Flanged Tritium Waste Containers (FTWC): On Tuesday, the NNSA and EM Field Office Managers issued a joint letter to Triad and N3B providing direction to remediate the FTWCs stored at Area G (see 4/5/2019 report). The letter directs the contractors to develop a joint plan to vent the FTWCs at Area G and then move the vented containers to the Weapons Engineering Tritium Facility to complete the remediation. Triad will be responsible for developing the safety basis to support this activity and performing the work at Area G. The EM Field Office Manager will be the safety basis and startup approval authority with the NNSA Field Office Manager’s concurrence.

Plutonium Facility–Transuranic Waste Management: Last week, during routine inspections, Triad personnel discovered a transuranic waste drum with a corroded filter vent in the basement of the Plutonium Facility. Aside from the vent, the drum appears to be in good condition and no contamination or other anomalies were detected. Waste operations personnel believe that there is no indication that the drum and its filter vent are not able to perform their safety functions. Safety basis personnel entered the New Information process and additional data is being collected regarding this drum and others. The drum was packaged last year and contains primarily leaded glovebox gloves from heat source plutonium operations. No other drums that have been inspected including some with the exact same waste profile show any evidence of vent corrosion. The deposits around the filter are acidic and additional chemical analysis is in progress.

Plutonium Facility–Safety Basis: The NNSA Field Office approved the Evaluation of the Safety of the Situation and Justification for Continued Operations for freight elevator failures with no conditions of approval or directed actions (see 3/8/2019 report). The higher drop heights for material in the elevator do result in slightly higher accident consequences to the public, however they remain well below the evaluation guideline, and no additional controls were recommended. The operational restriction put in place at the time a Potential Inadequacy in the Safety Analysis was declared will remain in place until the Documented Safety Analysis is revised to incorporate the more accurate consequences from this scenario.

On Thursday, Triad safety basis personnel recommended declaration of a Potential Inadequacy in the Safety Analysis associated with the hazards analysis for vehicle accidents impacting transuranic waste stored on pads outside the Plutonium Facility (see 4/12/2019 report).

RANT Shipping Facility: Triad transmitted to the NNSA Field Office a revised safety basis to address the first condition of approval to elevate acetylene and electric forklift controls to specific administrative controls from NNSA’s original approval (see 11/2/2018 report). NNSA approved changes addressing the condition of approval related to WIPP certification in December 2018.