

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

May 22, 2020

TO: Christopher J. Roscetti, Technical Director
FROM: M. T. Sautman and Z. C. McCabe, Resident Inspectors
SUBJECT: Savannah River Site Activity Report for Week Ending May 22, 2020

COVID-19: SRS currently has 15 confirmed cases of COVID-19.

H-Canyon: Non-destructive examination (NDE) personnel executed a work package while signed onto a lockout; however, the work package had not been added as an authorized task on the lockout. This lockout was created to allow the removal of insulation from the outside facilities caustic header. Per discussions during an issue review, the lockout was created with the intent of having several work packages added to it, including the NDE of the header. According to the site hazardous energy control manual, it is the shift operations manager's (SOM) responsibility to ensure work packages are included on lockouts. During the issue review, the SOM stated that because this activity was discussed at length previously, he assumed it was included in the lockout. H-Canyon personnel are developing corrective actions, including initiating a process to include an additional person to review lockouts to ensure the work packages are appropriately incorporated to avoid a single point failure. Additionally, H-Canyon personnel have initiated a change request to the site hazardous energy control manual to require others (e.g., the workers) to ensure their work package is included in the lockout.

Tank Farms: A specific administrative control (SAC) requires the 3H evaporator cell to be inspected at least once every 90 days of evaporator operation to estimate the buildup of leaking salt and to take actions to keep the accumulated salt to under 700 gallons. Based on the latest inspection, engineers estimate that 105 gallons of salt have accumulated. SRR plans to remove this salt during some upcoming work in the cell. This will be the first salt removal per this SAC.

Emergency Preparedness (EP): Last June, DOE-SR sent SRNS a letter of direction telling them to perform the evaluations in Recommendation 19-2, Sub-Recommendation 3, which dealt with emergency response. The resident inspector (RI) noticed that some of these actions being tracked in the Site Tracking, Analysis, and Reporting had recently been closed and verified by SRNS with little supporting documentation. DOE-SR personnel later informed the RI that these actions should not have been closed because they were not satisfied with the closure packages.

EP drills and exercises are cancelled through the end of August due to COVID-19.

H-Area New Manufacturing (HANM): An engineer was performing corrective maintenance on two nearly identical and side-by-side programmable logic controllers (PLC) in HANM. The engineer was troubleshooting the second PLC (in standby mode), but mistakenly turned off the first PLC (in primary mode) which caused multiple tritium air monitors to alarm. The control room responded by entering the appropriate limiting condition for operations associated with the equipment. The engineer noted that he had utilized a peer check to ensure he was on the correct unit when he first turned off the power to the second PLC but did not utilize peer check the second time. This is the second recent issue (see 5/8/2020 report regarding the Defense Waste Processing Facility) that could have been avoided with the use of component flagging.