/2014
1	INDEX	
2		
3	Presentation:	Page:
4	Opening Remarks	
5	By Dr. Winokur, Chairman	3, 36
б		
7	Testimony	
8	Panel 1 - Ernest J. Moniz, Secretary,	
9	Department of Energy	6
10		
11	Panel 2 - Madelyn Creedon, Principal	
12	Deputy Administrator, National	
13	Nuclear Security Administration	39
14		
15	Panel 3 - Mark Whitney, Acting Assistant	
16	Secretary for Environmental Management	ı
17	Department of Energy	77
18		
19	Closing Remarks	
20	By Dr. Winokur	127
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		

1 PUBLIC MEETING AND HEARING 2 3 (8:31 a.m.) 4 DR. WINOKUR: Good morning. My name is Peter Winokur, and I am the Chairman of the Defense Nuclear 5 Facilities Safety Board. I will preside over this public 6 7 meeting and hearing. I'd like to introduce my colleagues on the Board. To my immediate right is Ms. Jessie 8 9 Roberson, the Board's Vice Chairman. To my immediate 10 left is Mr. Sean Sullivan. We three constitute the 11 Board. This public meeting and hearing is the third in 12 the series of hearings to address safety culture at the 13 Department of Energy's defense nuclear facilities, and 14 the Board recommendation 2011-1, Safety Culture at the 15 Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant. 16

17 At this time, I will introduce members of the 18 Board staff who are participating today. Mr. Richard Reback, the Board's Acting General Counsel, is seated to 19 20 my far left. Mr. Richard Tontodonato, the Board's Deputy Technical Director, is seated to my far right. Several 21 22 members of the Board staff closely involved with safety 23 culture oversight at the Department of Energy's defense nuclear facilities are also here. 24

25 Today's meeting and hearing were publicly

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1 noticed in the Federal Register on September 25th, 2014. 2 The meeting and hearing are held open to the public per the provisions of the Government in the Sunshine Act. 3 In 4 order to provide timely and accurate information concerning the Board's public and worker health and 5 safety mission at the Department of Energy's defense б 7 nuclear facilities, the Board is recording this proceeding through a verbatim transcript, video 8 9 recording, and live video streaming.

10 The transcript, associated documents, public notice, and video recording will be available for viewing 11 in the public reading room at our headquarters in 12 Washington, DC. In addition, an archive copy of the 13 video recording will be available through our website for 14 at least 60 days. Per the Board's practice and as stated 15 in the Federal Register notice, we will welcome comments 16 17 from members of the public at the conclusion of this 18 morning's testimony, which will be at approximately 11:30 19 a.m.

The list of speakers who have contacted the Board is posted at the entrance to this room. We have generally listed the speakers in the order in which they have contacted us or, if possible, when they wish to speak. I will call the speakers in this order and ask that speakers state their name and affiliation at the

10/7/2014

1 beginning of their comments.

2 There is also a table at the entrance to this room with a sign-up sheet for members of the public who 3 wish to make comments but did not have an opportunity to 4 notify us ahead of time. This will follow those who have 5 already registered with us in the order in which they б 7 have signed up. To give everyone wishing to make comments an equal opportunity, we ask speakers to limit 8 9 their initial comments to five minutes. I will then give 10 consideration for additional comments should time permit. Comments should be limited to statements, 11 technical information, or data concerning the subject of 12 this public meeting and hearing. The Board members may 13 14 question anyone making comments to the extent deemed appropriate. 15

16 The record of this proceeding will remain open 17 until November 7th, 2014. I would like to reiterate that 18 the Board reserves its right to further schedule and 19 regulate the course of this meeting and hearing, to 20 recess, reconvene, postpone, or adjourn this meeting and 21 hearing and to otherwise exercise its authority under the 22 Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as amended.

Today, we are pleased to welcome Secretary of Energy Ernest J. Moniz. We hope to hear from Secretary Moniz regarding how the Department of Energy is

addressing concerns identified in the Board's
recommendation 2011-1 and his perspective and
expectations regarding safety culture at Department of
Energy defense nuclear facilities.

5 At this time, I welcome testimony by Secretary 6 Moniz, to be followed by questions from the Board 7 members. Welcome, Mr. Secretary.

8 SECRETARY MONIZ: Great. Thank you, Mr. 9 Chairman and members of the Board. Good to see you 10 again.

What I'm going to do, Mr. Chairman, is make, I 11 think, relatively few comments. I think it's better if 12 we then can get into a discussion, but certainly to 13 14 reiterate, our continuing commitment to safety culture improvements, this Board, and, frankly, our internal 15 organizations have -- have, you know, pointed out, I 16 17 think, areas of progress, but also areas -- considerable 18 areas of continued -- continued work. So, I'll just emphasize some of the areas, some of the specifics, and 19 20 starting out from the point of view that I think -- I 21 hope that there is no question about our sharing the same values and goals and then comes the question is how do we 22 23 kind of keep making progress towards -- towards that end. 24 And I'm going to start by saying one, I think for us, I think, very important thing, namely that as is 25

well known, we have been in a transition in terms of the Department of Energy's top leadership, specifically at the Deputy Secretary level. Dan Poneman, of course, was very central to our activities and discussions in this area, but as of yesterday, we have a new Deputy Secretary, Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall.

7 And I can assure you, we have already discussed safety culture. We have already discussed some of the 8 9 emergency response issues that were raised by the Board. 10 And I guess this is something that qualifies as something of a public announcement that next week we will have our 11 first town hall meeting, introducing the new Deputy 12 Secretary to the Department and looking and discussing 13 major issues. I can assure you these will be a focal 14 point in our introduction of the Deputy Secretary. 15 So, that's something that, again, we will focus 16 17 on, she will focus on, and we will raise that right off 18 the top as an element in the town hall meeting, because I

19 think that's, again, where things like commitment to this 20 need to be reinforced constantly. It doesn't substitute 21 for specific actions, but I think it's a necessary 22 setting of tone that we will -- we will try to accomplish 23 next week.

I think, again, something else that we can -- I think we all agree on is that the mission or missions of

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7

1 the Department of Energy remain very central to, you 2 know, delivering to our people on very important commitments, not only for this administration, but I 3 would say enduring commitments. Certainly some are in 4 areas not of direct responsibility of this Board, like 5 the whole clean energy and climate agenda, but there are, б 7 of course, the nuclear security mission, the broad nuclear security mission is one where obviously you do 8 9 have very important responsibilities. And I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and other members for ongoing 10 discussions that we've been able to have over the last --11 12 over the last year and a half.

And, again, don't need to keep repeating, but we all agree that safety culture, fostering safety considerations into every decision that we make, every day that decisions that are made in the line, allocation to resources, are all very, very critical.

18 Before I get back into some of the broader issues, I want to just kind of highlight a few specifics 19 20 that I think maybe in the end say more about how one 21 approaches these things on a day-by-day basis. So, for 22 example, the Board has pointed to safety culture and 23 emergency response shortcomings, the WIPP incidents this year were examples, I think, in both. Some of the 24 responses that we have -- not only responses, but things 25

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10/7/2014

we were doing somewhat earlier before -- before the incidents and continuing and -- but others in -- kind of in response.

For example, in terms of a response to the --4 to the radiological incident, the -- in a first meeting, 5 a videoteleconference with the team out in Carlsbad, the б 7 suggestion was immediately to kind of talk about a date for restarting operations. And we said, no, that's not 8 9 where we start. We don't set a date before we understand better, A, what happened and, B, what the recovery plan 10 is because these dates can then acquire lives of their 11 own, and that could lead to a compromise of safety. So, 12 that's just kind of an anecdotal example, but I think 13 that's exactly how one needs to be thinking all the time. 14

And, frankly, I think the message was well 15 received that that's how we were thinking about it as 16 17 well at headquarters. And I think now, you know, six 18 months later, with a draft recovery plan out, now we can begin to talk about what looks to be appropriate times 19 20 for restarting in a safe -- in a safe condition. 21 Similarly, on the emergency response side, the -- first of all, we have a -- well, frankly, we have recruited a 22 23 terrific individual, came from the National Security Council, to look at our emergency response capabilities, 24 again, broadly, because it goes back again to our 25

multiple missions, only some of which overlap with your 1 2 direct responsibility. So she is looking both in terms 3 of how we manage emergency response for things like 4 energy -- energy emergencies, you know, severe weather, infrastructure down, what -- how -- how we organize --5 organize a response, but also at the issues in terms of б 7 our own complex -- in terms of how -- how are we going to upgrade. We completely -- I think we concurred with your 8 9 findings, for example, in that -- in -- in that particular case. 10

Another example, I would say, is that we 11 reorganized our health, safety, and security functions. 12 We separated an office into two different components. 13 One is dedicated -- is the Environmental -- Environmental 14 Health, Safety and Security Office. That is -- that will 15 be managed by the Undersecretary for Management 16 17 Performance, itself a new organizational entity to -- to 18 elevate very -- very clearly to the undersecretary level that upgrading, upping our game in management performance 19 is -- is absolutely critical. 20

This is one element of that, and I think you'll be hearing later today from the director of that office, Matt Moury. But then having a separate -- separate organization on independent enterprise assessments headed by Glenn Podonsky that reports to me directly.

One of the findings earlier this year in that 1 2 independent assessment were safety culture shortcomings in the WTP arena at -- at Hanford. And, again, in terms 3 of how we're trying to, you know, internalize appropriate 4 responses to these, when we got the report in the spring, 5 the immediate charge back to that independent assessment б 7 activity was to notify the line organization at Hanford and through them the contractors that there would be a 8 9 one-year revisit to look again at safety culture and specifically look at what has been done in the year. 10

So, that -- that review, it's -- it's docketed 11 with the Independent Assessments Office. That will occur 12 in the late winter, which is the one-year anniversary of 13 the original -- original finding. And I think that's the 14 case where, you know, frankly, when -- when the site and 15 the contractors had good performance, they will have a 16 17 little more time; when there are shortcomings, well, 18 we're going to just go back and tell them and -- you know, tell them, one year from now you're going to --19 20 you're going to come back and be -- we're going to come 21 back and you're going to be -- you're going to be graded 22 on this.

23 So, again, those are anecdotal, but I think in 24 many ways they kind of tell a story about how we're 25 trying to react to this. We -- we certainly are not -- I

feel very strongly that when these findings are made by the Board or by our internal organization, we don't -certainly we don't bury our heads in the sand. We have to take them quite seriously. I view them as constructive findings that gives us a chance to -- to continue to up our -- up our game.

So, I just wanted to emphasize that that's what we're trying to do. And this does come directly to the Secretary's office, Secretary/Deputy Secretary, and we will try to take -- take strong action.

11 The -- you know, in a broader sense, I mean, we 12 know that the -- the Integrated Safety Management Policy 13 is the -- kind of is the foundation of the approach. 14 That's not new; that's been in place, obviously, for a 15 long time. It's an enduring framework, but we need to --16 we need to -- to continually implement it.

17 The Department, as the Board knows, and we've 18 said now already twice, does have a set of diverse missions and, frankly, I think that the -- the specific 19 20 implementation plans of many of our policies will look 21 slightly different compared -- you know, based upon the 22 mission. What we're trying to do is establish -- you 23 know, make sure that what are the core principles that must be part of the implementation plan, whether it's in 24 safety, security, or -- or other areas, things like, for 25

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12

example, project management, another area where we 1 2 will -- we've been at this for a -- you know, over a year in terms of redoing our fundamental project management 3 4 structures. We hope we'll be able to put those forward. 5 It's been a lot of iterations with the -- with the line б 7 organizations. Again, by the way, the same philosophy. Here are the core principles that must be observed, 8 9 whether it's the Office of Science or Defense Programs or 10 You will -- there will be some variations, EM. specifically in how that is implemented, but the core 11 principles must be respected and we will strengthen the 12 way in which the -- essentially the Office of the 13 14 Secretary gauges with that. That's something that I hope within weeks we'll 15 be able to -- to put out. And even though that may not 16 17 sound like direct -- directly safety culture, I think the

18 issue of being able to execute projects more effectively 19 certainly spills over into -- into those -- into those 20 issues. So, that's another example of something we will 21 be doing -- we will be doing soon.

I might say also that -- and I don't want to -despite these different missions, et cetera, and you know the -- the statistics, and also the limits of them, but -- but I do want to emphasize that, you know, things

like -- like injuries with respect to industrial -industrial practice generally is actually pretty good, despite the fact that we have -- we have pretty extraordinary risky operations in our -- in our nuclear facilities.

And I think, you know, on the one hand, one б 7 should not underestimate that kind of output measure. We also know that's far from the whole story, okay, and 8 there are -- you know, and interpretations. But I do 9 10 want to emphasize that we are -- you know, we do have that. It's not like we are in some major outlier space, 11 but I don't want to underestimate, nor do I want to 12 overestimate that as a -- as a important -- an important 13 14 issue.

The -- we are taking some additional steps, for 15 example, very much in line, I think, with your 2011 16 recommendation, we are forming a safety culture 17 18 improvement panel. That charter should be -unfortunately, he couldn't quite get it done by this 19 20 meeting, but we're, again, I would say within weeks, 21 certainly, of doing that. And, again, this will be a 22 panel specifically to manage a consistent implementation 23 of safety culture improvements and -- and sustainment 24 initiatives.

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I might say that we are also working with

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our unions. You all know, of course, the Hammer -- the Hammer facility, but there are other issues in terms of how contracts are structured and incentives put in. Again, a place where we have recruited as of June a really, in my view, outstanding individual from the labor world and, in fact, it's actually two individuals in dealing with labor.

And, in fact, this last week, I actually forget 8 9 which week this is. Last week, in fact, we made it very clear that something that really hasn't happened is that 10 they will be involved with our procurement people up 11 front in terms of how requests for proposals for our 12 sites are structured. Now, that will be -- they'll have 13 broad interest in terms of how those contracts are 14 structured, but I think that's another thing that will --15 that will influence safety culture issues strongly. 16

The -- I mentioned the -- the reorg already --17 18 or the various reorgs of relevance here. One area that we identified for improvement was a better understanding 19 20 of the leadership behaviors needed for a safety-conscious 21 work environment. And, so, a training course was 22 developed with a team of federal and contractor subject 23 matter experts from across DOE and NNSA, National Lab site contractors, aligned with the ISM system, focused on 24 our ISM quide. And this course has now been delivered to 25

-- approximately to 2,000 leaders and managers across the
-- across the complex.

And, interestingly, the -- those who have kind of come to this course and wanted to be part of the course, are not restricted to the kinds of nuclear sites that you are responsible for examining a broader interest, which I think, again, is a very positive kind of department or enterprise-wide activity.

9 I mentioned the contract language issues in 10 terms of particularly with labor. Those are probably the 11 kinds of things that I wanted to say. The -- we also do 12 have -- this is not, again -- this is more the energy 13 space, but although maybe it's the kind of thing that we 14 should think about more broadly, but an energy -- an 15 energy incident management council is being strengthened.

16 Its charter is being rewritten. The Deputy 17 Secretary will chair this. Again, this is right now 18 focused much more on the energy infrastructure response 19 side, but again, I think it's -- I think of this as 20 something of a continuum across all of these -- all of 21 these -- all of these areas.

22 So, you know, I think rather than kind of go 23 through the repetition of kind of our shared values, I 24 think that just gives a way of thinking and doing as --25 as recommendations come forward, as incidents occur, and

1 always trying to really strongly reinforce our shared 2 values. So, with that, Mr. Chairman, I think I'll turn 3 it back to you. DR. WINOKUR: Well, thank you for your 4 testimony. And so that we can gauge the amount of time 5 we have for questions, it's my understanding you'll be б 7 able to stay with us perhaps until about 9:20 this morning. Is that accurate? 8 9 SECRETARY MONIZ: I heard a yes. DR. WINOKUR: Yes, thank you very much. 10 All right we know -- we know who's in charge now. 11 Let me start out with a question for you about 12 safety culture at the Waste Treatment and Immobilization 13 14 Plant. And, actually, in your comments, you did mention the 2014 DOE independent oversight assessment of the 15 project. And I think it was somewhat sobering. They did 16 talk about the fact that there were improvements but that 17 18 no significant improvement in safety culture of the organization had occurred. And they said that there were 19 20 very few changes in the perceptions of workers, I guess 21 in terms of their ability to raise concerns and have them 22 addressed. 23 Is that consistent with your thinking? Have 24 you -- have you fully accepted the findings of that

25 report and are you comfortable with what the report's

1 suggesting?

2 SECRETARY MONIZ: Well, yes. I mean, again, I 3 -- well, I don't want to underestimate this -- the 4 progress noted by the group, but they clearly identified 5 major persistent problems. The -- first, there's no 6 question I certainly am committed to wanting openness. 7 Those on the front lines, I think, have a lot to offer in 8 terms of how the work should -- should go forward.

