DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

November 3, 2017

TO: S. A. Stokes, Technical Director
FROM: M. T. Sautman and Z. C. McCabe, Resident Inspectors
SUBJECT: Savannah River Site Resident Inspector Report for Week Ending Nov. 3, 2017

Technical Safety Requirements (TSR): SRR conducted a common cause analysis of seven TSR violations that had occurred since 2014. Common causes identified included:
- confusion on the use and content of an informal pre-job briefing,
- belief that certain work is routine and additional supervision is not required,
- supervisors place too much reliance on experience,
- continuing training is not considered a priority,
- TSR training does not include an explanation of the purpose of the control.
SRR management approved corrective actions for addressing the identified causes.

As a result of a staff review and a subsequent SRNS assessment (see 5/5 and 10/13/17 reports), a SRNS task team developed a standard process for entering and exiting Limiting Conditions for Operations and mode changes. This process is being incorporated into facility standing orders across SRNS and will eventually be incorporated into the Conduct of Operations Manual. The processes methodically and comprehensively define what should be reviewed prior to taking the action and what needs to be documented and communicated afterwards. This looks promising.

Salt Waste Processing Facility: Parsons provided DOE a revised proposal for resuming Phase III work for DOE concurrence. DOE concurred with commencement of Phase III Stage 1, which is the resumption of low risk system operational tests. DOE wants to evaluate the performance of Stage 1 before allowing Stages 2 and 3 to proceed. The resident inspector attended part of a conduct of operations refresher briefing and reviewed briefings on work authorization and release and senior supervisory watch. The training material included extremely few examples of the proper way to implement the requirements and no scenarios or exercises for the students to apply what they had learned. Parsons also developed a plan for the verification of shift operations manager proficiency for eight key administrative tasks.

Resident Inspector (RI) Observations: While observing Tritium Facilities Shift Operations Manager (SOM) turnover, the RI noted that oncoming and offgoing SOMs discussed the TSR mode status of Tritium Facilities in sufficient detail. However, the SOM turnover checklist procedure does not have a specific step to discuss or list the TSR mode statuses as it does for LCOs and surveillance requirements. The RI also noted that the Shift Technical Engineer’s (STE) turnover checklist procedure does not have a specific location for TSR modes, however, the STEs utilize a “best practice” by listing the modes under LCO surveillance requirements. Although the modes are discussed as part of turnover at Tritium Facilities, considering the recent mode-related issues (see 1/20/17 and 8/11/17 weekly reports) it would be beneficial to formally capture TSR modes statuses in the turnover checklist procedures used at Tritium Facilities.

H-Canyon Exhaust (HCAEX) Tunnel: SRNS is now planning to have an independent review of the SRNL analysis and conclusions by academic professionals. SRNS currently plans to have the report issued by December 5, 2017.