

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

January 6, 2017

TO: S. A. Stokes, Technical Director
FROM: M. T. Sautman and Z. C. McCabe, Site Representatives
SUBJECT: Savannah River Site Weekly Report for Week Ending January 6, 2017

DOE Award Fee Letters: DOE's letter to SRR noted that continued management attention was needed to address: 1) a degradation in conduct of operations in the liquid waste facilities and 2) an overall increase in errors found in the closeout of corrective actions and failure to maintain configuration control in corrective action due dates.

Solid Waste Management Facility (SWMF): SRNS rigging personnel were moving a crane at SWMF to pick up and transport waste. Prior to picking up the load, the crane operator rotated the carriage approximately 90 degrees and then it abruptly stopped. The crane operator then reversed the rotation a small amount and attempted to continue in the original direction and the carriage abruptly stopped again. The spotter then identified that the house locking pin was down and had struck a pin receiver twice which resulted in significant damage to the area around the pin. Prior to operating a crane, the crane operator is required to perform an inspection and document the condition of the crane in a checklist which includes the house locks. The crane operator failed to complete the checklist before operating the crane. Discussions during an issue review revealed that crane operators (beyond this instance) do not consistently complete the checklist prior to operating a crane. Furthermore, the checklist only allows each applicable inspection item, including the house locks, to be marked either satisfactory or unsatisfactory, so it is unclear whether completing the checklist would have prevented this issue. Rigging personnel appeared to not have a clear understanding of what management expectations were concerning when to complete the check list, how to perform the inspection, as well as what to do with checklists after they are complete. The immediate corrective actions include an extent of condition review, additional supervisory oversight when checklists are being completed, and SWMF facility manager approval prior to operating any cranes until permanent corrective actions are put into place (e.g., revising the checklist and relaying management expectations).

Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF): SRR continues to analyze the causes of the recent refrigerant release event (see 12/16/16 report), identify corrective actions, and determine the extent of condition. Corrective actions will likely include a series of management meetings with key operations and maintenance personnel and senior supervisory watch of maintenance work.

Tank Farms: SRR is using a tracked robot to remove insulation and lagging from the leaking 3H Evaporator pot. The robotic arm has stopped functioning. SRR will be removing the robot from the evaporator cell for repair. The site rep observed a management review of the planned controls for reducing the contamination levels and dose rates.

Saltstone: SRR successfully completed the hydro test for the 30 million gallon Saltstone Disposal Unit 6.

HB-Line: The plutonium inventory has been significantly reduced. The lower limit will have some operational impacts.