9 They have to feel completely open to having the opportunity to express that, to have -- to have technical 10 differences of opinion resolved in a -- in a professional 11 -- professional way. But, again, I think the -- if you 12 then ask, okay, what can you do to really, shall we say, 13 strongly encourage those problems being -- being 14 addressed, I mentioned a couple of them, I think. 15 One is this immediate message going back, 16 17 schedule a one-year revisit that will specifically look 18 at progress on these issues. And I think, frankly, both the contractor and the line organization are presumably 19

20 sent a strong message by that. If there is not

21 improvement at this one-year review, there will be a more 22 stern message, to be perfectly honest.

And, secondly, longer term impact is this idea of having a relook at how requests for proposals are structured. I think there's a lot of incentives that

need to be put in at the right time, and that's up front 1 2 when you're even asking for the -- for the proposals. DR. WINOKUR: Thank you. When the Board wrote 3 its recommendation, one of the things we focused on was 4 that the safety culture was making it difficult for the 5 project to address technical issues. It was deterring б 7 the timely reporting, acknowledgment, and ultimate resolution of these technical issues. We actually had a 8 9 hearing in the subsequent year at the site where we went 10 through some of these technical issues, which had not been resolved for a very long period of time, some of 11 them erosion and corrosion for over a decade. 12 And I think you know and you're aware that the 13 project is still having a lot of difficulty resolving 14 technical issues. Do you think the inability to resolve 15 these technical issues can somewhat stem from this 16 17 weakness in safety culture? Do you think that's still 18 impacting the project's inability to solve the issues?

SECRETARY MONIZ: Well, of course, with regard to WTP, as you know, we are in a process with the -- with the state in terms of a pretty fundamental restructuring of how the project is approached. While we -unfortunately, we were not able to reach agreement on specifics in terms of, you know, various milestones, et cetera, I think it is important to realize that both

1 department's and the state's proposals -- this is 2 relevant to your question. Peter --

2 relevant to your question, Peter --

3 DR. WINOKUR: All right.

SECRETARY MONIZ: -- both the -- both proposals 4 adopted fundamentally the same restructuring of a phased 5 -- phased approach. The -- and the driver of that was б 7 precisely the unresolved technical issues that you referred to. And, frankly, so, when I, you know, took 8 9 over the secretarial role a year and a half ago, my view was, again, well, we got -- we got to put this on the 10 We can't just put in another plan based upon the 11 table. plan of record when there are unresolved technical 12 It would be very -- in my judgment, my technical 13 issues. 14 judgment, let alone my kind of managerial judgment -- was that it would be very unsafe to execute the plan of 15 record without resolving those technical issues. And you 16 know very well what those -- what those are. 17

18 So, I'll be honest. I do think that -- that a little more attention to input some years ago might have 19 20 helped those technical issues to be resolved earlier. 21 So, our -- our plan is to make sure we have an executable plan. Executable means safe, among -- among other 22 23 things. And I would say that I think that in the last nine months, since we kind of took head-on this issue of 24 acknowledging and addressing the technical challenges, I 25

1 think we've actually made a lot of progress.

2 I'm not saying they're solved. If they were 3 solved, we could be putting all those milestones out 4 there right now. But that's kind of, again, the philosophy that we are -- we are trying to follow. 5 Ιt involves many lines of our management reforms, how б 7 project management is done. It certainly involves safety as a core consideration of that. And as I said, I think 8 9 there were opportunities that maybe were not taken full advantage of in terms of addressing this earlier. 10

DR. WINOKUR: Thank you. My final question for 11 now is the issue of whistleblowers. The Board began its 12 investigation at Hanford based upon some allegations of 13 Dr. Tamosaitis. The Board wasn't concerning itself with 14 any issues -- legal issues of ongoing litigation, but we 15 were looking at the fact that a whistleblower could be 16 viewed by the workers that -- as creating a chilling 17 18 effect, let's say, on the workforce and making it more difficult for the workforce to raise safety concerns. 19 20 And these whistleblower issues, incidences, continue in the project. There's a lot of congressional 21 interest, and then there's media interest, and then do 22 you think that -- that these issues are still impacting 23 the project and making it difficult for workers to feel 24 that they can raise safety concerns? 25

SECRETARY MONIZ: Well, certainly, I'm strongly 1 2 committed to doing all that we can in terms of making sure that kind of a chilling environment is not present. 3 4 Now, it's well known that there are some issues that are still ongoing, specifically with regard to WTP. 5 It's also public that certainly in one case, and we can't б 7 discuss the specifics, it's an ongoing issue, but it is public that a IG report was -- IG investigation was 8 9 requested to -- to look into that.

I would also say that in some other -- at least in one other very high-profile case in a different part of the Department, and, again, not in the nuclear sphere, that when it was very clear that there was a problem of the type that you have mentioned, we took immediate -immediate action and removed -- removed some rather senior -- senior individuals.

17 So, all I can say is that we will keep working 18 at this, making it very clear that this is not the way we want to do business. Frankly, this is, again, and I want 19 20 to go back that it's a recurring theme, a lot of how 21 contracts are structured up front can be very material on 22 these -- on managing downstream problems. And we have to 23 look at that kind of procurement reform. 24 DR. WINOKUR: Thank you.

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Mr. Sullivan?

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1 MR. SULLIVAN: Thank you, and good morning, Mr. 2 Secretary. 3 SECRETARY MONIZ: Good morning. 4 MR. SULLIVAN: Really great to have you here and on this very important topic. I actually want to 5 6 shift gears a little bit and ask you a question about the 7 Pantex Plant, the people who work there and their culture. And if you bear with me for just a minute, 8 9 because this is a public meeting, I want to go through a little bit of the background for the benefit of the 10 11 public. SECRETARY MONIZ: Mm-hmm. 12 MR. SULLIVAN: But the Board wrote this 13 Recommendation in 2011 focused on the Waste Treatment 14 Plant, and among the recommendations was a recommendation 15 16 to -- specific recommendation to an extent of condition 17 review, which is to look everywhere throughout the nuclear 18 weapons complex at safety culture. And that was done in 2012, and the results came back that said specifically at 19 20 Pantex the safety culture was not very good, which was concerning to us because this is where the actual weapons 21 22 and warheads are assembled and disassembled and many other 23 maintenance procedures happen. 24 And just recently, the Board received a brief 25 from the Nuclear Explosive Safety Senior Technical

Advisors, and again, by way of background, for the benefit 1 2 of the public, a nuclear explosive safety evaluation --3 I'm reading from your own instructions to make sure I get 4 it correct -- is they are -- they qualitatively assess the adequacy of controls in meeting the Department of Energy's 5 nuclear explosive safety standards and the criteria. 6 And 7 the senior technical advisors are persons who are acting from outside the actual community in order to reinforce 8 9 the independence and diversity. They are recognized senior-level science, engineering, and management experts. 10

And, so, these folks came in and told us that 11 just -- just in August, that they thought that the 12 relationship with the folks at Pantex was sub-optimal 13 between themselves and -- and the folks there. They said 14 some Pantex personnel seemed to view the nuclear explosive 15 safety studies as a barrier to overcome rather than a 16 17 rigorous process to help them think through any potential 18 issues and ensure the plant operates safely. They went on to say that many of their actual suggestions meet with 19 20 resistance rather than an openness to actually make 21 change.

22 Can you address, sir, for us just what -- what 23 you feel about the safety culture at Pantex and what 24 actions might be necessary in order to make improvements, 25 if improvements are, in fact, warranted?

SECRETARY MONIZ: Well, first of all, I think 1 2 improvements are, again, warranted, first of all, throughout our complex, and that would include at -- at 3 4 Pantex. I think -- I think later on Madelyn Creedon, the Deputy Administrator -- Principal Deputy Administrator, 5 6 will be -- will be testifying and can go into that a bit 7 more. And, again, in general terms, as I said, we'll establish this safety culture improvement panel, which is 8 9 not, of course, facility-specific but more -- more broadly 10 engaged.

The -- we are -- you know, working to try to 11 revise and improve kind of the safety-conscious work 12 environment self-assessment process. We clearly need to 13 make sure we have best -- best industry standards, 14 consistency, methodology, solicit and really listen to --15 to feedback, lessons learned. I believe NNSA is going to 16 17 be specifically looking at a reevaluation of DOE, you 18 know, orders, guides, and standards. And, again, Principal Deputy Creedon can -- can get into that more. 19 20 I will add that, again, I think a lot of the issues we deal with are linked, and we all know we have a 21 22 very significant modernization challenge for our 23 production complex. We did have some good news with 24 Kansas City there in August where, you know, half the footprint, a much better environment, saving operating 25

funds, but, of course, that's the non-nuclear 1 2 establishment and there are different challenges at Pantex and at Y-12, et cetera, Los Alamos. 3 4 So -- so, I think we have to -- we have to look at this in a -- in a coherent way. We have to move 5 6 forward on the modernization program. You all -- well, 7 you well know that there are challenges in each of those three sites that I mentioned, but I think -- so, we 8 9 have -- I think we need to make sure we are enforcing 10 these culture -- safety culture improvements continuously. It's very important every day that we are doing 11 work in these -- in these facilities, but we also need to 12 think about how that safety environment can be improved 13 14 dramatically as we go through the modernization over the next -- unfortunately I can't say two or three years, but 15 two or three decades. So, I think we have to keep those 16 17 different time scales in mind. 18 MR. SULLIVAN: Okay. Well, thank you, Mr. Secretary. So, you know, one of the things that they told 19 20 us -- again, these are the nuclear explosive safety -- the

21 senior technical advisors, is that, again, that they had 22 many issues that they had raised repeatedly over the 23 years, and they didn't seem to be getting addressed. And 24 they were simply looking for having a technical

25 conversation with management to understand why these

issues weren't being addressed. So, my question --1 2 SECRETARY MONIZ: Okay. MR. SULLIVAN: -- to you, sir, is really whether 3 4 you'd be willing to have that conversation with them. SECRETARY MONIZ: Well, so -- so, certainly, I 5 б probably have to be informed more to this, and I know that 7 there are some -- some areas which are not -- specific issues which are not discussable in the current format 8 9 today. So, what I would say is I think I'll go back certainly with General Klotz and see about how to best 10 bring those specific issues up -- up to my attention and 11 what we do about it. 12 I mean, I'm certainly aware of the general 13 issues and some of the -- as I said, some of these 14 classified specific challenges, but perhaps I need a 15 broader -- broader briefing. 16 17 MR. SULLIVAN: Thank you very much, Mr. 18 Secretary. SECRETARY MONIZ: Thank you. 19 20 DR. WINOKUR: Ms. Roberson? MS. ROBERSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and 21 22 thank you for your comments, Mr. Secretary. I appreciate 23 those. 24 Mr. Secretary, in the last three years, DOE's response to Board Recommendation 2011-1 has involved 25

changing procedures, conducting assessments, some 1 2 independent assessments, mostly self-assessments, and conducting a lot of training. And we -- this is a third 3 in a series of hearings. And, so, in our recent hearings 4 with safety culture experts, the Board has learned that it 5 is extremely difficult to make change to an existing 6 7 culture of safety. And DOE's culture has been evolving and getting stronger for almost 70 years. And, so, the 8 9 culture is what the culture is.

In September of 2013, you issued a memorandum to all departmental elements entitled "Personal Commitment to Health and Safety through Leadership, Employee Engagement and Organizational Learning." What are the challenges you see in driving the existing culture of safety or subcultures toward the expectations you laid out in that memo?

17 SECRETARY MONIZ: By the way, first of all, I 18 just would repeat that this will be repeated next week 19 with our first town hall meeting, as I mentioned with the 20 new -- the new Deputy Secretary. I can assure you, this 21 will be a prominent issue -- issue of discussion.

Well, you know, I am going to emphasize the half-full part of the glass, and I do think that there --I think there is progress being made. But, again, and I've said -- I said already earlier, we know that we have

1	a ways to go. You what's the problem? Well, you
2	identified one of the problems already. You know, there -
3	- these things take often take some time to to
4	change, but I believe that the training, the I hope,
5	you know, kind of more consistent level of attention at
6	the senior levels of the Department, and as I mentioned,
7	and I maybe I'm putting too much stock into this, but I
8	think the idea of looking up front when procurements start
9	is the time to start doing this, and not because you're
10	always behind if you are then responding to an incident
11	and the levers are not what one perhaps should have had in
12	place.
13	MS. ROBERSON: Okay. Well, we use your letter a
14	lot when we go to the field.
15	SECRETARY MONIZ: Oh.
16	MS. ROBERSON: We say this is the Secretary's
17	commitment.
18	SECRETARY MONIZ: Well, thank you for helping
19	support it. Right.
20	MS. ROBERSON: And what I what I wonder is,
21	is do you see oftentimes resigning to black-and-white in
22	actually making that public commitment has an impact. And
23	I just wanted to know if you think you see the kind of
24	impact you expected when you signed that memo.
25	SECRETARY MONIZ: Well, as always, I mean, I

think it tends to go slower than you maybe would have --1 2 would have liked, but I would -- I would say that I think putting it in black and white really is important. Of 3 4 course that's why we did it very early in my tenure, but on the other hand, black and white has the advantages of 5 black and white and the disadvantages of black and white, б 7 because in the end, there's a lot of interpretation required. And -- and if the -- and if the organization 8 does not have a sense that this is really -- really in the 9 thought process and in the commitments, you know, there 10 are ways of -- of dragging things out. 11

12 Now, I think we are making progress, as I said. I like it to be -- to be more -- faster and more 13 consistent, but we will keep pressing kind of in both 14 directions. But I might add, the reason I started out 15 with anecdotes is because I do think that -- it's that --16 17 I think those kinds of responses to findings and 18 recommendations that have operational consequences going down, like for example, okay, you didn't get an A, so you 19 20 get reviewed again.

I think that's what kind of says, look, you know, we're serious about this. And -- and until you perform at a higher level, we're just going to keep coming back and -- and there are other levers like in a contract that we can -- we can exercise.

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1 MS. ROBERSON: Thank you, sir. 2 DR. WINOKUR: Mr. Secretary, DOE is a very diverse organization, and you have many subcultures. 3 Even 4 when we deal with defense nuclear facilities, you have got NNSA; you've got EM; you've got research activities in 5 6 defense nuclear facilities; you've got a lot of production 7 facilities. And you've got to craft this overarching framework to build a strong culture of safety. 8 9 Are there elements in DOE that you see today that you think are leaders in this area that have stronger 10 safety culture that you could use to inform other elements 11 of DOE and strengthen their culture? 12 SECRETARY MONIZ: Well, it certainly is correct 13 14 that -- that there are different approaches to issues across -- across the Department, and -- and maybe just 15 again in the same way that Mr. Sullivan said as a public 16 17 hearing maybe just a little bit of background is that 18 the -- the reorganization that we put in place at the undersecretary level, one for energy and science, one for 19 20 management and performance, and one for nuclear security, which, of course, the NNSA is a legislatively required 21 position, the -- those -- that was done, first of all, to 22 23 very much emphasize these are the three big areas that we have got to advance for the administration and, you know, 24 for the American people: nuclear security, the energy 25

1 science mission, and better management performance.

Each of those three areas has one -- typically one, in NNSA you might say two -- large programs that do big, complicated things. The Office of Science, EM, which is in the management and performance line, and then principally defense programs, although nonproliferation does have at least some well-known major projects.

8 There's no doubt that each of those entities has 9 a different culture and a different set of challenges. If 10 we take an example like project management, I think, you 11 know, there's no -- I'm not revealing a big secret to say 12 that in general the Office of Science is viewed as having 13 had a much more successful program overall over the years.

14 So, what we are doing and what I mentioned 15 earlier in terms of what will be probably in a few weeks 16 our announcement of our kind of revised project management 17 approach is precisely to not fix what's not broken but to 18 use the essential principles being employed there in the 19 other two lines.

It's not to say that, again, execution is identical, because it can't be. An EM project and a -and a UPF and a coherent x-ray laser project are different. But what we're trying to do, and this is -this is in response to you -- is the general approach to these kinds of issues is we're trying to get a lot more

enterprise-wide experience, learn from best practices, 1 2 understand what are the core principles that make that approach effective, have those principles become 3 4 enterprise-wide, and then have the implementation at each of the undersecretary levels follow their needs and 5 6 their -- the kind of work that they -- that they do. 7 So, that's our general approach and it applies in all of these -- all of these areas. How successful 8 9 we'll be, well, we'll -- we will -- we will judge going 10 forward. 11 DR. WINOKUR: I'm hopeful you can take one 12 additional question. 13 Ms. Roberson? 14 MS. ROBERSON: And I'm going to be brief, just in case my peers have another question. You -- you hit it 15 a little bit in your opening comments, the major reorg you 16 17 did when you first took on the position as Secretary. And 18 I really just have one question I wanted to ask you. It may be a lot of pieces to the question. 19 20 You did talk about some of your drivers, but the question I wanted to focus on was how you viewed the 21 22 reorganization contributing to strengthening safety or your safety message. And then as a part of that, when you 23 were sworn in as Secretary, there were several independent 24 25 assessments that you actually had available to consider as

you reorganized: EM, federal assessment, and HSS. And I'm just wondering if any input from those assessments had any impact on your decisions in how you restructured the Department from a safety perspective.

