

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

January 19, 2018

TO: S. A. Stokes, Technical Director
FROM: M. T. Sautman and Z. C. McCabe, Resident Inspectors
SUBJECT: Savannah River Site Resident Inspector Report for Week Ending Jan. 19, 2018

Mr. Foster was onsite this week for resident inspector on-the-job training.

Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF): When a valve failed open, it allowed process water to gravity drain from one tank into another tank. Thirteen minutes later, the receiving tank high-level alarm activated and water started to flow out of the tank and into a sump, which alarmed a minute later. Thirty-three minutes after the sump alarm, a control room operator notified the shift operations manager (SOM) that both the sump and receiving tank were at hi-hi level. After a ten-minute investigation, the SOM determined a failed open valve had established a flow path and shut down the transfer by closing another valve. Approximately 2400 gallons of water flowed into the sump. Parsons is investigating why this and other valves (see 1/12/18 report) are failing open. Parsons also identified several other cases where a single valve failure could cause a transfer. Meanwhile, Parsons completed their corrective action plan (see 9/22/17 report) and is stopping the continuous senior supervisory watch and returning to normal operations.

Fire Department: The latest Baseline Needs Assessment recommends increasing the minimum Fire Department staffing from 18 to 21 personnel per shift. This increase is based on the additional risk associated with high-hazard ground operation functions, search and rescue, rehabilitation, and the need for a dedicated Safety Officer.

Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL): A manager at SRNL identified two individuals who had expired glovebox glove change out training yet were still performing change outs. Further investigation revealed that, despite completing the training initially, the site-training database had marked the training as not applicable (N/A) and therefore did not show up as expired or trigger a reminder to retrain before it expired after 24 months. The retraining is a hands-on practical evaluation that can be administered by anyone currently trained to change out gloves. The two individuals had administered the training for two other individuals. SRNL has scheduled a retraining for next week for all affected workers.

The employees' group is confirming all trainings currently marked N/A have been classified appropriately. Other research groups have confirmed that they do not have any employees with the glovebox glove change out training inappropriately marked N/A. Additionally, SRNL noted that they do not always discuss training requirements during glove change out pre-job briefs. Furthermore, SRNL noted that typically, only the managers review the training summaries for their respective employees, and there is no universal expectation for individuals to review their own training summary. SRNL is evaluating the appropriate level of self-review of training cards and discussions of training requirements during pre-job briefs going forward.

H-Canyon: DOE-SR approved the two response plans submitted last week that will allow two canyon vessels to be without safety significant air purge for a longer duration than the safety basis-specified maximum (see 12/1/17, 12/8/17, 1/5/18, and 1/12/18).