



Department of Energy
National Nuclear Security Administration
Washington, DC 20585



February 1, 2017

The Honorable Sean Sullivan
Chairman
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
625 Indiana Avenue NW, Suite 700
Washington, D.C. 20004


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DNF SAFETY BOARD


Dear Chairman Sullivan:


Consistent with your letter, dated February 26, 2016, please find the attached fiscal year 2016 Annual Metrics Report on the nuclear criticality safety criteria. This metrics report includes a series of tables and satisfies the annual reporting requirement established for closure of DNFSB Recommendation 97-2, *Continuation of Criticality Safety at Defense Nuclear Facilities in the Department of Energy (DOE) Complex*.

If you have any specific questions regarding the report, please contact Kevin Hahn, National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), who has overall responsibility for the consolidated report, at (505) 845-4106. Robert Wilson, Office of Environmental Management (EM), (303) 236-3666, is responsible for the EM information; and Andrew DeLaPaz, Office of Science (SC), (301) 903-8225, is responsible for the SC information.

Sincerely,


James J. McConnell
Associate Administrator
for Safety, Infrastructure and Operations


J. Stephen Binkley
Acting Director
Office of Science


Matthew B. Moury
Associate Under Secretary for
Environment, Health, Safety and Security


James A. Hutton
Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Safety, Security, and Quality Assurance
Environmental Management

cc:
Kevin Hahn, NNSA
Sue Cange, EM-1 (Acting)
Stacy Charboneau, EM-3
Greg Sosson, EM-3.11

Patricia Lee, EM-3.111
Robert Wilson, EM-3.111
Andrew DeLaPaz, SC-3
Joe Olencz, AU-1.1



2016
ANNUAL METRICS
REPORT

To
THE DEFENSE NUCLEAR
FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

January 2017

NUCLEAR CRITICALITY
SAFETY PROGRAMS



National Nuclear Security Administration
United States Department of Energy
Washington, DC 20585

Purpose

A Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) letter dated February 26, 2016, requested that the Department of Energy (DOE) provide an annual metrics table on the nuclear criticality safety criteria listed below in its Annual Report on Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) Programs. The Board's letter modified the annual reporting requirement established for closure of DNFSB Recommendation 97-2, *Continuation of Criticality Safety at Defense Nuclear Facilities in the Department of Energy (DOE) Complex*, which requires the Department of Energy to provide a report and briefing on the requested subject areas for its various nuclear criticality safety programs.

The points-of-contact for this report are Kevin Hahn, NNSA, 505-845-4106, Dr. Robert Wilson, EM, 303-236-3666, and Andrew DeLaPaz, SC, 301-903-8225.

The requested metrics include:

- The number of criticality safety infractions in each severity level, per site specific criteria;
- The number of identified non-compliances with DOE Order 420.1, *Facility Safety*, and the American National Standards Institute/American Nuclear Society-8 series of criticality safety standards. Include the number of contractor-identified non-compliances and the number identified by external parties;
- The number of contractor and federal criticality safety assessments completed including the total number of findings and opportunities for improvement from these assessments;
- Current contractor and federal criticality safety staffing levels, including the average years of experience in criticality safety, number of qualified staff, number in training, number of staff lost, and number of staff hired in the previous year;
- DOE's overall evaluation of the contractors' performance in the functional area of criticality safety, consistent with DOE Order 226.1B, *Implementation of Department of Energy Oversight Policy*.

The following tables represent the requested data for DOE sites for the fiscal year 2016.