5 SECRETARY MONIZ: Absolutely. And -- and, in fact, I'll say this quite -- you know, say it publicly, 6 7 that a -- an individual who really played a complete role, frankly was a driver of this, was, in fact, Glenn 8 9 Podonsky, who headed the merged organization before and he made a strong case that -- that -- and especially in the 10 11 context of our undersecretary reorganization that it was better to split the functions so that I had a true 12 independent assessment function that was separated from 13 the more line function, if you like, of now -- what is now 14 So, that was very much in there. 15 EHS&S.

16 But, also, I'll say honestly that, you know, we 17 did not adhere, you know, slavishly to some management 18 ideology about it, so, for example, at least in the interim in the transition, what we did is while some of 19 20 the interactions with the labor unions perhaps logically would have been in a different place, we decided to keep 21 22 them at least for a transitional period to be determined 23 in the independent assessments office simply because, 24 frankly, there was such a very good personal relationship and the unions really wanted that -- wanted that there. 25

That included running the Hanford facility, et cetera. 1 2 So, you know, we -- we're trying to get the 3 organization institutionalized to align with our principal 4 objectives, but, again, we don't want to fix what's not broken at the moment. So -- so, and safety was clearly a 5 major part of that -- of that interaction, specifically 6 7 with unions, for example. MS. ROBERSON: Thank you, sir. 8 9 DR. WINOKUR: Well, we certainly want to thank you for your time this morning. I think we have a couple 10 of additional questions which we'll submit for the record. 11 12 SECRETARY MONIZ: Okay. 13 DR. WINOKUR: And we understand your 14 responsibilities. We're very pleased you were able to spend some time with us this morning. So, once again, 15 16 thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. 17 SECRETARY MONIZ: Well, Peter or Mr. Chairman. 18 DR. WINOKUR: Peter to you is fine. SECRETARY MONIZ: Peter, Sean, and Jessie, you 19 20 know, look, I really appreciate what -- what you do. Your recommendations have been fair and I think point -- point 21 22 for -- point to directions for us to -- to respond to. 23 Again, you know, we -- you know, there's no -- there's no 24 magic wand that all these things get cured overnight, but 25 -- but we appreciate your work and we'll keep working with

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1 you. 2 DR. WINOKUR: Thank you again, Mr. Secretary. 3 SECRETARY MONIZ: And I do, also, and I would 4 just put an advertisement in for you to as soon as possible get together with our new Deputy Secretary, who 5 will play clearly a very important role in these -- in б 7 these issues. Thank you. DR. WINOKUR: Thank you, sir. 8 9 MS. ROBERSON: Thank you. DR. WINOKUR: Please join us. 10 As I mentioned earlier, this public meeting and 11 hearing is the third of a series of hearings to address 12 safety culture at the Department of Energy's defense 13 nuclear facilities and the Board's Recommendation 2011-1, 14 Safety Culture at the Waste Treatment and Immobilization 15 16 Plant. Subsequent public meetings and hearings will be 17 announced by separate notices. 18 In the first hearing, the Board received remarks from a recognized industry expert in the field of safety 19 20 culture on the tools used for assessing safety culture; the approaches for interpreting the assessment results; 21 22 and how the results can be used for measuring the safety 23 culture of an organization.

24The Board also heard remarks from safety culture25experts from the Federal Government, including senior
staff of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. The nuclear nexus between NRC and DOE is obvious, while NNSA and DOE have a similar federal contractor construct and both engage in complex high-hazard operations.

In the second hearing, the Board received 6 7 remarks from current and former Naval officers on techniques the Navy uses to measure, improve, and sustain 8 9 a robust culture of safety in operations and in the design 10 and construction of nuclear submarines. The Board also heard remarks from a member of the United States Chemical 11 Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, who is with us here 12 today, and two academic experts on the role of leaders in 13 establishing and sustaining a robust -- robust culture of 14 safety within organizations that conduct hazardous 15 16 operations.

The goal of the first two hearings was to learn more about safety culture, how it can be measured, how it can be improved, and how leaders influence it. Our goal for this meeting is to discuss with the Department of Energy senior officials their views on the current status of the safety culture of their organizations and their thoughts on improving that culture.

24 We will also discuss with them their 25 organization's progress in addressing the commitments

associated with Board Recommendation 2011-1. In this
meeting, the Board will hold three panels. The first
panel was testimony from the Secretary of Energy. In the
second panel, the Board will receive testimony from the
Honorable Madelyn Creedon, the Principal Deputy
Administrator of the National Nuclear Security
Administration.

8 The Board is interested in the views of NNSA 9 leadership on the concerns identified in the Board's 10 Recommendation 2011-1, safety culture assessments that 11 were conducted of NNSA and its contractors, and NNSA's 12 approach to address identified areas of concern.

In the third panel, the Board will hear 13 testimony from Mr. Mark Whitney, the Acting Assistant 14 Secretary for Environmental Management at the Department 15 of Energy. The Board is interested in the views of EM 16 17 leadership on the concerns identified in the Board's 18 recommendation, safety culture assessments of EM -- that's Environmental Management -- and its contractors, and 19 20 Environmental Management's approach to address areas of 21 concern.

This concludes my opening remarks. I will now
turn to the Board members for their opening remarks.
Ms. Roberson?
MS. ROBERSON: None at this time, Mr. Chairman.

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DR. WINOKUR: Mr. Sullivan? 1 2 MR. SULLIVAN: No remarks. 3 DR. WINOKUR: This concludes the Board's opening remarks. At this time, I would like to invite our second 4 panel member, the Honorable Madelyn Creedon, to the 5 б witness table. 7 Ms. Creedon will be provided 10 minutes for her opening remarks. The Board will accept her full written 8 9 testimony into the record. Ms. Creedon has been provided some initial lines of inquiry in advance of this hearing. 10 Ms. Madelyn Creedon was confirmed by the Senate on 11 Wednesday, July 23rd, 2014, as the Department of Energy's 12 Principal Deputy Administrator for the National Nuclear 13 Security Administration. At this time, we welcome remarks 14 by the Honorable Madelyn Creedon, to be followed by 15 16 questions from the Board members. 17 MS. CREEDON: Thank you. Again, good morning, 18

18 Mr. Chairman and members of the Board. It is, indeed, a 19 pleasure for me to be here today to discuss NNSA's efforts 20 and progress with respect to Recommendation 2011-1 and to 21 improve the NNSA's safety culture.

I've been the Principal Deputy Administrator for about two months now, and in that short time, I have had the opportunity to begin to explore the NNSA's safety culture, including the assessment of its organization and

safety culture activities. I look forward to discussing 1 2 this important topic with you all this morning. 3 NNSA actively supports the Department of 4 Energy's commitment to safety culture, not simply because it's a commitment to the DNFSB, but because it's the right 5 thing to do. NNSA has proactively supported responses to 6 7 Recommendation 2011-1 since DOE formed its response team in the summer of 2011. NNSA employees participated in 8 9 developing the implementation strategy and writing the implementation plan and have implemented those actions on 10 behalf of NNSA. 11

12 Three of our NNSA employees helped develop the safety-conscious work environment training for federal and 13 contractor senior leaders described in Section 5 of the 14 implementation plan, and they also serve on the team of 15 instructors who have taught the class to over 2,000 senior 16 17 federal, contractor, and plant and laboratory leaders, as 18 well as managers from across the DOE. We are also supporting the design of the safety-conscious work 19 20 environment training for first-line leaders.

Jim McConnell, the NNSA Acting Associate Administrator for Infrastructure and Operations and a former DNFSB staff member, teaches safety culture modules in nuclear enterprise leadership training for DOE and contractor senior managers. And, of course, DOE and NNSA

federal and contractor managers and employees at our sites are very involved in addressing the opportunities for improvement identified in the NNSA safety culture selfassessment report, which was conducted in response to the 2011-1 Recommendation. Our M&O partners are also running a series of workshops on safety issues, with the second one to be held later this month.

You are aware of -- of this safety culture 8 9 review that NNSA had conducted, and it looked at both the federal staff at headquarters and as well as the field 10 And, of course, this survey was conducted last 11 offices. The primary objective of the evaluation was to 12 vear. gather information regarding the status of the 13 organizational safety culture at NNSA. 14

This report recognized that the NNSA 15 organization is comprised of dedicated and talented 16 17 professionals who are committed to ensuring that the NNSA 18 mission is carried out safely, securely, and effectively. The report also stated that NNSA succeeds in its mission 19 20 and succeeds in carrying out its mission safely, but in many times the work that is carried out and is -- is 21 22 carried out in spite of the bureaucracy and some of the 23 organizational issues. So, it's really the result of the 24 dedication and the effort of these NNSA employees that really are instrumental to getting the job done. 25

The report's findings highlighted the need to 1 2 improve trust and respect between NNSA senior leadership and employees across the organization. The report also 3 describes the behavior of senior leadership as a culture 4 of entitlement and a culture of non-inclusion. From this 5 report, it's evident that NNSA must improve its б 7 environment and its communications so that our employees can trust the NNSA leadership. 8

9 Part of this improvement must be the 10 establishment of an environment in which our people not 11 only can but are encouraged to raise issues, including 12 those associated with safety at all levels and that they 13 not be concerned about retaliation for their actions.

14 The NNSA safety culture report identified 15 several recommendations for NNSA's consideration. These 16 include establishing a communication process to 17 effectively engage the workforce at all levels of the 18 organization, implementing a change management process, 19 but most importantly, establishing trust and respect 20 amongst NNSA employees, including its leadership.

There are no quick fixes. Even the best plans require some time to be effective. But the work has started. Frank Klotz, the NNSA Administrator, and I are actively engaged in addressing these issues and committed to success. Shortly after taking office, Frank started

planning a leadership team retreat, which we will have next week, to focus on key issues that significantly affect our culture. During this time, we will work as a team on four common themes: communicating effectively; developing a strategic plan and vision; achieving effective leadership; driving a performance-based culture.

7 The goal of this meeting is really to bring 8 together the NNSA senior leadership team and make sure 9 NNSA is a stronger and more effective organization. One 10 of the outcomes will be to establish a process to engage 11 our workforce to get their ideas, feedback, and solutions 12 for moving forward.

We're also establishing a working group to develop and implement actions to improve our safety culture. The working group will be made up of headquarter and field office employees and will be a key part of the effort to find the best ways to improve the safety culture.

The working group's first deliverable will be a strategy, building on the work that is already being done in our field offices and sites, to ensure that safety is a part of every aspect of NNSA's culture and drives how our agency performs its mission.

24 NNSA's key to success really does lie in our
25 talented workforce, both the -- both our federal employees

and our M&O partners who really do support NNSA's mission every day. Because of their commitment, we know we can rely on all of our employees to help us improve the work environment and NNSA's culture.

You have asked about organizations that have a 5 6 strong safety culture. A healthy organizational safety 7 culture is most often found within an aligned organization that has effective processes and motivated people. 8 Based 9 on the results of the field offices' self-assessments and 10 the data from the NNSA federal safety culture assessment, our field office managers and our M&O partners have 11 already taken measures to improve workplace culture, and 12 we applaud their efforts. 13

NNSA field office, headquarters, and contractor 14 senior leaders recently met in Nevada to share with each 15 other what they are doing to sustain the focus on the --16 17 on developing and maintaining a healthy safety culture at 18 their sites and within their organizations and to share their lessons learned. The field offices have also 19 20 drafted their sustainment plans, and we have submitted those to you, consistent with the DNFSB Recommendation 21 22 2011-1.

The NNSA leaders dedicated a day and a half to discuss safety and performance culture and exchange ideas on what and how to improve. You just heard the Secretary

talk about his commitment to safety. All of NNSA, but in particular our middle and senior managers, have important roles to play to establish a strong safety culture. Now that Frank Klotz and I are finally in place, we also have a lot of work to do to fix strategic communications and to make progress on a variety of issues confronting NNSA, including the safety culture.

8 We're trying to set the tone for the enterprise, 9 and we will communicate NNSA's support for the Secretary's 10 vision and our plans for achieving that vision to improve 11 the safety culture in our federal and contractor 12 organizations. In NNSA, our field managers play a key 13 role in communicating the safety culture vision to federal 14 employees in the field and NNSA M&O partners.

Field office managers and contractor senior leaders at NNSA's defense nuclear sites routinely discuss safety culture in meetings with subordinate managers and at all-hands meeting. I actually did the same in a small version of an all-hands last week when I was out at Los Alamos, and also in meeting with the Albuquerque and Sandia federal employees.

Frank and I will continue to visit NNSA field sites to discuss our safety culture vision and our expectations with field and with our contractor partners. Our NNSA mid-level managers have a particularly important

role to play in developing and communicating the safety culture vision, especially to our first-line managers and supervisors. These managers have greater visibility among the employees, and they work most closely with them. They are an important link in spreading the safety culture message throughout our federal and contractor organization.

Research suggests up to 80 percent of 8 9 communications get lost or are distorted in the flow downward from the top of the organization to the workers. 10 We need to use multiple methods, ensure consistency of 11 messages, and regularly ensure safety culture messages to 12 ensure our employees' confidence that we mean what we say. 13 As we all know, the NNSA enterprise is full of 14 lots of rumors, some unfounded, some really unfounded. 15 The Board observed that many of NNSA's safety culture 16 assessments found that workers have different perceptions 17 18 of the existing safety culture than their managers. Experts in safety culture assessment and organizational 19 20 psychology tell us its very common for workers and managers to have different perceptions of the safety 21

22 culture.

Managers almost always believe that the work
environment is better than what the workers believe.
Managers and workers are in different work environments,

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and so it's expected that they would have different perceptions. Managers -- managers may not get out to work sites frequently enough or hear enough or really listen to what the workers are concerned about, and I think this is a problem at NNSA, as well.

6 So, we have to fix that. And we also have to 7 improve the culture throughout the leadership engagement. 8 We have to improve our commitment, and we have to create a 9 consistent, conservative, overarching framework for safety 10 culture.

In his remarks, the Secretary told you that the 11 best approach is to use the behavioral aspects of the 12 13 integrated safety management framework. NSA -- NNSA agrees. Like DOE, the NNSA and its contractors have 14 embraced the integrated safety management program for many 15 16 years. For the most part, we have mature safety 17 management processes, but we need to continue to improve 18 them.

As the Secretary stated, integrated safety management has become an enduring framework for safety. NNSA is not looking at organizations we can model directly. Safety culture experts caution organizations against transplanting cultures. We are, however, benchmarking the other organizations, such as NRC, INPO, commercial power plants, and NASA to identify best

1 practices that we can apply in NNSA.

We're also proactively working with the rest of the Department to identify and adopt best practices. As I mentioned earlier, the NNSA production office at Y-12 is hosting the Safety Cultural Sustainment and Best Practices Workshop for DOE, NNSA, and their contractor partners later this month.

8 The Board rightly identified naval reactors as 9 an organization recognized for its strong safety culture. 10 At NNSA, six of our direct reports have Naval reactors 11 experience, of course in addition to Admiral Richardson. 12 Many additional NNSA and contractor employees have Naval 13 reactors experience and hold leadership positions at our 14 defense nuclear sites.

The rigor and discipline of their background 15 directly contributes to safety. Our employees, within 16 17 Naval reactors experience, clearly influence our culture 18 for the better, to the application of best practices and improvement ideas. And I would note overall that the Navy 19 20 nuclear culture is also very good in instilling the idea of raising issues and raising issues up the chain and 21 having successful layers -- successive layers of the chain 22 23 again push these issues up.

24 In fact, one of the most interesting things 25 about that Naval reactors culture is that in the Naval

reactors, you actually get in trouble if you don't raise it, as opposed to getting in trouble when you do raise it. And that's something that NNSA should also strive to achieve, that same culture, where one has -- where all of our employees have the freedom to raise issues, and as I mentioned earlier, are encouraged to do so.

7 In summary, NNSA and its contractors recognize the need to continuously improve safety -- to improve our 8 9 safety culture and are taking actions to address 10 weaknesses and implement best practices. Frank Klotz and I also understand that NNSA Headquarters has to be more 11 proactive in improving the safety culture and set the tone 12 13 to ensure an open atmosphere exists where issues can be 14 raised and resolved.

My experience at DOD recently taught me that it's the resolution of the issues is as important as the raising of the issues, because if issues are raised and not resolved, over time, people stop raising issues, so both parts are equally important.

20 We are also fully aware and understand that 21 safety culture is a continuing journey, and it will take 22 time to see changes in values, expectations, attitudes, 23 and behaviors. With that said, I think Frank and I are a 24 little bit impatient. And, so, my commitment to you and 25 to the employees of NNSA is that we will make immediate

progress, but most importantly, we will put in place a culture that looks to the long-term view of continuous improvement.

