John T. Conway, Chairman A.3. Eggenberger, Vice Chairman Edson G. Case John W. Crawford, Jr. Herbert John Cecil Kouts

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

625 Indiana Avenue, NW, Suite 700, Washington, D.C. 20004 (202) 208-6400 • FTS 268-6400



March 27, 1991

The Honorable James D. Watkins Secretary of Energy Washington, D.C. 20585

Dear Mr. Secretary:

On March 27, 1991, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, in accordance with Section 312(5) of Public Law 100-456, approved a recommendation which is enclosed for your consideration.

Section 315(A) of Public Law 100-456 requires the Board, after receipt by you, to promptly make this recommendation available to the public in the Department of Energy's regional public reading rooms. Please arrange to have this recommendation placed on file in your regional public reading rooms as soon as possible.

The Board will publish this recommendation in the Federal Register.

Sincerely,

John T. Conway /

Enclosure

RECOMMENDATION TO THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY pursuant to Section 312(5) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.

Dated: March 27, 1991

The principal safety issues to be resolved in connection with restart of the K-Reactor at the Savannah River Site have been assembled in the Reactor Operations Management Plan (ROMP) issued by the Savannah River Site contractor and updated on a number of occasions. These issues had been identified in the course of reviews by a number of organizations, including in-house groups of the DOE, a committee of the National Research Council of the National Academies of Science and Engineering, and the Savannah River contractor. The issues so identified have been divided into those that require resolution before the reactor is restarted, and those that can be addressed over a longer period. DOE has apparently found this process of definition and prioritizing of issues to be acceptable, and the Board has generally regarded it as orderly and competently done.

However, the Board considers the extension of this process to its culmination in closure of the issues as equally important, and has been carefully following its progression. This has largely been done through review of the issue closure packages as they have been received, and further discussion of them with representatives of the DOE and its contractor. The Board considers that it must comment on two aspects of the process.

First, it is seen that the closure packages, which are meant to document completion of the necessary work regarding each issue, contain mainly a list of the reports supporting a conclusion that the issue has been resolved, and the signatures of officials in the contractor's management chain concurring with the conclusion that closure has been achieved. There is no discussion of the relation of the reports to the issue itself, and no enlightenment is provided on the reason for concluding that the work has produced the desired objective.

During briefings by representatives of the DOE and its Savannah River Site contractor some months ago, Board members pointed out that closure packages of this form would cause difficulty to reviewers, including the Board, because of the failure to provide the logic to support conclusions. It was suggested that each closure package be headed by a brief discussion, stating the issue, the steps taken to address it, the basis for the conclusion that closure had been successful, and the relation of the referenced documents. This text need not be long. At this stage in the Board's review, the need for such documentary discussion is even more evident. Not only would it aid the Board in its review; it would show others how these problems of the past have been corrected.

Second, the Board is concerned that changes made to the process of final review and approval of closure of issues indicates a weakening of DOE's determination to assure itself of resolution of these problems of the past. Originally, DOE's formal concurrence was to be required for closure of each issue in the ROMP. DOE's concurrence is no longer required. It has been restated that closure of issues is to be dealt with in the DOE's Safety Evaluation Report (SER) when it is issued. The current indication is that this will be done through discussion and description of the closure process, rather than through stating the DOE's position on closure of all specific issues.

The Board remains convinced that the issues covered by the ROMP represent real deficiencies in past practices, and that their correction is important. In its reviews of activities to resolve issues in the ROMP, the Board has observed numerous areas in which improvement was needed over the measures that had been considered by the contractor as satisfactory. These have been transmitted through formal recommendations and through informal observations that on the whole have helped to improve the restart activity in important and often essential ways. This convinces the Board that the closure packages deserve DOE's close attention, to the extent of restoring the original intention of approving the closure issue by issue. In the present situation, where the Board reviews each package to determine adequacy and the DOE does not, DOE is relying on the Board to do DOE's job.

In accordance with the above, the Board recommends:

- that each closure package of an issue in the ROMP be provided with a brief narrative discussion that clarifies the meaning of the issue, describes the steps that were taken to resolve it, states the reason for concluding that closure has been achieved, and shows how the referenced documents support the claim of closure,
- 2. that the DOE revert to its earlier plan to fully review and concur with the determinations of each issue closure.

Department of the Army

my Science Board; Open Meeting

n accordance with section 10(a)(2) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (Pul. L. 92–463), announcement is made of the following Committee Meeting:

Name of the Committee: Army Science Board (ASB)

Dates of meeting: April 23-24, 1951 Time: 0800-1630 hours each day Place Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Agenca: The Army Science Board 1991 Summer Study on Army Simulation Strategy will hold a two-day meeting. The meetings will include technical/programmatic briefings and site visits in the area of modeling and simulation. The meeting will be open to the public. Any interested person may extend, appear before, or file statements with the committee at the time and in the manner permitted by the committee. The ASB Administrative Officer, Sally Warner, may be contacted for further information at (703) 695-4781/0782. Sally A. Warner.

Administrative Officer, Army Science Board. [FR Doc. 91–7814 Filed 4–4–91; 8:45 am]

`rmy Science Boald; Open Meeting

In accordance with section 10(a)(2) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (Pub. L. 92–463), a mouncement is made of the following Committee Meeting:

Name of the committee: Army Science Board (ASB).

Dates of meeting: 30 April~1 May 1991.

Time: 0800–1700 hours each day. Place: Pentagon, Washington, DC.

