

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

June 29, 2018

**TO:** Christopher J. Roscetti, Technical Director  
**FROM:** Ramsey P. Arnold and Zachery S. Beauvais, Resident Inspectors  
**SUBJECT:** Pantex Plant Activity Report for Week Ending June 29, 2018

**Specific Administrative Controls (SAC):** Per the NPO site integrated assessment plan, NPO completed two additional assessments that evaluate individual SACs and their implementation (see 4/27/18 report). Of the three SAC assessments completed this year, all identified findings including SAC implementation inadequacies, inadequate use of the safety control implementation database, and compliance deficiencies with DOE requirements.

The resident inspectors recently completed an independent evaluation of technical safety requirement (TSR) and other hazard control violations with an engineering nexus related to SAC implementation. Of the 14 violations from April 2017 to April 2018, the resident inspectors focused on eight events (see 4/14/17, 7/14/17, 10/27/17, 12/1/17, 12/21/17, 1/19/18, 2/2/18, 3/16/18 reports). With the evaluation, the resident inspectors looked at the adequacy of past CNS management self-assessments (MSA) of the SACs and the issues management processes related to the events. Of the MSAs available, CNS had not identified implementation issues with the SACs prior to the TSR violation—something that should have been identified via the MSA process. The resident inspectors have shared their observations with NPO and CNS. Based on the recent TSR violations including those reviewed by the resident inspectors and those occurring since April 2018 (see 5/4/18 and 6/1/18 reports), CNS is taking actions to improve control owner training and the quality of SAC MSAs.

**Warhead Measurement Campaign (WMC):** NNSA completed the WMC federal readiness assessment (FRA), documenting 1 pre-start finding and 10 observations (see 6/15/18 report). NNSA identified the pre-start finding because the production section managers had not received training for the WMC TSR controls and CNS did not identify this gap by the training needs analysis. Prior to starting WMC operations on two of the three weapon programs, CNS will have to close the FRA pre-start finding. Additionally, CNS submitted a newly generated HAR to cover WMC activities. In March, NPO issued a SER to approve the HAR with one condition of approval (COA) and three important comments. The COA related to not protecting an initial condition in the safety analysis that limits the radiation exposure duration of units. CNS addressed the COA by developing a SAC to record and monitor exposure time. Once the HAR is implemented, CNS has thirty days to address the remaining three important comments.

**On-site Transportation Operations:** The resident inspectors and an NPO facility representative observed on-site transportation operations during a grave shift and portions of a day shift. During the shift stand-up, there was a healthy two-way dialog between transportation management and personnel. Throughout the shifts, the resident inspectors observed multiple loading and unloading operations before and after inter-zone movements of special nuclear material and weapons. Transportation personnel completed necessary pre-operation checks for each of the facilities they entered and took the necessary actions to implement SACs throughout the operations including upon entry into the loading dock. Transportation management and personnel demonstrated a thorough understanding of their operations, procedures, and safety requirements throughout the shifts.