At every turn, Frank and I will emphasize our 4 5 personal values that are captured in the phrase that you 6 have heard Frank use many times: mission first, people 7 always. To that end, we will value and respect our employees; communicate frequently and openly; encourage 8 9 employees to raise problems and issues and get them 10 resolved, without fear of retaliation; ensure that issues raised are addressed in a timely and transparent manner; 11 and encourage differing opinions and a questioning 12 13 attitude.

We'll also expect every leader at NNSA to do the 14 same, and we will hold ourselves and them accountable. 15 We owe it to our employees to improve our culture -- all of 16 17 it -- which will improve the trust our employees have with 18 NNSA leadership. We owe it to our stakeholders to improve our culture so that they can trust that we will meet 19 20 mission -- that we will meet our mission safely and securely, with quality and timeliness. 21

22 Thank you very much, and I look forward to your 23 questions.

DR. WINOKUR: Thank you for your testimony. TheBoard member questions will begin with Mr. Sullivan.

MR. SULLIVAN: Thank you, and good morning Madam 1 2 Deputy Administrator? Is that -- I've got your title 3 correctly? It's a mouthful? MS. CREEDON: Yeah, I know. 4 MR. SULLIVAN: Well, it's good to see you this 5 6 morning. 7 MS. CREEDON: Thank you. MR. SULLIVAN: Thank you for coming. So, I want 8 9 to go straight back to Pantex, because you heard my question to the Secretary, and I think he promised that 10 you could give us more detail. So, by way of review, the 11 -- when the -- an extent of condition review was done in 12 2012 on safety culture, Pantex did not score well. 13 14 And recently we've heard from your nuclear explosive safety senior technical advisors that they were 15 concerned that in Pantex their suggestions tend to meet 16 17 with resistance rather than a willingness to make changes 18 that would improve safety. So, can you speak to any more? You just gave us 19 20 an awful lot in your introduction about generally things that you're doing, but can you speak to any more about 21 22 specifically what is happening at Pantex? 23 MS. CREEDON: So, I am aware that Pantex did not 24 score particularly well in the safety assessment study that was done. And as I have started to venture out on 25

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51

the road, the first stop was Los Alamos, and Sandia, as
 well as meeting with our federal folks, both at Sandia,
 Los Alamos and also the Albuquerque folks. I have to get
 out to the rest of the sites. Pantex and Y-12 are high on
 that list.

б I have not had an opportunity to get into all of 7 the details of that, but one of the things in some of our discussions internally -- and, again, I'm not sure if this 8 9 is the case, but I know that there are some ideas about 10 this, is that maybe because these senior technical advisors are independent contractors and they're -- that 11 maybe there is a communications issue where they don't 12 always see or may not be fully aware how and where their 13 14 advice really has been implemented. That may be part of the problem, but given the results, it surely isn't all of 15 16 the problem.

17 So, this is something that I will definitely 18 look into, and as soon as I can get down to Pantex, we'll 19 spend some time down there, and also we'll talk to the --20 we'll talk to these senior technical advisors, as well, to 21 try and figure out what's going on.

22 MR. SULLIVAN: Okay. Thank you. You know, I 23 had the opportunity just last week to go out to Pantex to 24 spend a whole day to watch operations. But when I -- when 25 I looked at the site office, the -- all the top managers

1 for the site office, they weren't there.

2 They -- the site office is a combined site office with 3 Tennessee. One of the principal managers was -- I was 4 told was on vacation, but the others were -- were up in 5 Tennessee.

Do you have the right structure for people to be 6 7 looking for you, your eyes on the ground, there in Pantex? MS. CREEDON: This is something we're going to 8 9 have to look at, I think, pretty closely. We just had this combined contractor mechanism get put in place 10 The federal manager, Steve Erhardt, 11 earlier this summer. is extraordinarily capable, but, frankly, I'm worrying a 12 little bit that we may burn him out because he spends a 13 14 lot of time moving back and forth.

So, one of the things that, you know, I need to 15 do and Frank and I need to do is really sit down with 16 17 Steve and understand, as he gets more into how this is 18 going to work, exactly some of the logistical issues with respect to getting back and forth between the two sites 19 20 and also making sure that he has the federal -- the federal help that he needs so that he can fully implement 21 this. He's a very talented guy, but it's really important 22 23 that we, as I say, utilize him fully and we don't burn him out in the process. So, this is something we're going to 24 have to look at as this goes -- as this implementation 25

MR. SULLIVAN: Thank you. And, so, lastly, I 2 3 just want to encourage you that when the senior technical advisors came to brief us, they had a lot of important 4 things to say, but one of the things that they basically 5 had to say was that they didn't -- they weren't sure they б 7 were being heard because a lot of their recommendations they had made over and over, and it didn't appear that any 8 9 action was being taken.

10 So, I would simply encourage you as you go to 11 look for all the people that you need to talk to, and I 12 know that's a very large group, but to reach out to this 13 group and -- and to hear from them directly. And I would 14 -- I would ask you to consider doing that.

15 MS. CREEDON: Thank you. I will.

16 MR. SULLIVAN: Okay, thank you.

17 MS. CREEDON: Thanks.

DR. WINOKUR: Let me say first of all I enjoyed your testimony very much. I know you've only been on the job for two months, but I think it was very insightful and demonstrated an understanding at least of the challenges you're facing.

And the question I want to ask is one that you have covered to a reasonable degree, but maybe I'll just hit on a few fine points. What I was concerned about is

¹ goes forward.

how do we take the message -- the vision from the
 Secretary and the senior leadership, yourself and
 Administrator Klotz, and how do we get it down to the
 workers, what you call this committed workforce. And I
 want you to know that I understand that your workforce is
 committed.

7 And I think in your testimony you talked a lot 8 about leaders, middle managers, site office managers. I 9 mean, who from your perspective are the key leaders that 10 you think need to get on board to be absolutely certain 11 that you can transition from what the administrator and 12 yourself and the Secretary are saying and the workers are 13 hearing and understand.

MS. CREEDON: So, at a minimum, it's the senior 14 leaders and headquarters and our senior leaders in the 15 They have to start it. But they can only go so 16 field. 17 far. It's going to take a while, and it has to -- it has 18 to trickle down to everybody. It has to be the mid-level It has to be those first-line supervisors. 19 managers. It 20 has to be everybody that's doing the work.

And as you also know, I think, the annual federal workplace survey, NNSA didn't do very well on that either, and that was from a headquarters perspective. So, we have a lot of work. And it isn't just the safety piece. We have a lot of work on NNSA at large to make it

a better place to be. Part of that is the safety culture, 1 and part of that is as all of our -- as all or our senior 2 3 folks talk to people, very often we tend to emphasize --4 they tend to emphasize a certain aspect. Is it a production -- a production schedule? Is it project 5 б management? Is it keeping the costs in line? 7 And, so, I think our managers tend to focus on what they do best -- their job jars, so to speak -- and 8 9 making sure that as they focus on what they do best that 10 they also focus on some of these broader issues, the safety and the security and these other issues. 11 I think that will help convey that everybody is committed to this. 12 So, it's -- as I say, it's going to be a while, 13 14 as we work through this. You know, Frank and I have two years to get this right, so we're going to try really hard 15 16 to achieve it. 17 DR. WINOKUR: And I'll bring up Joe Bader who we 18 recently lost. He passed away to a long illness, and I know was a very close friend of yours and mine. And one 19

of the things he always said to me, it's those mid-level managers, they are the key, because the message can get lost going down the chain.

Are there any particular attributes or things you're looking for in these mid-level managers to be certain that they can provide the kind of leadership you

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56

1 need to establish the safety culture?

2 MS. CREEDON: Well, at a minimum, I think 3 they're the ones who have to encourage the workforce to 4 raise issues, and then they have to raise the issues to their senior workforce. So, they are the ones who, as I 5 said, have the most frequent contact with most every --6 7 with most everybody that actually does the work. And, so, they're the ones that are going to have to really in some 8 9 instances get that message across, that issues need to be raised, and get people to be empowered, if you will, to 10 11 raise issues.

12 And it's not just safety; it's across the board. And so that we can make sure that these bubble up and that 13 they -- we can figure out how to get them resolved. 14 Or if we can't get them resolved, understand why we can't get 15 them resolved, and then try and tackle that -- that issue. 16 17 But they are key. We've got to get our message down; and 18 they've get our -- they've got to get the workers' message 19 up.

20 DR. WINOKUR: And I guess the last part of this 21 is how will you ensure yourself that the message is 22 getting down to the workers? I think you clearly 23 demonstrated that your understanding of, you know, the 24 potential miscommunications going down the chain of 25 command. How -- how would you as the Deputy convince

1 yourself that it's what it needs to be?

MS. CREEDON: Well, I mean, at a personal level, Frank and I are just going to have to go talk to people. We're just going to have to get on the road and talk to people. But we have almost 40,000 employees by the time we look at the federal employees and the M&O contractors. So, we're clearly not going to talk to all of them. It just isn't possible, as much as I would like to.

9 But it really is also going to be important that we talk to all of our -- our managers and make sure that 10 they're also talking to their employees and really build 11 this environment where issues can -- can bubble up, 12 because they're going to have to bubble up, because we 13 14 can't do it on our own. We're going to have to rely on our folks to do a lot of the work for us and to be our 15 eyes and hears on the ground, and then really to be able 16 17 to come forward and tell us what's going on. And our 18 field office manages are going to be key to that.

19 DR. WINOKUR: All right, thank you.

20 Ms. Roberson?

21 MS. ROBERSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and 22 thank you for your comments, as well, today.

You laid out in your opening statement a series of actions that NNSA has undertaken: a communications plan, the strategy, the effective leader training, and

1 several other actions. And I guess I wanted to just ask 2 you, are you -- we often ask have you had the opportunity to give some thought to what kind of metrics. 3 And when 4 people hear metrics, they kind of think about the operation and how many of this gets out. When you're 5 making this kind of change, change management plan was a 6 7 weakness in the previous assessment, and you mentioned improving that. 8

9 Have you had an opportunity to give thought to 10 what kind of metrics would tell you and the Administrator 11 whether these changes or these efforts that you're driving 12 are having the intended result, early enough that you can 13 course correct?

14 MS. CREEDON: I have to say probably not to the degree that they need to be done yet. I'm not quite there 15 I think in terms of demonstrable effects, it would 16 vet. 17 be things that would show up on future surveys, even to 18 the -- you know, to the annual employee survey. One of the things that Frank and I have talked about doing is 19 20 doing more frequent surveys within NNSA, and a little more tailored to NNSA, and just try to understand where there 21 22 are options for improvement and opportunities for 23 improvement. And part of that would be putting in those 24 surveys an opportunity for people to actually write comments, as opposed to just saying yes, no, maybe on some 25

1 of the response forms.

So, that's something small, but it might help 2 measure at least where our folks are thinking and where 3 4 they think the progress is being made or not. But really looking at how you establish metrics for change in the 5 6 safety culture, it strikes me as hard, and I'm sure Don 7 Nichols and his folks have thought about this a lot more than I have, but it is something I'm going to have to do, 8 9 because I don't have a good answer to that question. 10 MS. ROBERSON: And then in the last question, it may seem a little unfair, but I have to ask this. 11 The 12 Board made this Recommendation in 2011, and the Department's undertaken quite a few actions, a lot of 13 assessments, training, changed and strengthened some 14 procedures. And I guess in the vast enterprise of NNSA, 15 I'd ask you is there a particular sub-organization or 16 17 operation that you think really has got it? It doesn't 18 mean they're perfect, but I'm not asking you who's the worst; I'm asking you kind of who you think exhibits the 19 20 best practices that you'd like to drive across the 21 enterprise. 22 I don't know yet. MS. CREEDON: 23 MS. ROBERSON: Okay.

24 MS. CREEDON: I don't know yet. I'm -- I mean, 25 I think part of being a little bit new is I think what's

1 bubbled up more has really been the problems and not the 2 good stuff. 3 MS. ROBERSON: Okay. MS. CREEDON: And, so, one of the things that we 4 have to do is make sure the good stuff comes forward, too, 5 6 and that people get acknowledged for when they do things 7 right, and I know -- and not just the -- the acknowledgment for when they do something that's not 8 9 right. 10 MS. ROBERSON: And then the last question I'd ask you is you -- I mean, clearly word of mouth is -- is 11 the most effective way, but are there other tools that you 12 and the Administrator will be using to communicate and 13 14 recommunicate your expectations in this area to your 15 enterprise? 16 MS. CREEDON: I think there are a variety of 17 tools. We -- we do mass emails in some levels of 18 communication. We have weekly staff meetings where all of the headquarters senior leaders and all of our field 19 20 office senior managers participate. They obviously participate by VTC, but they're all there. It's an 21 22 opportunity for us to raise some issues, for them to raise 23 some issues, so then hopefully they can then turn around 24 and carry it back. 25 What we probably need to get a little better at

is communicating better with -- so, us also communicating better with our M&O partners. The field office managers have a lot of interaction with them across the board, as do each of the individual headquarters components, have interaction across the board. But I think as a body, we probably are going to have to look at more interaction amongst us.

8 So, you know, we're looking at doing this in 9 November, but I think this is probably something that 10 we're going to have to -- to do a little better to make 11 sure it's not just sort of internally focused on the NNSA 12 employees, but it also has a -- a broader message.

13 MS. ROBERSON: Thank you.

DR. WINOKUR: You -- I had asked the Secretary a question about the fact that the DOE was a very diverse organization with many subcultures, and NNSA is no exception to that. You've got Naval reactors, you've got Los Alamos, you've got Livermore, you've got Pantex, you've got production, you've got research.

You talked interestingly in your testimony about transplanting cultures and the challenges associated with that. Can you say a few more words about it or perhaps just explain to me do you think it would be possible to transfer some of the Naval reactors culture to Los Alamos, because they're two very different organizations, and they

1 both have very established cultures, and they grew up very 2 differently in the last 70 years? So, any thoughts on 3 that?

MS. CREEDON: So, I think I also mentioned that 4 5 you can't pick up one culture and lay it over top of another organization. It just -- it won't work, but one 6 7 of the things that Don and his team have started to do is -- is -- and also, frankly, some of the lessons learned 8 9 that are going on in these meetings that are the field and are the contractors -- is really look at where -- where 10 11 are the things that you can pull out. Where are those specific things that are examples of best practices? How 12 do you identify them? And then how do you figure out 13 14 where you can apply them?

So, some things might apply well at Pantex or Y-15 12 and not so much at Sandia. And that's -- that's really 16 17 the challenge, is finding -- finding those best practices 18 and then getting -- getting them instilled appropriately but in the right organizations, so that the practices are 19 20 suited for the organization, and then getting the people in those organizations to really adopt those so that it's 21 22 not a not-invented-here but that is, okay, this is pretty 23 good and we'll give it a shot, so that it becomes theirs and that they can modify and push it. 24

But I know that's -- you know, that's a somewhat

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1 theoretical explanation, but it is hard. Having -- having 2 watched it at DOD in the various cultures at DOD, it's 3 very hard to get those best practices shared across the 4 board.

5 DR. WINOKUR: And me, I'm interested to know, 6 and give me an example in DOD of two different 7 organizations whose -- which that it would be difficult to 8 transfer cultures. Is this between the Army and the Navy 9 or between the different services, or who? Who would it 10 be?

MS. CREEDON: So, as I mentioned, the Navy has a -- the Navy has a pretty good -- at least the nuclear pieces of the Navy have a pretty good self-assessment. The Air Force's self-assessment is not as strong.

15 DR. WINOKUR: Okay.

And, so, one of the things that 16 MS. CREEDON: 17 the Secretary of the Air Force has committed to do is 18 improving the Air Force's self-assessment program, and so they're looking at how the Navy does self-assessment 19 20 programs. So, interestingly enough, the Navy's -- at least in the nuclear side, the Navy self-assessment 21 22 program grew out of the various reviews that occurred 23 following the 2007 Minot incident that the Air Force had. So, it's -- it would seem to be something that the two of 24 them can work on together to improve the self-assessments. 25

1 DR. WINOKUR: Thank you. 2 Mr. Sullivan? MR. SULLIVAN: Thank you. So, in my -- in my 3 4 first question, I zeroed in on Pantex, so now I'd like to zero in on Los Alamos. And as -- as you are aware, the 5 public may not be, but last summer the -- the laboratory б 7 director out at Los Alamos paused operations in the nation's plutonium facility, PF4, and many of those 8 9 operations have -- have yet to restart. 10 Just recently, the Secretary sent out a memo to Administrator Klotz and to Mr. Whitney, who's sitting 11 behind you, transferring legacy waste management from NNSA 12

13 to -- to EM. And in that he -- the Secretary pointed to 14 the fact that -- that Los Alamos under NNSA was -- was 15 dealing with some significant management challenges, 16 including restarting operations in PF4.

