

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

January 5, 2018

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** S.A. Stokes, Technical Director

**FROM:** J.W. Plaue and D. Gutowski

**SUBJECT:** Los Alamos Activity Report for Week Ending January 5, 2018

D. Gutowski started his assignment at LANL.

**Federal Oversight.** Last month, NNSA Headquarters approved an organizational change and realignment for the local field office. The key changes include: establishing a Deputy Manager for Technical Operations; retitling the existing Deputy Manager to Business, Security, and Missions; and splitting the previous office of the Assistant Manager (AM) for Operations into an AM for Field Operations and a new AM for Nuclear Safety, Engineering, and Readiness. In addition, each AM will be assigned a deputy. Overall, this action addresses span of control concerns and returns the field office to a structure similar to several years ago. Field office management has also prioritized working qualification and hiring processes for Facility Representatives after the loss of five personnel last year.

**Plutonium Facility–Infrastructure.** Last month, LANL management transmitted the fiscal year 2018 (FY18) update to the TA-55 Project Execution Strategy to the NNSA Field Office. Major accomplishments from FY17 included: completing the wrapping of roof girders; seismic qualification testing of critical spares for electrical and ventilation systems; and installation of concrete pads for new generators serving the electric firewater pumps. Planned work for this year includes: development of a prioritized list of gloveboxes to undergo fire hazard evaluations; complete installation of the diesel generators and transfer switches for the electric firewater pumps; and continuing seismic qualification testing of other critical spares. Notable out-year activities include: modifications to ensure certain walls meet their intended fire barrier functions by FY21; ventilation system modification by FY22; replacement of the fire alarm system by FY23; and removal of non-seismically qualified buildings from the fire water yard main by FY24.

**Plutonium Facility–Work Control.** On Wednesday, Plutonium Facility personnel held a post-job review for a radiological contamination event that occurred in mid-December. During replacement of filters for glovebox service lines, a routine job survey discovered contamination on one worker's gloves and then a continuous air monitor alarmed. The maintenance personnel who were wearing respirators placed the work in a safe condition and exited. Radiological control technicians found contamination on three of the workers' protective clothing. Post-job participants identified that the isolation process did not recognize that the potential for contamination in this filter (a negative service system) differed from those replaced previously without incident (positive service systems). As such, the work package did not identify appropriate controls. Facility management intends to issue a lessons learned.

**Emergency Management.** On Tuesday, the NNSA Field Office approved the implementation plan for DOE Order 151.1D, *Comprehensive Emergency Management* (see 10/14/2016 weekly). NNSA Headquarters revised this order in response to the recently closed Board Recommendation 2014-1, *Emergency Preparedness and Response*. LANL's plan indicates that most requirements will be implemented by the end of fiscal year 2019, though full implementation to include updated hazard surveys and technical basis documents is anticipated by the end of fiscal year 2021. The approval letter also notes the need for NNSA Headquarters to clarify the annual exercise requirements for Defense Nuclear Facilities.