

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

December 20, 2019

TO: Christopher J. Roscetti, Technical Director
FROM: M. T. Sautman and Z. C. McCabe Resident Inspectors
SUBJECT: Savannah River Site Activity Report for Week Ending December 20, 2019

Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF): The resident inspector (RI) observed an emergency preparedness proficiency drill (see 8/15, 8/30, and 9/20 weekly reports). The incident scene response, contamination control, and interactions with the fire department were better than that seen in earlier proficiency drills. The RI also observed workers remove a hot cell manipulator under simulated radiological conditions. There were a few delays and rough spots, but in general the evolution went well. The RI and a Parsons employee noted that a manipulator had a handwritten “Do Not Use” sign taped on it rather than a formal tag and an unauthorized operator aid was clipped next to a hot cell window. DOE and Parsons continue to discuss which contractor operational readiness review (ORR) findings, other issues mentioned in the report, and DOE assessment findings need to be completed prior to the start of the DOE ORR.

Building 235-F: DOE had a peer review conducted of the evaluation of 235-F fire hazards that was performed by a SRNS consultant. The peer review reiterated concerns with ceiling tiles, identified concerns with plastic light diffusers, and suggested evaluating the impact of a fire involving the cable trays that pass through the Plutonium Fuel Form facility rooms. SRNS has been removing ceiling tiles and plastic light diffusers in order to reduce the combustible loads in the 235-F rooms. During this effort, workers have found some additional combustibles in the ceiling after they removed the tiles. These items have included a wood plank and pieces of plywood, a hose, tape, and plastic. SRNS is planning to inspect the ceilings in other parts of the building for additional combustibles and is planning to remove what has been found.

H-Canyon: H-Canyon personnel recently completed a maintenance outage on a chiller that began in August. In November, a scope change required a new lockout to replace the original that was installed months earlier. Upon completion of the work, the subcontractors and subcontract technical representative (STR) informed the shift operations manager (SOM) that they were prepared to sign off of the November lockout, which would have signified that they no longer require protection from the hazardous energy controlled by the lockout. However, they realized that although the lockout had the appropriate signatures for establishing the lockout, no one had ever signed onto the lockout as a holder. Review of the SOM log revealed that the November lockout was established immediately before the original was removed. The log does not mention any personnel signing on to it as a holder, nor would it typically. Only two individuals should have signed onto the lockout, and both, along with their STR, are adamant that they signed onto it. Review of lockouts processed at approximately the same time has not revealed any misplaced signatures. H-Canyon personnel are still investigating.

Savannah River National Laboratory: The RI observed a training for research and development (R&D) personnel regarding work planning and control (WP&C). Over the last month, SRNL management provided several sessions as a result of continued short comings associated with WP&C over the last several years. The training contained appropriate information and discussed several examples that appeared relatable to the audience.