17 And they've been -- they've been doing these 18 operations in PF4 for -- for several years, so in my view, and this is my -- my personal view, is that their 19 20 challenges are not technical. They know technically how to do the work, but the challenges are more management and 21 22 perhaps culture. So, I'm wondering if you could address 23 to what extent there are cultural issues, safety culture 24 issues out in Los Alamos and what NNSA is doing about 25 that.

MS. CREEDON: Certainly associated with PF4, and this is a topic that I had some discussions with the Los Alamos folks, as well as the NNSA folks last week, I think what they have adopted right now is actually a very good approach. And in many respects, it's very similar to what the Secretary described about the approach to restarting WIPP.

And it's not not picking a date certain and working backwards from it. It's understanding what needs to be done across the board, whether it's procedural, whether it's operational, whether it's technical, whether it's safety, and identify all those things, bin them in -- bin them into work baskets, if you will, and start -- and start working them down.

And at some point, you'll have a sense of when -- when that date happens, but I know there's certainly frustration because PF4 has been down as long as it has, but I think that the plan that they've laid out, where they've clearly identified a whole series of actions that have to be taken and that they're going to work through these actions.

And if something happens in that action to complete, you know, so the effort to complete that action bogs down, they're going to go back and figure out what happens, you know, and they're not going to cut corners

1 and they're not going to jump forward to an artificial 2 date, because I think that's -- that's a problem, you know, and it does drive to some strange behaviors. 3 4 So, it's not just a safety issue; it's an across-the-board management issue. And I think they 5 understand that. There are some other examples of that б 7 that you're probably aware of at the moment, but particularly with respect to things Los Alamos has on its 8 9 plate, it does have a lot on its plate. And I think they are recognizing that they have -- they have to take a 10 different approach to some of these things. And, of 11 course, we also have the plutonium operations, other than 12 just the plutonium operations in PF4 that we have to work 13 14 on, as well.

MR. SULLIVAN: Thank you. So, again, by way of background, so after the pause, the contractor did their own self-assessment. They gathered some team and they gathered some -- some experts, including people who weren't actually -- who didn't actually live and work there in -- in Los Alamos.

And they wrote a report which identified that, in fact, many of the things that had led to the pause had been identified in earlier reports and yet hadn't been addressed. So, much like -- or similar to the comment about the nuclear explosive safety senior technical

advisors, that wasn't the first time people had said, hey, 1 2 you know, there are things here that fundamentally need to 3 be addressed and they haven't been addressed. 4 So, are you confident now that this approach 5 will address those underlying issues in moving forward 6 there in Los Alamos? 7 MS. CREEDON: I am confident they have a good How well they succeed in actually addressing and 8 plan. 9 resolving all these is something that we're going to have to follow and track and work with them closely. 10 11 MR. SULLIVAN: Okay. Thank you very much. DR. WINOKUR: Ms. Roberson? 12 13 MS. ROBERSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 14 At the Board's hearing in Pantex about a year and a half ago, the Acting Administrator at the time 15 committed to conducting an assessment of safety culture of 16 17 the federal NNSA organization, and that assessment was 18 accomplished a few months later. And you talked about some of the upcoming actions as a result of that. 19 20 The -- the assessment was completed following an organizational -- a set of organizational changes that 21 22 included reorganizing the safety elements within NNSA 23 Headquarters. And one of the things of particular 24 interest to us from the assessment, noted from the assessment, was -- and I'm going to quote -- "The NNSA 25

organization does not effectively manage change." And I
 know going forward you've talked about that being an
 element of your actions.

But in reorganizing the safety function, and we had a lot of questions about that as well, too. And, so, I'm just wondering are you planning -- are you looking at that to make sure that that is structured the most effective way for what you and the Administrator want to accomplish in this arena?

10 MS. CREEDON: So, the -- so, the answer to the 11 last part of that question is yeah, we are; yes, we are. And obviously I wasn't around when all of that was 12 happening, but I've heard a few descriptions of that. 13 14 And, so, it's clear that as we look forward at what organizational structures we make, so any changes that we 15 make, we have to -- we have to do a much better job 16 17 communicating with our employees, not only the what, but 18 the why and how -- how it impacts them, because that also was one of the issues that came out of that is people 19 20 didn't understand how this change was going to affect them, what did it mean to them, did they have to move, did 21 22 they lose their job, that sort of thing. So, I think that 23 was something that we're really going to have to be very 24 conscious of.

25

MS. ROBERSON: Okay. And then the -- I don't

want to use the word "metric" again -- I'll say tools.
How do you conclude with confidence that you've -- you're
applying the right amount of resources to safety, and I'll
say balance what mission but to give you confidence that
you've got the right kind of resources applied to your
safety functions to ensure that you can accomplish your
expectations in that arena.

MS. CREEDON: That's a really hard question, 8 9 recognizing that we've got pretty significant budget issues coming down the road, particularly if as of -- as a 10 department we end up going back to the life of 11 sequestration. So, you know, we had two years of the 12 Budget Control Act, so a lot of that depends on where we 13 14 head from a budgetary perspective. But overall, we have to -- if we have to do a mission and we have to do the 15 mission safely and securely and effectively, and it's part 16 17 of a whole package.

18 So, I have a bit of a reaction to the balance, because I think it's an entire mission package and you 19 20 have to do it -- you have to do it all. And at some point, frankly, we have an obligation that if we can't do 21 22 that mission and we can't do it safely and we can't do it 23 securely, we have to kind of raise a red flag and say we 24 just can't do this if the money isn't there to do it. 25 Now, on the other hand, we have to make sure

that we're doing it efficiently and that we're using the money that we have in the most effective and efficient way. And that's a task we have to do. So, we have to -you know, we really have to make sure we are getting blood out of that stone or turnip or which -- you know, whatever the analogy is.

But we have to make sure we can -- you know,
that we do it. But if we can't, we -- you know, we have
an obligation that says we can't do this.

10 MS. ROBERSON: Thank you.

11 DR. WINOKUR: Mr. Sullivan?

MR. SULLIVAN: You mentioned before that you've 12 only been there two months that the good stuff hasn't 13 14 bubbled up yet. So, I just want to start by noting that you do have an awful lot of good stuff out there. You've 15 got a lot of very smart people, a lot of very dedicated 16 17 people. They're a lot like offensive linemen in football. 18 You know, we notice them when we throw the penalty flag, but we don't notice the -- all the plays that they make 19 20 that are -- that are really good.

Do you have any thoughts about you will try to get that part of information to be brought up to a point where you will -- it will come to your attention or -- or how you will reach down and find it yourself and how you might share those best practices?

MS. CREEDON: Yeah. We've -- we've actually had 1 a couple conversations on that, and so one of the things 2 that we've started to do is really have our field office 3 4 managers highlight when people do something, you know, There are opportunities for -- on the federal 5 special. б side, there are some opportunities for -- for on-the-spot 7 rewards. I mean, they're small rewards. They're about \$500, but I just approved a small package of those last 8 9 week or week before last. So, it's those kinds of things that we really can say, you know, that was really well 10 done. And we're looking at other ways to try and do even 11 non-monetary things to say this is really good. 12

Don Cook has been -- on the DP side has been 13 presenting a series of awards for -- for some really good 14 work that's happened. So, I mean, there are -- there are 15 ways to do this. We're also trying to look at ways to 16 17 make this even a little bit higher visibility. So, we've 18 been talking to our PA folks so that they can take some of these good examples and -- and some of this really fine 19 20 work and put it out to a broader community, so not just the office where the person works knows how -- how good 21 22 some of this was, but, you know, also to put it out into 23 these broader NNSA casts so that everybody's aware that, yeah, we really have good people out there who really are 24 25 doing good things.

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72
MR. SULLIVAN: Okay. And I just want to take a 1 2 moment to -- to give you a piece of advice, which I'm sure you've -- you've probably already learned in the Pentagon, 3 4 but if you find yourself spending all your time in Washington, DC, with all the noise that goes on here and 5 6 all the people who want your attention here, you're 7 probably in the wrong place, because the action is out there. So, I encourage you to get around as much as you 8 9 can. There are good people. And I -- I try to do that, and I -- I enjoy every time I do get to meet them. 10 Thank 11 you.

12 MS. CREEDON: Thanks.

DR. WINOKUR: I want to ask you a couple of questions about balancing mission and safety. I think you brought it up. I think it's an incredibly important area about how the Department does that. And let me express some personal opinions now. I'm not speaking for the Board.

When Tom D'Agostino was the Administrator, he had a statement when you came into the Pantex plant you saw it: Getting the job done. I didn't think it was a great safety message, even though I understand underlying that was a full commitment on the part of NNSA to make sure that safety and mission were integrated. It went without saying, we heard. And now we have a new

statement: Mission first. Do you think that those 1 2 statements can confuse workers that if they see that in 3 bold print when they go to work every day acknowledging 4 the fact that they are incredibly committed and they want to get their job done every day? Do you think that's an 5 б issue?

7 MS. CREEDON: But that's not all of the -- of our statement. Our statement is: Mission first, people 8 9 And -- and it takes that whole phrase, because always. it's the "people always" part that is as important as the 10 "mission first." And, so, hopefully they read the whole 11 thing: Mission first, people always, because it is the 12 You know, how they do the work, how they're people. 13 trained, how they do safety, how they do security. I 14 mean, they're the ones that do the mission. 15 So, it's a phrase in its entirety: Mission first, people always. 16 17 DR. WINOKUR: And you feel that provides the 18 necessary balance between mission and safety? MS. CREEDON: I -- I think so. I hope so. 19 20 DR. WINOKUR: Okay. It seems to be well received. 21 MS. CREEDON: And 22 we'll see how it goes, but I think it is, because I do 23 think it conveys that idea that, you know, people are 24 always important. 25

DR. WINOKUR: One of the things about the

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balancing mission and safety that I think is incredibly important is that if you don't get the safety right, and I'm not asking the Department to say safety is an overriding priority, which NRC does, but if you don't get the safety right and you have an accident like we had at WIPP, you can see not only the impact on the dollars but the impact on the mission is just sobering.

8 And, so I -- I just -- you know, I also 9 encourage you to -- and you know this and understand it, 10 that it's not really choosing between the two, because if 11 the safety goes wrong and the accident occurs, especially 12 one of these low-probability, high-consequence accidents, 13 that obviously it can really hurt your mission.

MS. CREEDON: No, I agree. And it's -- and it's true -- it's true of security and the incident at Y-12 is an example of that as well. So, I mean, it really is, it's the whole package.

18 DR. WINOKUR: I'm going to kind of change gears a little bit. Can you share some of your thoughts on 19 20 changing established cultures, based maybe a little bit upon your experience at the Department of Defense? 21 I 22 mean, we raised this point a few times today. It's one of 23 the things we have learned in our prior hearings. People can come and create cultures, whether they're Steve Jobs 24 or Admiral Rickover or people, they create them from 25

scratch, they -- but -- but when you have an established culture, something that's been ingrained for 50, 60, 70 years, obviously changing it and improving it and moving in the direction you want to go is a very, very challenging task, a very daunting task.

6 You've seen some of this also on the DOD side. 7 Are there any insights you have about what it takes to 8 change that culture, that very well established culture?

9 MS. CREEDON: Probably the most significant 10 thing is recognizing that the culture needs a change, so that's the first thing. The second thing is sometimes 11 even when there is a recognition of that, it -- the words 12 are only spoken at the senior leaders. And there's not a 13 14 lot of follow-through to go with those words. So, the second thing is making sure that not only the senior 15 leaders say the right words, but they -- but they follow 16 17 up on those words with real actions that all the way down 18 to, you know, the lowest -- the lowest person really begins to see some change, some real change in them, and 19 20 then all the way down to the middle management.

21 So, I mean, that's why it takes time. And it's 22 going to take time and, you know, just having watched a 23 little bit of some things in DOD, it's -- it takes a lot 24 more than just senior -- senior leaders saying this is the 25 way I want it to be.

DR. WINOKUR: Okay, thank you. 1 2 Do the Board members have any other questions for Ms. Creedon? 3 MS. ROBERSON: I don't, Mr. Chairman. 4 DR. WINOKUR: Mr. Sullivan? 5 MR. SULLIVAN: No. 6 7 DR. WINOKUR: Well, with that, we want to thank you very much for your testimony today and spending time 8 9 with us to answer questions. 10 MS. CREEDON: Thanks. DR. WINOKUR: I think it was a very nice 11 dialogue. We appreciate it. We wish you well in your new 12 job. Next time we see you, two months, we'll see. All 13 right, I'll leave it at that. And -- and we thank you 14 again, and we'll move on to our third panel. 15 16 MS. CREEDON: Thanks very much. 17 DR. WINOKUR: At this time, I would like to 18 invite our final and third panel member, Mr. Mark Whitney, to the witness table. Mr. Whitney will be provided 10 19 20 minutes for his opening remarks. The Board will accept his full written testimony into the record. Mr. Whitney 21 22 has been provided some initial lines of inquiry in advance 23 of this hearing. 24 Mr. Mark Whitney was named Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for the U.S. Department of Energy 25

Office of Environmental Management in May 2014 and
 currently serves as the Acting Assistant Secretary for
 Environmental Management. At this time, we welcome
 remarks by Mr. Whitney, to be followed by questions from
 the Board. Welcome.

6 MR. WHITNEY: Thank you and good morning, 7 Chairman Winokur, Vice Chairman Roberson, and Mr. Sullivan. I do very much appreciate the opportunity. 8 9 This is my first hearing and -- well, my first hearing, not just in this capacity, but my first hearing in front 10 So, I do appreciate the opportunity. 11 of the Board. I've enjoyed, you know, listening to the previous two panels of 12 my boss and my colleague, Madelyn Creedon. 13

You know, today, I would really like to and plan to address DOE's Office of Environmental Management's ongoing improvements regarding safety culture and safety -- a safety-conscious work environment. We are continuing to strengthen the organizational safety culture across EM, and we've made that a primary focus for not only myself but all of EM's leadership.

DOE'S Office of Enterprise Assessments, as you're aware, most recent independent oversight assessment of the safety culture at our largest cleanup project, the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant at Hanford, found that while many improvements have been made, there's still

a lot of work to do. And, so, we recognize that and --1 2 and we'll talk about that a little bit later, as well. EM and the Office of River Protection recognized 3 4 that however changing culture takes time and it requires a commitment -- a sustained commitment to actually change 5 б culture. You all have talked about that in the 50, 60, 70 7 years that have given us the culture we have in the Department. While EM is only 25 years old, that's -- 25 8 9 years is enough time to develop your own culture. And it's hard to turn and you can't turn it on a dime. 10 So, that's where we are right now, but we recognize the 11 commitment it does take, and we are dedicated to making 12 13 that commitment.

14 It is a journey. And I do want to highlight the fact that the most recent assessments does say that there 15 are improvements that have been made. And that does 16 17 provide us with some indicators that -- that we hope we're 18 on the right path. Like I said, we are focused on continuing to make improvements. And while that's a good 19 20 thing, you know, that -- that there were improvements noted, our focus has to be on the other issues in the 21 22 report that were identified as not having been improved 23 over the period of time.

24 Bechtel National, Incorporated, and ORP, the 25 Office of River Protection, are continuing to aggressively

work on improving their safety culture. The results of 1 2 the 2014 independent assessment -- or independent oversight assessment of safety culture -- are being used 3 to guide additional corrective actions. And those actions 4 are captured in the Office of River Protection's 5 6 Comprehensive Safety Culture Improvement and Oversight 7 Plan, which EM Headquarters is monitoring on a -- a regular basis. 8

9 In addition to assist ORP in proactively responding to emerging technical and culture issue --10 issues raised at ORP, we are providing subject matter 11 expertise resources on a regular basis. As you heard, 12 Secretary Moniz, of course, has established a vision for a 13 strong safety culture and a strong safety-conscious work 14 environment. And he's clearly articulated his 15 expectation, as well as his personal commitment in this 16 regard, and I do believe that EM, while we still have work 17 18 to do, has been a leader in this area within the Department and across our complex to further improve our 19 20 safety culture.

As the leader of the organization, I, of course, support the Secretary's vision for establishing the strong safety culture and commit to continuing to work towards ensuring that the Environmental Management Program does exemplify the organizational behaviors necessary for a

1 safety-conscious work environment.

I also understand that a healthy -- a healthy 2 3 safety culture is essential to our success, both the 4 Department's and Environmental Management's programmatic success. But leading the change in our safety culture 5 6 does require us to change behavior throughout the 7 organization, and this is required to foster an environment of trust, of mutual respect, and of course a 8 9 questioning attitude.

Like the Secretary, I am observing signs that we're headed in the right directions in terms of building a more positive safety culture, not only at the waste treatment plant but also throughout the EM complex, across our complex. At the same time, I recognize we do have a lot of work to do, as I said, and our focus has to remain on continuous improvement throughout the process.

17 So, we have -- we have implemented some actions 18 over the past few years, and so I'll address a few -- a few of these right now. We -- in 2013, we, of course, 19 20 completed safety-conscious work environment selfassessments across the complex, our sites did, as well as 21 NNSA and Office of Science sites. While, you know, we 22 23 performed these self-assessments to help us evaluate the status of our safety-conscious work environment at our 24 specific sites, you know, and they were focused primarily 25

on the focus areas that are in Attachment 10 to the ISMS
 Guide and the focus areas and attributes contained in
 those.