Annual Report on DOE Nuclear Criticality Safety Programs

Table 1. Criticality Safety Infractions and Program Non-Compliances

Site/Major Project	Overall Grade ¹	Criticality Safety Infractions ²					Program Non-Compliances ³	
		Level 1	Level 2	Level 3	Level 4	Level 5	Contractor-identified	Externally identified
Livermore	Green	0	0	0	2	0	0	0
Nevada	Green	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Los Alamos	Red*	0	0	1	6	17	21	3
Sandia	Green	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pantex	Green	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Y-12	Green	60**					0	0
Uranium Processing Facility	Green	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	0
PNNL (Office of Science)	Yellow	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Richland CHPRC	Green	0	0	0	0	0	3	0
Richland WCH	Green	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
River Protection WTP	Green	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	0
River Protection Tank Farms	Green	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
PPPO Paducah-FPDP	Yellow	0	1	2	7	N/A	0	1
PPPO Portsmouth-Fluor/B&W	Green	0	0	0	5	1	0	0
PPPO BWCS	Green	0	0	0	0	1	2	2
Idaho Flour Idaho LLC	Green	0	0	2	0	0	0	0
Idaho CH2M WG	Green	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Idaho ITG/AMWTP	Green	0	0	2	3	0	0	0
Oak Ridge UCOR	Green	0	0	0	3	1	0	0
Oak Ridge Isotek	Green	0	0	0	0	3	0	0
Oak Ridge TWPC	Green	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Savannah River SRNS	Green	0	0	0	0	2	0	0
Savannah River Parsons	Green	0	0	0	0	0	N/A	N/A
Savannah River SRR	Green	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Footnotes:

- | | | | | | |
|--------|--|-------|--------|-----|---|
| 1 | <table border="1" style="border-collapse: collapse; width: 60px; height: 20px;"> <tr><td style="background-color: green; color: white; font-size: 8px;">Green</td></tr> <tr><td style="background-color: yellow; color: black; font-size: 8px;">Yellow</td></tr> <tr><td style="background-color: red; color: white; font-size: 8px;">Red</td></tr> </table> | Green | Yellow | Red | Meets or exceeds expectations
Adequate but needs improvement
Does not meet expectations |
| Green | | | | | |
| Yellow | | | | | |
| Red | | | | | |

- 2 Levels 1 through 5 consistent with site specific criteria
 3 "N/A" for program non-compliances indicates no assessments were performed during FY16

* The overall rating of red is a snapshot of the state of the program evaluated against requirements. The program remains noncompliant in several areas and compensatory measures remain in place to ensure safety in operations. It is important to note that the overall rating is yellow when comparing the program against program improvement goals (last year's approach to determining the rating). A program improvement plan is in place and progress is closely monitored by the Field Office.

** 35 Minor Non-compliances, 20 Deficiencies, 5 Occurrences

Annual Report on DOE Nuclear Criticality Safety Programs

Table 2. Contractor and Federal Assessments

Site/Major Project	Contractor Assessments			Federal Assessments		
	Total Assessments ¹	Total Findings ²	Total OFIs ³	Total Assessments ¹	Total Findings ²	Total OFIs ³
Livermore	3	0	10	6	0	1
Nevada	1	3	11	2	4	4
Los Alamos	3	3	0	3	4	0
Sandia	7	0	13	5	1	5
Pantex	3	2	10	1	0	0
Y-12	7	1	9	7	1	0
Uranium Processing Facility	4	1	2	2	0	1
PNNL (Office of Science)	13	1	10	1	0	2
Richland CHPRC	3	0	3	14	0	4
Richland WCH	1	0	0	2	0	0
River Protection WTP	0	0	0	2	4	0
River Protection Tank Farms	1	1	1	1	0	2
PPPO Paducah-FPDP	2	0	12	1	9	17
PPPO Portsmouth-Fluor/B&W	3	0	3	0	0	0
PPPO BWCS	5	11	14	1	2	4
Idaho Flour Idaho LLC	14	16	21	1	0	0
Idaho CH2M WG	28	0	19	4	0	0
Idaho ITG/AMWTP	6	0	0	4	0	0
Oak Ridge UCOR	16	0	0	4	0	0
Oak Ridge Isotek	1	0	7	4	0	0
Oak Ridge TWPC	1	0	1	5	0	0
Savannah River SRNS	137	16	77	24	3	8
Savannah River Parsons	0	0	0	0	0	0
Savannah River SRR	15	0	7	8	1	4

Footnotes:

