

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

November 2, 2018

MEMORANDUM FOR: Christopher J. Roscetti, Technical Director
FROM: J.W. Plaue and D. Gutowski, Resident Inspectors
SUBJECT: Los Alamos Activity Report for Week Ending November 2, 2018

Management: On Thursday, Triad National Security LLC assumed responsibility for the management and operations of the NNSA scope at LANL.

Area G–Safety Systems: On Tuesday, N3B engineering personnel performing a walk-down discovered a discrepancy between the drawings and field configuration for safety class vehicle barriers protecting high risk areas. An immediate operability evaluation determined that all of these vehicle barriers are configured improperly and are inoperable. Facility operations personnel subsequently implemented compensatory measures consistent with the technical safety requirements (TSR) actions associated with repair, relocation, or maintenance of the vehicles barriers by restricting vehicle access. N3B personnel are developing a design and a work package to restore the barriers to the required configuration.

Plutonium Facility–Radiological Safety: Last Friday, a worker received a puncture wound while performing electrical installation work for a new glovebox. Facility personnel followed the radiation protection standing order implemented following the discovery of a puncture related uptake (see 9/7/2018 report) and ensured the worker received a wound count. There was no evidence of an uptake. The work package for this task required puncture resistant gloves for tasks with potential sharps hazards; however, the worker was not wearing the required gloves because the puncture occurred during a wire brushing activity that was not recognized as having potential sharps. The investigation report from the earlier puncture is with DOE Headquarters for review.

RANT Shipping Facility: On Thursday, the NNSA Field Office conditionally approved the revised safety basis. The conditions of approval require Triad to: (1) elevate controls on acetylene and electric forklifts to Specific Administrative Controls in the next TSR revision and (2) revise the safety basis within 30 days to ensure adequate criteria to verify containers meet Waste Isolation Pilot Plant certification. Last Friday, the NNSA Field Office received a schedule to support facility restart (see 10/19/2018 report). The schedule anticipates achieving startup authorization on January 30, 2019, assuming a number of factors including success-based reviews and parallel contractor and federal performance demonstrations.

Safety Basis: Protecting the limit of radioactive material inventory assumed in the safety analysis is an important function of a TSR. The resident inspectors found that this function is inconsistently specified in the TSRs at LANL. For example, operators must execute a surveillance to ensure compliance with the limit *prior to* any receipt of inventory at the Confinement Vessel Disposition project, Transuranic Waste Facility, the Waste Characterization, Reduction, and Repackaging Facility, and certain locations at Area G. Surveillances are required on a monthly or greater periodicity at the Weapons Engineering Tritium Facility, the Plutonium Facility, and the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research building. The recently approved TSR for the RANT Shipping Facility requires the inventory surveillance, which is the primary TSR control, within 8 hours of receipt. The TSRs are also inconsistent with the required completion times to restore inventory. For example, the Plutonium Facility is immediate, while RANT allows up to 7 days.