4 But I think more importantly, or just as 5 important, it really helped us understand better and 6 helped us gain increased awareness and knowledge 7 throughout the complex of what safety culture is and what a safety-conscious work environment is. So, while I do 8 9 believe that we had tangible results and findings that we 10 were able to take action on and continue to take action on, I think the process of doing this was extremely 11 12 valuable across the complex.

13 EM also supported the -- the consolidated report, of course, the extent of condition report through 14 extensive dedication of time and resources to ensure a 15 timely review and to make sure that it was consistent with 16 17 deliverables identified in the 2011-1 milestone. This, of 18 course, consolidated report included elements of the safety-conscious work environment self-assessments, as 19 20 well as the -- the independent assessment of the Office of Health, Safety and Security. 21

In that review, as the Secretary mentioned, DOE identified the high-level departmental improvement actions, which have been embraced by EM and heavily supported by EM resources to date.

Also, consistent with the 2011 safety-conscious 1 2 work environment, consolidated extent of condition report, and in conjunction with NNSA and the Office of Science, of 3 4 course, EM did request that each of its site offices develop a site-specific safety culture sustainment plan. 5 6 And those plans were to contain a description of the 7 sustainment tools to be used, how the tools are suitable for the site conditions and plans and schedules for use of 8 9 the tools, and how the tools would align with recommended departmental actions. 10

Many of the sites have recently submitted these 11 tools -- or these sustainment plans or are in the process 12 of doing so. We recently, last month, had a field 13 managers meeting in Idaho, a senior leadership meeting 14 where a portion of the agenda was dedicated to discussions 15 of sustainment plans, getting the field officers' 16 17 perspective on the sustainment plans, what they found in -18 - in pulling those together and -- and our initial read on some of those. 19

And so we're still getting those; we're still going through those. We understand we have a commitment to deliver those to you and we will do so. I'm currently going through them myself right now, and so once we -we're able to do that, we will -- we will provide those to you. I believe we just recently received the last one.

Training has been a big focus for us, of course. 1 2 And out of the -- the consolidated report, one of the key areas that we, of course, found was the need to increase 3 4 awareness and understanding and -- and specifically through training. So, we've worked a lot on developing 5 6 and executing training programs across the complex. One 7 of these, for example, is the safety-conscious work environment for DOE and DOE contractor senior leaders. 8 9 And this course has been conducted in 85 sessions across the complex for over 2,000 participants. 10

I I had the benefit of participating in one of those when I was in Oak Ridge, and it's been implemented at nearly every DOE site across the complex, not just the defense nuclear facilities, which I think, as the Secretary mentioned, is -- is important.

In addition to the safety-conscious work 16 17 environment training for senior leaders, it's also 18 important to really build and understand awareness of a safety-conscious work environment throughout the 19 20 organization, of course. And, so, we are currently developing a training program focused on first-line 21 22 supervisors in the area of safety culture. It will build 23 somewhat on the success we've had with the -- the senior leaders training program, as well, working with the Office 24 of Science, of course, and the National Nuclear Security 25

1 Administration to develop that course.

The independent oversight assessment report of the EM program that was dated November of 2012, identified a lot of problems, frankly, including that some senior managers indicated that they do not perceive that they have any direct responsibilities for safety, that the site leads are responsible for safety, and it's their interest in following the safety issues.

9 Additionally, it found that there's a pervasive 10 belief that EM-40, my colleague, Jim Hutton, and his team, 11 own safety -- own safety -- and that the mission units --12 mission support units did not have as significant a role 13 as we know that they do. They didn't fully understand the 14 roles and responsibilities in this area, as well as how 15 they interact and integrate with the field.

To ensure that EM senior leadership understood 16 17 expectations associated with safety responsibilities, in 18 September of last year, EM-1, my predecessor issued a memo to all direct reports, both at headquarters and in the 19 20 field, to outline his expectations and to clearly articulate that safety is essential to our mission, our 21 future success, and is a core value of the Office of 22 23 Environmental Management.

24 It further states that we must integrate safety 25 into management at work practices at all levels. Senior

leaders do have the distinct role of demonstrating a
 commitment to safety through their actions and behavior,
 as well as establishing clear expectations and
 accountabilities for their staff.

The memo did provide additional clarification on 5 6 the responsibility to emulate the attributes of a strong 7 safety culture that promote trust, questioning attitude, and receptiveness to raising issues. So, through our 8 9 longstanding commitment to the integrated safety management, we will continue to build the kind of robust 10 safety culture vital for safe and efficient operations in 11 EM and introduce safety culture and sustainment methods 12 13 into our day-to-day operations.

To further advance the EM safety culture, we are 14 incorporating, which I think is a key activity, attributes 15 of a strong safety culture in our evaluations of senior 16 17 executives' performance. You know, in fact, many of the behavioral elements and attributes from Attachment 10 to 18 the ISMS Guide do have strong -- very strong -- a direct 19 20 link to the executive core qualifications of the ESES cadre. And, so, we are focusing heavily on that, ensuring 21 22 an understanding of roles and responsibilities and 23 expectations and accountabilities.

I'll speak briefly on WIPP, lessons learned and then close and then of course take any questions that you

1 may have. The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant fire accident 2 investigation board report identified critical issues 3 really associated with -- with how -- fundamentally how 4 DOE performs contractor oversight, as well as a lack of 5 clarity around federal roles and responsibilities. And 6 these helped contribute to the incident.

7 In response, we've done a few things, you know, focused on improving the capabilities and the expertise, 8 9 particularly in the technical areas of the Carlsbad field 10 office, and that includes reorganization of the field office, to separate oversight from actual -- from program 11 execution, which is important. We've also provided CBFO 12 authority to hire 22 additional folks, again primarily in 13 the technical disciplines: nuclear safety, 14

15 technical/operational areas.

16 We -- CBFO is in the process of -- of, you know, 17 filling this position. They've -- they've been able to 18 hire three of those 22. And they are in the hiring 19 process, various stages of the hiring process for the 20 remainder -- remainder of those folks.

Lastly, EM has arranged for a safety culture assist visit to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in January of 2015. And that team will include safety culture experts from various organizations, including the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, to include NASA, commercial nuclear

1 industry, and other experts from the DOE complex.

So, as the organization that's responsible and accountable for the cleanup of the environmental legacy brought about from decades of nuclear weapons development and Government-sponsored nuclear energy research and development, we do recognize that the safe and successful execution of our mission affects the nation's safety and security.

9 We do remain focused on embedding a commitment to safety deeply in the culture of EM, and I will continue 10 to depend and build upon the processes for bringing safety 11 issues to the forefront, including line management, to 12 include the Office of the Ombudsman, to include the 13 Differing Professional Opinions program, to include the 14 Employee Concerns Program, and every other tool at our --15 that we have available to us to bring these concerns to 16 17 the forefront. We're here to complete a mission, and we 18 must do it safely.

You know, just a message is -- for me on this issue, I want to emphasize that to kind of, you know, reiterate what the Secretary said, costs and schedule for us, for our projects, although we have significant cost and schedule, we have several projects, as you're aware, across the complex that have experienced technical issues, and that's driven up costs and -- and extended our

schedule, but we still cannot let the costs and schedule
 concerns drive our judgment on -- on opinions or concerns
 related to worker or public safety. Those will be judged
 on their technical merits.

5 One, I think recent example, as the Secretary 6 mentioned, is his personal involvement in the WIPP 7 recovery process. And from the very beginning, after the 8 February events and his, you know, continuous stressing of 9 the -- the schedule piece, and let's not have us, you 10 know, a schedule drive us to do something that's not 11 prudent.

12 So, I was -- had the opportunity to be out with him in Carlsbad in August when he visited and heard him 13 14 deliver that message directly. We've -- we've done a lot, we've learned a lot since February. We had to the two AIB 15 reports, first on the fire incident and then second on the 16 17 response to the radiological release. We're awaiting the 18 third report. We've also, you know been completing entries into the mine. We're learning from that. We're 19 20 doing radiological rollback and characterizing as we go in, so we're learning more about the conditions of the 21 22 mine.

23 So, the WIPP recovery plan that was released, as 24 the Secretary mentioned last week, on the 30th of the 25 month, did outline a goal for resuming operations in the

first quarter of 2016, but if you'll notice in that 1 2 recovery plan, it's very, very explicit that we will not do -- we will not do that, we will not resume operations 3 4 or entry into the mine for placement of waste in the first quarter of '16 if it compromises safety. Safety will 5 drive our -- our schedule for resuming operations. 6 So, 7 the Secretary's message was taken to heart when we developed the plan, of course. 8

On a more personal note, I did recently come 9 10 from the field. I was in Oak Ridge as the EM field office manager and have now been at headquarters for a few months 11 in this role. I've seen firsthand how important safety is 12 in all facets of what we do in the field, and I'm going to 13 14 bring that mindset and I have brought that mindset with me to headquarters and will continue to emphasize that in all 15 16 that we do.

17 So, I want to thank you again for the 18 opportunity to discuss the Department's safety culture 19 improvement efforts, and I'll be happy to answer any 20 questions that you may have.

21 DR. WINOKUR: Well, thank you for your 22 testimony. I'm going to begin the questioning. Let me ask 23 you to start out by just generally giving -- giving me 24 your sense of what -- how safety culture is on the WIPP 25 project -- on the WTP project, excuse me, on the WTP

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1 project.

MR. WHITNEY: I believe that we have a committed 2 3 and focused leadership team there now. I really believe 4 that. We have regular updates directly from the site office manager. Our last month's meeting, I thought, was 5 6 -- was actually very productive and informative for me 7 being, you know, the new guy, to see the focus that Kevin and his team is -- is placing on this. Kevin giving a 8 9 major portion of the briefing on -- on what they're doing with respect to their improvement plan. 10

And, in fact, you know, there were a couple of items that I pulled from that and -- and suggested to Jim that we need to take some of those as lessons learned and see if we can find at some of the other sites, and one specific that I thought that we could use at headquarters, and so we've requested some additional information from them.

18 So, you know, but I'm not naive. I understand that's a large project. The concerns that were identified 19 20 were so great a couple years ago that, you know, just to, you know, reiterate what I said during my comments, it's 21 22 going to take time, but we are committed and we'll provide 23 the -- the focus and the dedication to -- to seeing it 24 through. And I do think we have the right team there in 25 place right now to do it.

DR. WINOKUR: Well, I did take the opportunity this weekend to read the 2014 DOE Independent Oversight Assessment Report, and it's really sobering. I mean, using some of the words in the report, it said there have been many improvement efforts -- efforts, but there is still no significant improvement in the safety culture of the organizations involved in the project.

8 And, so, the Board wrote a recommendation three 9 years ago. There was an HSS assessment three years ago. 10 Here we are three years later, and this assessment is 11 basically saying, no improvement. I'm just trying to 12 figure out why you think things are going to improve on 13 that project?

MR. WHITNEY: Well, I think improvements 14 were -- were noted, but like I said, you highlighted the 15 key concerns, and that is our focus going forward. 16 So, what the team has -- has done, so in addition to the 17 18 actions coming out of the previous HSS independent assessment, they -- the Office of River Protection 19 20 completed those actions and then recently completed assessments of those actions and those -- the things that 21 22 they had put in place under their improvement plan. 23 Those assessments, in combination with this most recent HSS 2014 assessment, really have formed the basis 24 for their -- their current improvement plan, which really 25

1 consists of four major items. But they found -- I mean,
2 they found themselves that many of the -- the things that
3 they put into place, the nine actions, many of them did
4 not have the effect that they intended or had hoped would.
5 Several of them did and they want to continue those and
6 pull those into -- into their process going forward.

So -- so, I am -- I do have some confidence, and I do think it's an indicator that -- that, you know, that the report highlights things that are working, and we need to take those and build off those and not be defeated by the assessment but actually use that to continue to get better.

DR. WINOKUR: But, in fact -- and I appreciate that. In fact, when you do read the report, it says some of the trends are negative, going in the opposite direction. You're not gaining ground; you're going backwards on that project. Is that your -- did you read the same thing I did about it?

MR. WHITNEY: Yes. No, I -- yes, I read it, as well, and had very similar concerns that you did. All I can say is we are committed, you know, to -- to improving the safety culture, to addressing the issues that haven't improved, and to looking closely at those things that -that may be going in the wrong direction.

25 I -- I will say that it's -- it's not because of

lack of effort by the team and not for focus. 1 I do think 2 it goes back to what Ms. Roberson and you have alluded to 3 before. You know, we have a culture that's decades old, 4 right? And it takes time to change. And, you know, in Oak Ridge, a lot of that is, you know, when I was there, 5 you have relationships that are 20, 30 years old. 6 And 7 that forms a large portion of your culture.

8 And, so, you know, and that's just one piece of 9 the culture that's been formed. And, so, really getting 10 at some of these issues is not -- it's not a two-year 11 process. It's not. I mean, and we have to face that, but 12 it doesn't mean that we should stop trying. And we're not 13 going to.

14 DR. WINOKUR: One of the questions, Mr. Whitney, I asked the Secretary and I ask you again, the Board's 15 purview is safety oversight, so we are very concerned 16 17 about the resolution of the technical issues, which have a 18 serious impact on the safety of the design and construction project itself. Do you think safety culture 19 20 -- I asked the Secretary this and I'll ask you -- do you think safety culture -- weaknesses in safety culture may 21 22 still be an impediment to the resolution of technical 23 issues on the project?

24 MR. WHITNEY: I think that the Secretary 25 answered it very well, that the way we have -- we want to

1	ensure that our focus from a project perspective and a
2	scheduling and sequence in work does not put ourselves
3	into a position where we face undue technical issues that
4	are going to cause problems, and therefore he talked about
5	the you know, the discussions with the state and where
6	we are with the consent decree and our focus from the
7	beginning, not putting ourselves in that situation again
8	and focusing on those those elements of the project
9	right now that we can implement, that don't have the same
10	degree of technical challenges and not setting ourselves
11	up with schedules that aren't reasonable.
12	And, so that is that is our focus. But, you
13	know, admittedly, our safety culture is not where it needs
14	to be. And, so, we need to continue to focus on that, and
15	we should always consider it a a risk and always be
16	focused on it.
17	DR. WINOKUR: All right, thank you very much.
18	MR. WHITNEY: Yes, sir.
19	DR. WINOKUR: Mr. Sullivan?
20	MR. SULLIVAN: Thank you, and good morning, Mr.
21	Whitney.
22	MR. WHITNEY: Good morning.
23	MR. SULLIVAN: Nice to see you again.
24	MR. WHITNEY: You, too.
25	MR. SULLIVAN: Thank you for being here. I do

want to go to WIPP, which you addressed in your opening 1 remarks. And, again, by way of background, so the Board 2 had this 2011 recommendation which was focused on the 3 Waste Treatment Plant. There was an extent of condition 4 review that was undertaken by the Department. And 5 specifically at the WIPP site in January of 2013, the 6 7 field office and your contractor issued a -- issued a report, and I want to quote from it. They said that "The 8 9 integrated safety management system status is a stage III, 10 indicating a fully mature culture has been achieved."

