DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

January 26, 2018

TO: S. A. Stokes, Technical Director

FROM: M. T. Sautman and Z. C. McCabe, Resident Inspectors

SUBJECT: Savannah River Site Resident Inspector Report for Week Ending Jan. 26, 2018

Mr. Peter Foster was at SRS for resident inspector (RI) training for a detail at another DOE site.

HB-Line: An individual assigned to HB-Line for a Technical Safety Requirement (TSR) minimum staffing position became unqualified for their position early in the shift on January 19. Approximately ten hours later, a first line manager was performing another task when they noticed that the individual was no longer qualified. Earlier in the shift, the individual took a computer-based training (CBT) course (set to expire in 30 days) that is required on their qualification card. The individual did not pass the exam associated with the course. After failing, the training system informed them that they would be eligible to re-take the exam the following day. Mistakenly believing they were still qualified, the individual did not inform their supervisor and proceeded as such, leaving the watch bill populated with an unqualified person for the rest of the shift. Once operations identified the issue approximately ten hours later, they immediately designated another individual to the watch bill to fulfill the TSR minimum staffing requirements. Investigation after the fact revealed that the thought that an individual was still qualified after failing a CBT exam once, but not twice is a widespread incorrect belief. HB-Line personnel have since informed others on site of this issue. As of now, it is unclear how many times this has happened in the past without identification. SRNS personnel are developing multiple corrective actions to ensure this issue will not happen in the future.

Tritium Facilities: The RI observed a requalification oral board for a shift technical engineer. The conduct and grading of the board was appropriate.

Salt Waste Processing Facility: The safety instrumented system (SIS) cuts power to several sampling pumps upon detection of a low vacuum in two gloveboxes. As part of the sample pumps system operational test, the RI observed workers use the SIS maintenance interface to deenergize a safety relay and verify it cut power to six pumps that supply flow to the gloveboxes.

Emergency Preparedness (EP): The RI observed a coached EP drill simulating a fuel truck crashing into the side of 235-F causing structural damage to the west man trap and concrete plenum. The fuel truck also caught fire. Integration between operations, Radiological Protection Department, and Fire Department was better than that observed at 235-F in the past. The RIs noted a few minor opportunities for improvement, but they were also identified by site personnel.

A RI met with SRR EP personnel to discuss their drill performance trends, new drill/exercise grading criteria, and other recent initiatives. SRR has developed a matrix to ensure they are assessing all EP program elements over the next five years. They are also tracking controller participation to ensure they are maintaining proficiency in this role.

H-Canyon: The RI observed performance of several Target Residue Material activities at H-Canyon. No concerns were identified.