- 1 Total assessments focused on criticality safety including:
For Contractors: management self-assessments, criticality safety committee reviews, operational readiness assessments, and biennial/triennial external reviews
 *does not include regularly scheduled operational reviews

For Federal: DOE headquarters, site office, field office, and Office of Enterprise assessments; CSSG reviews, federal readiness assessments, and "For-cause" assessments
 *does not include day-to-day oversight conducted by facility representatives
- 2 Findings: Total number of assessment observations that generate a corrective action plan
- 3 OFIs (opportunities for improvement): Total number of all other assessment observations that were not findings

Annual Report on DOE Nuclear Criticality Safety Programs

Table 3. Contractor Staffing

Site/Major Project	Contractor Staffing					
	Qualified ¹	Target ²	In Training	Staff Lost	Staff Hired	Experience ³
Livermore	6	Yes	1	1	0	20
Nevada	2	Yes	1	1	0	8
Los Alamos	9	No	11	1	6	8.8
Sandia	6	Yes	4	0	1	17
Pantex	4	Yes	2	0	0	4
Y-12	22	No	15	3	3	15.5
Uranium Processing Facility	29	No	6	5	3	22.1
PNNL (Office of Science)	4	Yes	1	0	0	17
Richland CHPRC	8	Yes	0	0	0	20.6
Richland WCH	1	Yes	0	0	0	23
River Protection WTP	2	Yes	2	1	0	13
River Protection Tank Farms	3	Yes	0	0	0	25
PPPO Paducah-FPDP	6	No	5	2	6	17.6
PPPO Portsmouth-Fluor/B&W	13	Yes	0	0	1	16
PPPO BWCS	1	Yes	0	1	0	20
Idaho Flour Idaho LLC	4	Yes	1	0	0	15
Idaho CH2M WG	3	Yes	0	0	0	10
Idaho ITG/AMWTP	3	Yes	1	0	0	18
Oak Ridge UCOR	4	Yes	0	0	0	16
Oak Ridge Isotek	5	Yes	0	1	1	25+
Oak Ridge TWPC	4	Yes	0	0	0	28+
Savannah River SRNS	20	Yes	8	1	3	21
Savannah River Parsons	2	Yes	1	2	1	25
Savannah River SRR	2	Yes	0	0	0	29

Footnotes:

- 1 Qualified to independently perform criticality safety work consistent with site specific criteria
- 2 Does the number of qualified staff meet the programmatic need?
- 3 Average years of experience for all qualified staff

Annual Report on DOE Nuclear Criticality Safety Programs

Table 4. Federal Staffing

Site/Major Project	Federal Staffing					
	Qualified ¹	Target ²	In Training	Staff Lost	Staff Hired	Experience ³
Livermore	1	Yes	0	0	0	17
Nevada	1	Yes	1	0	0	10
Los Alamos	1	No	0	0	0	10
Sandia	1	Yes	0	0	0	21
Pantex	2	Yes	1	0	1	20
Y-12						
Uranium Processing Facility						
PNNL (Office of Science)	1	Yes	0	0	0	21
Richland CHPRC	1	Yes	0	0	0	4
Richland WCH						
River Protection WTP	5	Yes	2	0	0	7
River Protection Tank Farms						
PPPO Paducah-FPDP	4	Yes	0	0	0	26
PPPO Portsmouth-Fluor/B&W	5	Yes	0	0	0	25
PPPO BWCS	*	Yes	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Idaho Flour Idaho LLC	3	Yes	0	2	0	7
Idaho CH2M WG						
Idaho ITG/AMWTP						
Oak Ridge UCOR	2	Yes	0	0	0	22
Oak Ridge Isotek						
Oak Ridge TWPC						
Savannah River SRNS	3	No	0	1	0	16
Savannah River Parsons						
Savannah River SRR						

Footnotes:

- 1 Qualified to independently perform criticality safety work consistent with site specific criteria
- 2 Does the number of qualified staff meet the programmatic need?
- 3 Average years of experience for all qualified staff
- * No additional federal staff; those dedicated to FPDP and Flour/B&W also support BWCS as needed.