And then only 13 months later, they had a fire, 11 12 followed by a radiological release incident. And the accident investigation board for the radiological release 13 incident said, and I'm going to -- again, I'm going to 14 quote, says that "NWP and CBFO have allowed the safety 15 culture at the WIPP project to deteriorate, as evidenced 16 by the workers' feedback that they do not feel comfortable 17 18 identifying issues that may adversely affect management direction, delay mission-related objectives, or otherwise 19 20 affect costs and schedule. Questioning attitudes are not welcomed by management, and many issues and hazards do not 21 22 appear to be readily recognized by said personnel." 23 So, they did an assessment in January of '13 and

24 said that they had a fully mature culture, and then 13
25 months later we have incidents which lead to an

investigation report that said the culture was not good at 1 2 So, how did this happen? all. MR. WHITNEY: Well, the January '13 self-3 4 assessment findings was clearly not the case, and so a couple of, you know, not excuses for that, but a couple of 5 6 things that I'd like to mention is, one, we are focusing 7 on the -- the guidance for conducting self-assessments and increasing the rigor and the structure and the consistency 8 9 of those. And that's something that we are undertaking 10 currently. You know, the accident investigation board 11 reports have been very clear on the problems that face 12 WIPP from a culture standpoint, a safety culture, 13 14 particularly comparing the mine culture to the nuclear safety culture and the -- the issues that -- that were 15 found there. And, so, you know, we are focused. 16 There's 17 a lot of work going on right now as part of the recovery 18 effort, a vast majority on basic safety management programs and getting those to where they need to be. 19 20 And that's, you know, back to my point before and the Secretary's, our focus is on safety and doing this 21 22 safely -- safely going forward. And I'll be going out to 23 WIPP next week, to Carlsbad, and you're welcome to join me 24 if you'd like. 25 MR. SULLIVAN: Well, I will --

1 MR. WHITNEY: Responding to your interest in 2 going to -- to Carlsbad. 3 MR. SULLIVAN: I'll always look at the weather 4 before I decide whether or not I'm going to go. So, in the eight months that's -- that's 5 б transpired since -- since they had the incidents at WIPP, 7 what has the Department done to look at the other places in your -- in your complex to see if you have the same --8 9 the same issues might be present there? 10 MR. WHITNEY: That's a good question. Now, we have not undertaken at this point a systematic review, 11 extent of condition, based on what happened at WIPP. 12 We do plan to look at that when the final report is complete. 13 But what we have done is really focused our efforts 14 working with the individual sites, you know, starting with 15 -- with basic things like briefings from Joe Franco, the 16 CBFO manager, to all the -- the other field office 17 18 managers on -- on what happened, what were some of the issues they uncovered from, you know, Jim Hutton's group 19 20 discussing some of the -- the deficiencies that were noted 21 in the AIB reports. 22 And, so, we've -- we've tried to have a constant

22 communication of the issues and the lessons we were
24 learning as we -- as we go through this process, building,
25 you know, to a great extent off the two AIB reports. And

our plan is going forward when the final report is done to 1 2 take those and look at them comprehensively and -- and see how we might be able to do something more systematic with 3 4 respect to the condition across -- across the complex. We have, of course, you know, as a result really 5 of the fire incident tasked the entire EM complex with 6 7 looking at deferred maintenance, doing a review of all deferred maintenance across the complex, specifically 8 9 those that are -- have safety-related components. And, so, we have now received all of those inputs. 10

And that was -- that was in interactive and 11 iterative process with Jim Hutton and his team, working --12 and headquarters folks working directly with the sites as 13 14 those were being developed to understand that the guidance was understood by the sites and what they should be 15 focusing on. And, so, we're pulling that information 16 17 together to identify trends, lessons learned for the 18 rest of the complex, and also to factor those things into our -- our planning and budgeting process. 19

20 MR. SULLIVAN: Okay. But to be clear, we --21 this was a clear -- this was a case where -- where out in 22 Carlsbad they said they had a good culture, and then 13 23 months later only -- only by virtue of an accident and 24 then an accident investigation board did we learn that 25 that wasn't the case. Have we -- we haven't gone yet to

1 the other sites to see if -- if we accurately have a good 2 gauge on what their cultures are?

Well, that is part of our ongoing 3 MR. WHITNEY: process with the -- you know, quite honestly, largely in 4 response to the Board's 2011-1 Recommendation of things 5 that we've done across the complex with safety-conscious б 7 work environment and the HSS independent assessments, as well. Those -- those are ongoing on safety culture and 8 9 specifically nuclear safety culture.

10 Now, as far as taking specific lessons learned from the WIPP incident, I believe we're doing that on a 11 12 daily basis and communicating what's come out of the AIB reports and what we found even since the -- the last 13 report, the second report was complete by going into 14 the -- into the mine and just, you know, looking at where 15 we are and understanding exactly what's the situation 16 17 that's in the mine.

18 We were able to take those things and communicate those out to the -- out to the sites, and not 19 20 just, you know, send an email and say look at this, but 21 actually engage and talk about it, answer questions, 22 and -- and the sites amongst themselves, as well, I 23 believe, have -- have done that on a regular basis, at least when I was, you know, in Oak Ridge, we did do that. 24 We had regular calls, monthly calls, just with 25

the site managers, and we talked about issues, lessons 1 2 learned. Of course, WIPP, you know, was the topic of the 3 day on several of those conversations, and those -- those 4 issues were communicated and -- and, so, I think we're doing it. I think, you know, my point was a systematic 5 extent of condition focused explicitly on the findings 6 7 from the WIPP might be premature until we get the accident investigation report three. 8

9 MR. SULLIVAN: So, you mentioned earlier that at 10 WIPP the -- in the field office they're separating 11 oversight from operations. Is that a model that you will 12 be implementing everywhere in the -- within the EM 13 complex?

MR. WHITNEY: Well, I think, you know, just from a principle standpoint, the oversight should not report up through the project in -- at any site. And, so, that's not something I've experienced at -- at other sites, but it is -- I believe is the right model. Oversight needs to be external to the actual project being executed. Yes. MR. SULLIVAN: Okay, thank you.

21 MR. WHITNEY: Yes, sir.

DR. WINOKUR: One of the -- you know, one of the things Mr. Sullivan was talking about was the fact that you go out to a site, they tell you they have a great ISMS safety culture system, and then you have an accident that

1 follows, so you really wonder whether or not, you know, 2 the assessment or headquarters' perception of what's going 3 on at the sites is what it needs to be. 4 And I -- I want to say that because you made a statement during your comments that you felt EM was a 5 leader in safety culture. б 7 MR. WHITNEY: Mm-hmm. DR. WINOKUR: Did you say that? I think you 8 9 said that. 10 MR. WHITNEY: A leader in this -- this process that we've undertaken since 2012. And I -- and I think as 11 a result now, I do think we're a leader in safety culture. 12 And -- and at least I feel like this leadership team is 13 14 focused on that, focused on communicating that message and fixing the problems that we have. 15 16 I mean, I'm not -- I'm not going to argue with 17 you that -- that we have issues and that, you know, a 18 report that comes out in January 2013 that essentially runs completely counter to what happened in February 2014 19 20 is the situation that we want across our sites. And -and we're focused on, you know, trying to ensure that 21 22 doesn't happen and really doubling down efforts. 23 I will tell you it's not for a lack of effort 24 that these -- you know, that some of these things have happened. And we're going to continue focus and -- and 25

we're working with experts from industry, from other organizations, trying to not keep this stovepiped, because obviously we have issues, and if the issues are in our organization, then we need to look out elsewhere for support and expertise and independent parties. And, so, we're doing that as well.

DR. WINOKUR: So, are you a leader in safety
culture because you're working hard at it, or do you feel
your sites really do have strong safety culture?

10 MR. WHITNEY: I feel that, you know, across our sites, there -- there is a strong safety culture, I do. 11 And -- and I believe that we do have specific sites where 12 we've had incidents, and we've had things happen that 13 would -- would, you know, indicate otherwise. But I think 14 generally across the board we do have a strong safety 15 culture at our sites. But, you know, it's not perfect. 16 17 It's imperfect.

And, you know, to be quite honest with you, I think no matter what line of work you're in, what industry you're in, your safety culture will never be perfect, but we should continue to strive for that, and that's what we're going to do.

23 DR. WINOKUR: Do you think you have a strong 24 safety culture at Hanford?

25

MR. WHITNEY: I think we are continuing to make

improvements towards getting to a strong safety culture at
 Hanford.

3 DR. WINOKUR: Okay, I have a question I had 4 asked before of Administrator Creedon. I'd like to ask it 5 of you, and that's the challenge that it -- that you face 6 in terms of taking the message that the Secretary and 7 yourself, the senior leadership of EM, you know, the 8 vision, the commitment to safety culture, and translating 9 it down to the workforce.

10 MR. WHITNEY: Mm-hmm.

DR. WINOKUR: And there's a lot of levels of 11 management in between that. And can you say anything 12 about that mid-level management structure and what you 13 think they need to do and how they need to be trained to 14 make sure that you, in the end, do get the message without 15 the rumors and without the really big rumors that Ms. 16 17 Creedon talked about down and get -- get things moving in 18 the direction you want?

MR. WHITNEY: Yes. Well, you know, first of all, I think that we recognize that, you know, no matter how good your safety culture policy is or your -- your programs are, if it's not implemented where the work gets done, you know, they're not of significant value. So, we recognize that and that's been one of the -- the focuses that we've had.

I think it goes back to a question that you've asked about leadership, and it starts with hiring people, hiring the right people, and hiring folks that have the technical capability, but have -- that are also leaders and have the ability to lead. And that's at not just the headquarters leadership level but at the site, at the site level, and the mid-level managers at the sites.

8 So -- so, that is a very important issue for me 9 and something that I've looked at very closely since I've 10 been in this position. And, you know, and I think that 11 it's something that from a human resources perspective 12 that we need to focus on as a program. But we will, you 13 know, continue to emphasize this.

14 And I think, you know, the message has to be communicated from headquarters. It can't be the push of a 15 button on an email saying this is, you know, a letter, 16 look at it. It has to be followed up with continuous 17 18 communication via all-hands meetings, town hall meetings, and your leadership at the sites have to live it. And, 19 20 most importantly, you know, they have to mean it, because people, you know, they know if you're not sincere, if 21 22 you're just, you know, stating a motto or a slogan. They 23 -- they realize it and they get it, so you really have to 24 work at it.

And I think, to me, safety culture is -- it's

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not complex, but it takes a lot of effort and a lot of 1 2 time, it really does, and you have to invest and you have 3 to make a concerted effort to put in the time. And it's 4 the same as general organization -- organizational 5 culture, which in my mind you can't really separate the They're intertwined, and so it's -- but it is, from б two. 7 my perspective, the most important thing that you do as a leader is not solve the technical issues, it's to lead 8 9 people and -- and develop a culture that is the right culture for their organization, that promotes getting 10 things done and empowers folks to get things done, both on 11 a safety basis, a project basis, and all that we do. 12 You have technical staff to help you resolve the 13 technical decisions, and you can make -- our technical 14 issues, you can make decisions on that, but that's our 15 most important quality that I think that we need in 16 17 leaders. And, so, I think it all starts there. And, so, 18 I think your questions were very appropriate for the topic this morning, and I agree completely with those. 19 20 DR. WINOKUR: Thank you. 21 Ms. Roberson? 22 MS. ROBERSON: Thank you. Thank you for your 23 comments, Mr. Whitney. 24 MR. WHITNEY: Thank you. MS. ROBERSON: Let me ask you, do you -- are you 25

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confident that your site offices and your contractors 1 2 understand your expectations in this area? 3 MR. WHITNEY: I'm confident they understand 4 expectations. MS. ROBERSON: Are you confident they understand 5 б your expectations? You're the leader --7 MR. WHITNEY: Yes. I'm confident they understand my expectations. I meet with the site office 8 9 managers who are direct reports to me as EM-2 and, you 10 know, we -- every -- on a -- we have a biweekly call with each of those. It's a regular scheduled call. And then I 11 end up talking to each one probably a few times a week on 12 different issues, but safety is, on our biweekly calls, 13 always part of our agenda on our call to talk about that. 14 And the performance plans, although I didn't 15 develop the previous ones, I thought they were pretty good 16 17 for the senior executives and the direct reports when it 18 comes to safety. And then I am taking a performance evaluation process right now, and then we'll move into the 19 20 planning process for the next fiscal year. And I've already taken an interest in that, 21 22 making sure that those expectations are captured in those 23 plans, because it helps in addition to communicate 24 obviously to someone to see exactly what they're going to

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be held accountable for. So, I do -- I do think my

1 expectations are understood in this area.

2 MS. ROBERSON: Okay. And, so -- and maybe it's 3 I mean, I kind of know EM has definitely been just me. 4 aggressive on the front end to getting their assessments done, looking at certain procedures. And I know you guys 5 б are working on sustainment plans. What isn't quite so 7 visible is where there are specific concerns or weaknesses. Are corrective actions being taken? Are you 8 9 holding your sites accountable for corrective actions for real problems in the middle? 10 11 MR. WHITNEY: Yeah. And -- and, yeah, I mean, I think that's the daily basis types of things that 12 you're -- you're talking about, the real problems that are 13 14 encountered, but also the problems that have come up in the assessments. And, so, yes, I mean, that's -- and 15 those problems span, you know, project, safety, security, 16 17 all -- all issues. We are holding them --18 MS. ROBERSON: So, how are you doing that? MR. WHITNEY: Excuse me? 19 20 MS. ROBERSON: So, how are you holding them 21 accountable? 22 I'm doing it through, you know, MR. WHITNEY: 23 one to the performance process and the regular --24 MS. ROBERSON: The contract performance process? MR. WHITNEY: For the -- for my senior 25
leader -- for the feds, through the regular, you know, SES 1 2 performance review process. With respect to I think, you know, WTP's a good example of, you know, contractor 3 4 assurance and some of the issues that were identified in the 2011-1 Recommendation. And what we've done since that 5 time, recognizing that that was -- that was an issue is 6 7 really kind of refocused our performance evaluation management process for the contractor to pull in and focus 8 9 more on the things like technical issue resolution, selfidentification of problems and really working through 10 these issues that are directly associated with -- with the 11 12 Board's recommendation and our implementation plan.

And, so, we think that's a good example of what we are doing. And I think we're making -- I think we are making progress in that area. I don't want to sound naive, but -- and I realize the 2014 report, you know, indicated that we still have a lot of work to do, and we agree with that. But I do think we are making progress as -- through a combination of these efforts.

20 MS. ROBERSON: So -- so, let me ask you, because 21 I think experience is instructive. So, I think you 22 probably gave us the short answer, I'm hoping. But we 23 talked about when Mr. Sullivan was asking about WIPP and 24 what's been done in the complex. So, I understand the 25 final investigative report is not done yet.

1 MR. WHITNEY: Mm-hmm. 2 MS. ROBERSON: But you already know that you 3 thought you had a site that had a pretty good culture of 4 safety, but they had weaknesses in fundamental safety 5 management programs. б MR. WHITNEY: Mm-hmm. 7 MS. ROBERSON: So, are you looking at your other sites, as well, to see -- you talked about deferred 8 9 payments. I would say fire protection, emergency management. What are you doing to make sure the 10 correlation between what -- where they think they are -- I 11 think -- I don't know who, maybe it's the Secretary that 12 uses this term "perceived performance is actual 13 14 performance." So, there are things you already know, lessons learned you already know. So, I'm going to ask 15 you again, are you taking any of those lessons learned to 16 17 the other sites? 18 MR. WHITNEY: Yes. MS. ROBERSON: Okay. 19 20 MR. WHITNEY: Definitely on that -- on a really -- I would say a continuous basis, the lessons learned 21 22 from WIPP, we are taking to other sites. I do think we 23 need to do -- my point was I do think we need to do --24 take a more systematic approach once we have the final and really, you know do a comprehensive review and see if, you 25

know, and do something a little more formal. 1 But, yes, 2 ma'am, in response to your question, we are. MS. ROBERSON: So -- so, same question I asked 3 4 the Deputy Administrator: How are you assuring yourself that what is being done are the right things? You have 5 б tools, metrics? I know that there are going to be metrics 7 kind of at -- maybe at the site level, operational level, but as an executive running a program, what are you --8 what kind -- what are you going to view to help you 9 10 understand whether actions that are being taken are 11 leading things in the right path? MR. WHITNEY: Yeah, that's a good question. 12 And I think that it's important to have that headquarter 13 federal oversight of what's going on in the field. And, 14 so, one of the things that the Secretary mentioned was the 15 safety culture improvement panel that came out as an 16 17 action from the consolidated report. 18 That panel, one of the first orders of business, and the Secretary indicated the charter is being 19 20 developed, and I think within the next few weeks that charter will be finalized and the panel will be 21 22 established. But one of the first orders of business, I 23 understand, is the development of metrics that can be used 24 in this area, that we can have as a -- a DOE-wide system

25 of metrics.

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1 It's not -- I think this is going to be a hard 2 one. It's really going to be a hard one to quantify some 3 of these things, right, because so many of them are 4 qualitative in nature. But -- but we have taken -- my 5 understanding is that is going to be on the, you know, 6 current agenda as one of the first things that we take up 7 with this panel.

MS. ROBERSON: So -- so, one other -- one other 8 9 example, and I don't want to whip it to death, cleanup project at Idaho, you also had a self-assessment done on 10 that project as a part of -- part of 2011-1. 11 And then there was an incident, and the -- one of the root causes 12 of the cause of that incident was a lack of a questioning 13 attitude. The attributes of a healthy safety culture 14 weren't necessarily evident. 15

So, what's -- what are you -- what is happening on that project to try to address -- because it -- I mean, we -- we do talk about this takes a long time, but you don't really have a long time on that project, right? MR. WHITNEY: Yeah, yeah. That's a good point. MS. ROBERSON: You hope not. MR. WHITNEY: We want the treatment unit to --

23 to function and not be obsolete by the time we start 24 operating, right? So, yes. But to the point, I think one 25 of the things that is indicative to me that we have, you

know, addressed, not resolved the issue, but addressed 1 2 that issue with respect to IWTU is the fact that we are 3 being deliberate through the commissioning process. 4 You know, it's going on two years now, two 5 years, and we're not going to get ourselves into a 6 situation where we start operating a facility that's not 7 ready for prime time. And, so, I think that's actually a really good sign, although some may take it as a bad sign, 8 9 but our focus is on getting through the startup and commissioning process in a manner where we have confidence 10 it's going to work. 11

And of course the site -- I think we have 12 good -- very strong management at the site now. You know, 13 we have hired Jack Zimmerman, you may know, as a -- the 14 federal manager for the EM program there. And he brings a 15 wealth of experience and expertise with him. 16 And 17 particularly in safety culture, as well, and has been 18 involved in some of these things from a complex DOE EM complex-wide perspective. And he gets it. 19

And so we -- and we have also most recently -- I think as a -- an example or an indicator that this group has become more of a learning organization and they clearly weren't before. We have -- they have brought in folks that were the THOR Corporation that developed the technology to get help in this area. We've also brought

in NETL to provide additional expertise in a fluidized bed processing. And, so, we're -- we're working together to try to resolve the issue, but I think -- I think they've come -- I think they've come a long way, and I think they understand what the expectations are. I think we have the right -- I do think we have the right folks in place right now to do it.

