Staff Activity: Mr. D. Cleaves was on site to augment resident inspector (RI) coverage.

Technical Safety Requirements (TSR): In the next revision of the SRS TSR Methodology Manual, the criteria for TSR violations focuses on events involving operations outside the safety basis. Other TSR implementation issues would be reported as management concerns and handled with other contractor assurance processes. According to the new language, as long as the LCO Required Action was completed within the associated completion time, a TSR violation would not occur if 1) the LCO was not entered when the condition criteria was met or 2) the staff was not cognizant of the action, but the action was moot or implemented by happenstance. Furthermore, if operations is not cognizant that a safety system was rendered incapable of performing its safety function, but upon time of discovery enters the Required Action and completes it within the associated completion time, a TSR violation would not occur. The existing TSR Methodology Manual also states that a TSR violation does not occur if a SAC has an associated recovery action and that action is taken within the required time limit. However, DOE-STD-1186 states that the distinguishing feature of a directive action SAC is that it does not specify actions to take within a defined completion time if the SAC requirement is not met.

Building 235-F: SRNS has removed most of the loose debris from Cell 1 and has begun cleaning out Cell 2. SRNS is trying to identify a safe means to lift 42-lb furnaces about 30” out of their wells. Existing rigging points in the cell are hard to inspect and have not been used for decades and installing and erecting a new frame has its own challenges.

Defense Waste Processing Facility: A mechanic and an electrician stated that they verified they had the correct motor control center (MCC), but after the electrician donned his personnel protective equipment, he actually de-energized an adjacent MCC instead. Although the MCCs were clearly labeled, the mechanic did not notice the mistake either and proceeded to install a single point lockout tagout (SPLT) and disassemble the tank blower. Since the SPLT was for mechanical rather than electrical energy, the electrician verified an air gap was present, but not that the desired tank blower was de-energized. Meanwhile, a control operator received an alarm that an unexpected vent blower had lost power and notified the shift operations manager, who shut down the ongoing work on the energized equipment.

Salt Waste Processing Facility: The Resident Inspector observed classroom training on the 11 process/utility abnormal operating procedures (AOP) and five simulator drills involving AOPs. The classroom training emphasized integrated equipment response to upsets and AOP actions.

Emergency Preparedness (EP): A resident inspector and Mr. Cleaves observed the annual evaluated EP exercise at the Solid Waste Management Facility. The scenario involved a forklift crash involving transuranic waste containers, worker injuries, and subsequent fire. DOE and the contractor are currently grading the performance of the exercise.