DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

TO:S. A. Stokes, Technical DirectorFROM:P. Fox, Hanford Resident InspectorSUBJECT:Hanford Activity Report for the Week Ending April 20, 2018

105-KW Basin: The DOE federal Operational Readiness Review (ORR) team completed their review (see 04/13/2018 report). The team identified five prestart findings related to radiological control performance, radiological control staffing, facility egress, operational procedure content and format, and drill program implementation and management. Based on the prestart findings, the team determined that the contractor needs to address additional aspects of core requirement (CR) 1 (establishment of Safety Management Programs to ensure safe accomplishment of work) and CR 10 (establishment and implementation of an operational and emergency management drill and exercise program) before they start sludge retrieval. In the ORR out-brief, the team stated that they are confident that the Engineered Container Retrieval and Transfer System can be safely and compliantly operated after the contractor completes the items on their manageable list of open prestart issues (punch list) and resolves the prestart findings identified by the ORR team. DOE-RL and the ORR team lead will verify that the contractor actions to resolve the prestart findings are adequate before the facility is allowed to start operations.

Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP): Although most work on the PFP site remains suspended pending completion of the causal analysis and associated corrective actions for the December contamination spread event (see 12/22/2017 report), a PFP team started work to restage waste supersacks that contain strongbacks from the Plutonium Reclamation Facility canyon. This action is included on the list of activities that the contractor is allowed to perform in order to maintain the site in a stable condition, and is necessary to restore compliance with Technical Safety Requirements that protect source term assumptions in safety basis accident analysis calculations that define the potential consequences for a number of outdoor accidents (see 2/23/2018 report). The effort to restore TSR compliance has been delayed because of the need to develop work instructions to support the activity and by adverse wind conditions that have restricted worker access to the PFP site.

Tank Farms: The contractor completed prerequisites for evaporator campaign 08 and placed the evaporator facility in operation mode.

Building 324: The contractor Hazard Review Board (HRB) met to evaluate a procedure that facility workers will use to move large waste containers between the Radiological Engineering Complex airlock and the Cask Handling Area. The HRB approved the procedure, with comments. The resident inspector notes that the procedure is worked in conjunction with six other procedures resulting in a significant management challenge for the Field Work Supervisor.

DOE Headquarters: The DOE Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management visited the Hanford site and observed activities at DOE-RL and DOE-ORP facilities.

Hanford Site: Hanford site emergency management program personnel conducted an annual protective action drill for the 100 area and the 200 east and west areas.