MS. ROBERSON: Well, let me just say one last 8 9 thing on this question. It doesn't mean I'm done talking forever, just now. The -- when we had our other hearings, 10 one of the things we asked a lot of questions about 11 because we actually formally raised it in our response to 12 the Department's IP, and that was a 13 14 concern -- we had reservations about the effect of relying on self-assessments. 15

16 MR. WHITNEY: Mm-hmm.

MS. ROBERSON: And we asked a lot of questions in our previous hearings, and we understand that's a -that's an essential tool, but clearly one of the things I walked away with is that is not sufficient. And when I kind of look at EM, it's, to me, maybe not to you, it's kind of any activity that had an independent assessment, they got some pretty tough feedback.

24 MR. WHITNEY: Mm-hmm.

25 MS. ROBERSON: Self-assessment, not so much.

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So, I guess my question is, you know, going back to the questions about WIPP, why do you have confidence that you have a good picture of your operations where they did self-assessments?

MR. WHITNEY: And that's a good question. 5 I 6 think, you know, self-assessments are imperfect by nature 7 -- human nature, right? And they're never going to be perfect. I do think part of the value of those is going 8 through the process. From my experience in the field, 9 that was tremendous. And, again, it goes back to being 10 sincere about it and committed to it and so the folks --11 you know, the folks that are in the organization actually 12 believe that you mean -- you know, mean what you say. 13

I think, you know, we have found the -- the same 14 thing, that we need to refine the rigor and the structure, 15 the consistency of the guidance that we're providing to do 16 17 self-assessments to hopefully tweak those a little bit. Ι 18 do think it's important to point out that the independent assessments and the self-assessments as are captured in 19 20 the consolidated report, they did align fairly closely as far as the attributes that, you know, required most of the 21 22 -- you know, a very thoughtful approach, and most of our 23 attention.

24 But you're right, the tone is -- is clearly 25 different. And, you know, I do think a healthy self-

1	assessment focuses on the things that need to be fixed.
2	You know, you can have a line in there, you know, if you
3	feel like your organization is doing a good job, that you
4	got to focus on the things that need to be fixed, and
5	because that's, you know, that's what we need to be, you
б	know, addressing when we go through the self-assessments.
7	But I think by nature they are going to be
8	imperfect and, you know, just the whole the survey
9	process and the difference in responses between the
10	management and the employees, you know, there's always
11	I think I read somewhere that there's usually a 15 to
12	20 percent difference in responses, right, because leaders
13	the leaders, you know, kind of think that they're
14	evaluating themselves.
15	MS. ROBERSON: Right, exactly.
16	MR. WHITNEY: And, so, they want to be a little,
17	you know, less harsh on themselves.
18	MS. ROBERSON: Right.
19	MR. WHITNEY: Because they are trying to do the
20	right things and put the right things in place, and I
21	think that is a true statement, you know, across across
22	the board, so
23	MS. ROBERSON: All right. Thank you very much.
24	MR. WHITNEY: Thank you.
25	DR. WINOKUR: I think you mentioned something

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about the qualitative nature of safety culture just a 1 2 moment ago, and I would just point out that the Board's 3 initial recommendation came from the fact that we were 4 concerned that safety culture was making it difficult for the waste treatment plant project to actually address its 5 technical issues. And I think there's more than a few б 7 examples of that recently, whether it's solving technical issues at WTP or preventing accidents at the WIPP facility 8 9 or addressing criticality concerns at Los Alamos.

10 MR. WHITNEY: Mm-hmm.

DR. WINOKUR: I mean, this is a -- this is a theme, and we were told during one of our hearings that a new book, "A Life in Error" by James Reason, talks about the importance of safety culture as being this overarching theme as to why issues occur. So, I would just -- I would just raise that for your attention.

17 MR. WHITNEY: Right, thank you.

18 DR. WINOKUR: I wanted to ask you, we have discussed a few times today about the diverse nature of 19 20 the organization. You have a very large organization. Are there sites -- I kind of got at this before. 21 Are 22 there sites in EM that you think really are the better 23 sites for safety culture that can provide leadership to 24 the other sites or where you can harvest lessons learned 25 and apply them?

MR. WHITNEY: I think that the latter part is 1 2 more important, actually, because I think everyone's, you know, hit on it this morning, that you can't necessarily 3 4 transplant a whole safety culture. What you try to look for are key elements, just like we do for the broader 5 safety culture attributes, try to look at key elements 6 7 across organizations that work, that are effective, whether it's, you know, what NRC does, what INPO does, 8 9 what we do, and try to -- try to adopt those and adapt them, but also take lessons learned from the individual 10 sites, those folks that are -- do -- are having success 11 in, you know, specific areas and then try to, you know, 12 transplant those across sites to, you know, to kind of fit 13 14 into their site-specific organizational culture, because despite how, you know, we may feel that, you know, we can 15 move around the DOE and the EM program, we have sites all 16 17 over the place and people probably perceive that we move 18 around different sites.

You know, in reality, most people stay at a site for their entire career, and that may not be the best thing, but that's -- that's generally how it works. And, so, there's a lot more than organizational culture that impacts safety culture. It's like the community. It's what goes on all around you.

And, so, it's hard to, you know, take whole

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elements from one site to another, but there are, I think, 1 2 lessons learned that we can -- can take from some sites and some things that sites do -- do well. And, you know, 3 4 as ironic as it may sound, I think that what WTP and ORP is going through right now and the processes that they're 5 focused on, although, you know, I think to date there has б 7 been some marginal improvement, but as their 2014 assessment indicated, it's -- we've got a long ways to go. 8 9 I think there are things that we can learn from what they're doing because, you know, activities, you 10 know, they're going through a lot right now, and they 11 really are focused on that. And they have some good ideas 12 and some good things that they're implementing that we 13 14 want to support. And we want to -- we want to take them to other sites, and we want to bring them to headquarters, 15 too, some of these things that I'm hearing about. 16 17 DR. WINOKUR: Do you have a site that pops in 18 mind as a leader in safety culture in EM, one of them that just you look at, you --19 20 MR. WHITNEY: I wouldn't single out a specific site. I wouldn't. 21 22 MS. ROBERSON: Well, why not? 23 MR. WHITNEY: Well, based on the previous leadership at Oak Ridge, I would say that they are far and 24 25 above...

1 DR. WINOKUR: Okay. Mr. Sullivan? 2 MR. SULLIVAN: So, we've talked about WIPP and Hanford a lot. We've heard Idaho mentioned. You just 3 mentioned Oak Ridge, so I don't want the folks in Savannah 4 River to be -- feel left out. Is it -- is it good there? 5 MR. WHITNEY: I -- I think that Savannah River, б 7 like many of our -- like all of our sites, they have areas where they can improve in safety culture. I did have an 8 opportunity to visit and, so, you know, I'm basing my 9 10 assessment on one visit and a lot of conversations with different folks in the organization, both at Savannah 11 12 River and at Headquarters.

I think in general they -- they have a -- a good 13 safety record. It's hard for me to judge safety culture 14 right -- I don't want to say that it's a great safety 15 culture just because I don't know that it is 16 17 right now, and I just need to be on the job a little bit 18 longer to kind of form those assessments, but obviously it's a -- a very important site to us with, you know, one 19 20 of the sites and one of the missions we consider our -you know, our riskiest and the things that we need to 21 22 address. And, so, we are paying a lot of attention to 23 that.

24 So, I do, you know, talk about this a lot with 25 Dr. Moody and with folks at Headquarters on the Savannah

River site, not just the mission, but the safety, and try 1 2 to focus on those things. So, I'm going to withhold complete judgment. I don't have anything to indicate that 3 they have, you know, significant safety culture issues. 4 MR. SULLIVAN: Okay. And I'll just add from my 5 perspective, I'd agree with that. My -- my vision of -б 7 my view of what Dr. Moody does down there is that he runs a pretty good show. 8 9 MR. WHITNEY: Mm-hmm. 10 MR. SULLIVAN: So, like I said before, there 11 are good things out there. Let's go back to your experience at Oak Ridge, and just talk to me specifically 12 about the things either you did or that you saw their 13 federal leaders doing that you thought particularly 14 was -- were good things, things that you'll be encouraging 15 your other field office representatives to do. 16 17 MR. WHITNEY: Well, you alluded to one, a little 18 different, you know, take on it from, you know, going from Headquarters, getting out to the field, but site office 19

20 managers and the management in the field, they have to get 21 out to the facilities. They got to get out, walk around, 22 talk to people, ask people questions, and not just --23 fact-grabs are great, and I rely on them tremendously to 24 let me know what was going on and, you know, I always had 25 a line in to them to talk about things. You got to talk

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to the folks doing the work, the contractors, other 1 2 federal folks there. And, so, a lot of it, I think, is just as basic 3 4 as -- as walking around, talking to people, letting them know -- understand that you actually are -- care about 5 б safety and what they're doing in general. 7 It gets back to what I said earlier, which this isn't a complex issue, but it is an issue that requires a 8 9 lot of time and commitment and, you know, and different type of approaches given different type of environments. 10 And, so, that is something -- of course, we went through 11 the safety-conscious work environment self-assessment 12 process, as did the other sites. 13 14 And -- and I found that to be a very -- a very good process. And that was kind of the source of my 15 comments at the beginning about, you know, it's kind of 16 17 the process itself had a lot of value because, you know, 18 we use that to -- not just do interviews -- you know, have our team that was responsible for it doing interviews, and 19

20 doing surveys.

And, you know, I was hands-off. You know, the person leading that reported to me at the end with -- with the results, but also just to have -- once we had the -the self-assessment complete and developed our own -- I think we called it an action plan, just to show that we

were actually committed to the things that we outline and 1 2 we tried to be, you know, tried to be, you know, very fair and harsh on ourselves, and then meetings with -- with --3 with the federal staff. Of course, the contractors did a 4 self-assessment as well, or did self-assessments as well 5 6 and went through the same process. 7 So, I mean, I think communication and actually, you know, saying it and then meaning it and then following 8 9 through on it with the most important thing being the follow-through. 10 11 MR. SULLIVAN: Okay. Thank you very much. 12 MR. WHITNEY: Thanks. 13 DR. WINOKUR: Ms. Roberson? MS. ROBERSON: Mr. Whitney, you mentioned this 14 in your opening comments. I have a few questions on the 15 independent assessment of EM itself, the federal 16 17 workforce. Have you guys developed a set of corrective 18 actions for some of those, you know, fairly significant weaknesses that surfaced in that assessment? Do you guys 19 20 have a corrective action plan -- or an action plan or 21 whatever you want to call it? 22 MR. WHITNEY: Mm-hmm. 23 MS. ROBERSON: Something that says you're going 24 to reverse --25 MR. WHITNEY: Yeah, we -- we don't have a formal

corrective action plan, and I'm going to turn just to make 1 2 sure real quick? Is that correct? 3 We don't have a formal corrective action plan, 4 but we did take actions associated with -- with the assessment of the EM program, and -- and we had talked 5 6 about it earlier as being not a very positive assessment 7 of our safety culture. And, so, the answer is we don't have a corrective -- we do not have a formal corrective 8 9 action plan. 10 MS. ROBERSON: So, how do all the people in EM 11 in the organization know you've taken those actions? How do you communicate to them when you -- because they 12 13 participated in the assessment, so they knew there were 14 problems. 15 MR. WHITNEY: Mm-hmm. 16 MS. ROBERSON: How do they know what actions 17 you've taken? 18 MR. WHITNEY: This is also a part of the process that we're going through with the -- with -- with all the 19 20 other assessments that we're doing across the complex, but specific to Headquarters, it is through the all-hands 21 22 meetings, communication directly with folks, and whether 23 it's emails or EM Fedcasts or, you know, the town hallstyle meetings with employees to talk about these specific 24 25 issues.

MS. ROBERSON: Okay. So, one specific thing I 1 2 wanted to ask about that report was a quote. In the report, HSS stated that "Some senior managers indicated 3 4 that they do not perceive that they have any direct responsibility for safety and that the site 5 representatives have the interest in following safety 6 7 issues." Do you believe that EM senior managers now have a better understanding of their responsibilities for 8 9 safety?

10 MR. WHITNEY: Yes. And that -- yeah, that's a good example of one -- one of the actions that, you know, 11 has been taken to address that. My predecessor did 12 outline his expectations and roles and responsibilities 13 and accountability in this area, and those types of things 14 are also being pulled into the performance plans of the 15 senior executives. That's a completely unacceptable 16 17 viewpoint to have for a senior leader at Headquarters.

18 We're all responsible for safety, and, you know, we look to Jim, that was the next part of the, I think, 19 20 critical comment that EM-40 is the one that has to deal with that. We look to him for his technical expertise and 21 22 for guidance and for help. But, you know, he's no more 23 accountable or responsible than the rest of us. So, no, I don't agree with that, and we have taken concrete actions 24 to make sure that the expectations are understood. 25

1 MS. ROBERSON: Okay. DR. WINOKUR: Thank you, Ms. Roberson. Do the 2 3 Board members have any other questions for Mr. Whitney? 4 MS. ROBERSON: No. MR. SULLIVAN: 5 No. If not, then I want to thank you, 6 DR. WINOKUR: 7 Mr. Whitney. Thank you for your testimony and answering the Board's questions. 8 9 MR. WHITNEY: Thank you. DR. WINOKUR: And I want to thank both of our 10 last two panelists, Ms. Madelyn Creedon and Mr. Mark 11 Whitney, for their dedication to safety practices designed 12 to continuously improve and sustain safety in both the 13 14 operations and in the design and construction work at DOE's defense nuclear facilities. 15 Thank you. 16 MR. WHITNEY: Thank you. 17 DR. WINOKUR: And you are excused now. Thank 18 you. At this time, per the Board's practice, we would 19 20 like to end the hearing by providing an opportunity for comments from interested members of the public. It is my 21 22 understanding that we do not have any requests to speak at 23 this time, but I do want to look to the audience and ask if anybody would like to make a public comment. 24 Seeing none, with that, I'm going to turn to the 25

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Board members for their closing comments, and then I will 1 2 end with my comments. Ms. Roberson? 3 MS. ROBERSON: No closing comments, Mr. 4 Chairman. DR. WINOKUR: Mr. Sullivan? 5 6 MR. SULLIVAN: No, I have none. 7 DR. WINOKUR: Thank you. I will now provide my To begin with, I'd like to thank 8 closing remarks. 9 Secretary of Energy Moniz, Principal Deputy Administrator Creedon, and Acting Assistant Secretary Whitney for 10 supporting this meeting. I want to thank all the members 11 of the public, as well as congressional staffers, elected 12 officials, and other representatives of state and local 13 organizations who were able to find the time to join us 14 today, either in person or on the internet. 15 An active community with engaged leaders is a 16 17 vital part of any successful program of this nature. As 18 we learned during our previous public meetings, establishing and maintaining a robust culture of safety is 19 20 not easy. It is hard work and requires dedication and commitment from all members of the organization, in 21 22 particular from senior leaders. 23 Today, we had the opportunity to hear from the Secretary of Energy and senior leaders of the Department 24 of Energy about their experiences, perspectives, and goals 25

related to the status of safety culture at the 1 2 Department's defense nuclear facilities and planned actions for future improvement. 3 4 Our goal for the previous two meetings in this series was to learn more about the relationship between 5 organizational culture and safety, how culture can be 6 7 monitored and changed, how cultural change can be used to improve safety, and how leaders are the essential factor 8 9 in making those changes. 10 Using the understanding gained through this series of meetings, the Board will continue to evaluate 11 the effectiveness of the implementation of its 12 Recommendation 2011-1 and consider whether future action 13

14 is necessary.

Once again, I want to thank everyone for their 15 16 participation at this meeting. The record of this 17 proceeding will remain open until November 7th, 2014. Ι'd 18 like to reiterate that the Board reserves its right to further schedule and regulate the course of this public 19 20 meeting and hearing, to recess, reconvene, postpone, or adjourn this public meeting and hearing, and to otherwise 21 22 exercise its authority under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 23 as amended.

This concludes the public meeting and hearing of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board. We are now

adjourned. Thank you all for attending. (Whereupon, the public meeting and hearing was adjourned at 11:24 a.m.) б

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