

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

March 15, 2019

**TO:** Christopher J. Roscetti, Technical Director  
**FROM:** Z. C. McCabe, Resident Inspector  
**SUBJECT:** Savannah River Site Activity Report for Week Ending March 15, 2019

**Staff Activity:** Mr. D. Cleaves and Dr. D. Minnema were on site this week to augment resident inspector coverage, and to observe 235-F activities.

**H-Canyon:** While conducting load testing on the A-Train diesel generator, H-Canyon personnel observed a slight fluctuation in the frequency meter. They declared the A-Train inoperable while H-Canyon personnel initiated and evaluated a non-conformance report (NCR). H-Canyon personnel entered a Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) for situations where the A- or B-Train diesel is not operable. H-Canyon personnel then performed the required action of aligning an alternate diesel generator (C-Train) to the A-side emergency switchgear, disconnecting the A-Train diesel. The following day, H-Canyon personnel dispositioned the NCR as “use as is,” and developed a package to return the A-Train to operable status. With concurrence from the shift technical engineer (STE), the Shift Operations Manager (SOM) declared the A-Train operable and exited the LCO, but did not first realign the A-Train diesel to the A-side switchgear which is necessary for the A-Train to be operable. The power support operator (PSO) on the next shift recognized the error and alerted the appropriate personnel. The subsequent issue investigation revealed several contributing factors. For instance, the SOM and STE did not follow the Safety Envelope Required Tracking reference procedure which directs the return of off-line components to service as a required action. Additionally, the SOM exited the LCO without first notifying the PSO who is responsible for maintaining the diesel generator equipment. SRNS personnel are currently performing a causal analysis to identify additional, long-term corrective actions.

**H-Area New Manufacturing (HANM):** During recent deconstruction and removal (D&R) efforts, tritium personnel inadvertently disposed of ten filter housings that are still needed. These particular filter housings are no longer available, therefore tritium personnel have decided to attempt to retrieve these items from a B-12 waste container. Through X-Rays and D&R documentation, tritium personnel believe they have identified three potential locations for 8 of the filter housings. Each of the three potential locations are inside a different 1 gallon “paint can” inside a 5 gallon bucket inside the same B-12 container with other low-level waste. Tritium personnel are planning to open the B-12 container outside HANM and retrieve the three buckets while wearing air-supplied plastic suits. They will then transport the buckets into a hood inside HANM, open it, retrieve the paint can, move it inside the adjacent glovebox, and then open and sort through the paint can’s contents. It has been approximately fifteen years since the last time a similar evolution occurred at HANM.

**Solid Waste Management Facility:** The TRUPACT-III readiness assessments continued this week (see 3/8/19 report). The resident inspector observed SRNS-conducted interviews of personnel from operations, radiological control, and rigging.