Agenda: The Army Science Board Ad Hoc Subgroup on Initiatives to Improve HBCU/MIs infrastructure will neet to receive information briefings on HBCU/ MI programs from a variety of different sources. The group will be examining ways to maximize both the HECU/MI contribution to Army Research Development and Acquisition and the HBCU/MI infrastructure. The meeting will be open to the public. Any interested person may attend, appear before, or file statements with the committee at the time and in the manner permitted by the committee. The ASB inistrative Officer, Sally Warner, may be contacted for further information at (703) 695-0781/0782. Sally A. Warner,

Army Science Board; Closed Meeting

In accordance with section 10(a)(2) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (Pab. L. 92–463), announcement is mad of the following Committee Meeting:

Name of the Committee: Army Science Board (ASB).

Dotes/time of meeting: April 18-1

Time: 0800-1630 Hours. Place:

April 18, 1991—Washington, DO April 19, 1991—St. Louis, MO.

Agency: The Logistics and Sustainal lility Issue Group of the Army Science Buard will meet to initiate a study of Legistic Support and Strategic Deployment During Operation Desert Shield/Storm. This meeting will be closed to the public in accordance with section 552bc) of title 5, U.S.C., specifically subparagraph (1) thereof, and title 5, U.S.C., Appendix 2, subsection 10(il). The classified and unclassified matters and proprietary information to be discussed are so inextricably intertwined so as to preclude opening any partion of the meeting. The ASE Administrative Officer Sally Wayner, may be contacted for further information at (703) 695—0781/0782.

Sally A. Warner,

Administrative Office, Army Science Board. [FR Doc. 91–7803 File 1–2–91; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE \$710–08–4

DEFENSE NUCLEAR RACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

Adoption of 5 CFR Para 735— Employee Responsibilities and Conduct

AGENCY: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.

ACTION: No ice.

summany: Pursuant to 5 CFR 735.104(f), the Director, Office of Government Ethics, has approved the adoption by the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board of the current government employee standards of conduct and conflict of interests regulations set forth in 5 CFR part 735, in lieu of developing the Board's own regulations on these subjects. This notice announces the Board's adoption of 5 CFR part 735 as the regulatory framework for Board employees standards of conduct and conflict of interests issues.

EFFECTIVE DATE: April 3, 1991.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 5 CFR
705.104(f) provides that small federal
gencies do not have to prepare their

wn specific regulations implementing the Office of Personnel Management (OtM) regulations on employee standards of conduct and conflicts of interest. Instead, an agency may request the Office of Government Ethic; [OGE] upproval to adopt 5 C. R part 735. Such approval was requested by letter from the Board's General Counsel to the Director of OGE, dated February 20, 1991. By rearn letter, dated March 5, 1991, the Director granted his approval.

Accordingly, persuant to a unanimous affirmative vote of the Board members, the Board has adopted 5 CFR part 735 (Employee Responsibilities and Conduct), in lieu of promulgating its own regulations. After the effective date of this notice, 5 CFR part 735 regulations will govern conflict of intensits and standards of conduct issues pertaining to Board amployees.

Dated: March 21, 1991. John T Conway, Chairman.

(FR Ooc. 91-7753 Filed 4-2-91; 8:45 am)

BUILING CODE 6820-KD-M

[Recommendation 91-2]

Closure of Safety Issues Prior To Restart of K-Reactor at the Savannah River Site

AGENCY: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.

ACTION: Notice; recommendation.

SUMMARY: The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board has made a recommendation to the Secretary of Energy pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 2286a concerning closure of safety issues prior to restart of K-Reactor at the Savannah River Site. The Board requests public comments on this recommendation.

DATES: Comments, data, views, or arguments concerning this recommendation are due on or before May 3, 1991.

ADDRESSES: Send comments, data, views, or arguments concerning this recommendation to: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, 625 Indiana Avenue, N.W., suite 700, Washington, DC 20004.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Kenneth M. Pusateri or Carole J. Council, at the address above or telephone (202) 208–6400.

OGE is now independent of OPM and exercises the authority under 5 CFR part 735.104(f) for approvel of agency requests to adopt 5 CFR part 735. Public Law 100-598, 102 stat. 3031-3035.

Dated: March 27, 1991. Iohn T. Conway, Chairman.

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Dated. March 27, 1991.

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In accordance with the above, the Board recommends:

1. That each closure package of an issue in the ROMP be provided with a brief narrative discussion that clarifies the meaning of the issue, describes the steps that were taken to resolve it. states the reason for concluding that closure has been achieved, and shows how the referenced documents support the claim of closure.

That the DOE revert to its earlier. plan to fully review and concur with the determinations of each issue closure.

John T. Conway. Chairman.

March 27, 1991.

The Honorable James D. Watkins, Secretary of Energy, Washington, DC 20585.

Dear Mr. Secretary: On March 27, 1991, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, in accordance with Section 312(5) of Public Law 100-456, approved a recommendation which is enclosed for your consideration.

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The Board will publish this recommendation in the Federal Register Sincerely,

John T. Conway,

Chairman.

[FR Doc. 91-7754 Filed 4-2-91; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 6820-KD-M

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Complesion

[Docket Nos. RP88-115-000, RP90-104-000, and RP9 -192-000]

Texas Gas Transmission Corp.: Informal Settlement Conference

March 27, 199

Take notice that an informal settlement conference will be convened in these proceedings on April 23, 1991, at 1 p.m., at the offices of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 810 First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426. The conference will continue on April 24, if necessary.

Any porty, as a sfined by 18 CFR 385.102(c), or any participant, as defined by 18 CFR 385.102(b), is invited to attend. Persons wishing to become a party must plove to intervane and receive intervenor status pursuant to the Commission's regulations (1) CFR 385.214),

For additional information, contact Donald A. Heydt (202) 208–0740 or e Leveque (202) 208-5705.

Lois D. Cashell,

relary.

CDoc. 91-7767 Filed 4-2-91; 8:45 am] FILLING CODE 6717-01-M