

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

June 12, 2020

TO: Christopher J. Roscetti, Technical Director
FROM: M. T. Sautman and Z. C. McCabe, Resident Inspector
SUBJECT: Savannah River Site Activity Report for Week Ending June 12, 2020



The above section has been redacted because DOE has marked the information as Official Use Only.

FH-Lab: F/H-Lab personnel only reduce the *posted* (emphasis added) fissile gram equivalent (FGE) contents of the High Activity Drain Tank when the posted value approaches 380 FGE, which protects the 400 FGE single parameter limit. Additionally, F/H-Lab personnel routinely transfer the contents of the tank to H-Canyon for disposal in H-Tank Farms, but these reductions are not reflected in the HAD Tank posted value. The posted value has required a “subtraction” (i.e., approached 380 FGE) three times in the past fourteen years including once last month. At that time, analytical group personnel requested (via email) engineering to develop the calculation required per procedure to perform the subtraction. The engineer involved did not realize that the intent was to perform a subtraction, and assumed they were requesting the much more common calculation used to support a HAD Tank transfer. The Analytical group personnel received the incorrect calculation and proceeded to perform the subtraction and revise the posted value. The procedure included a step that required the Analytical group personnel to verify that criticality safety personnel had reviewed and approved the calculation (they had not). The Analytical group personnel assumed that since the calculation had been approved, that criticality safety personnel had also approved it. During an issue review, SRNS personnel have identified poor communication practices and assumptions as contributors to this error. SRNS personnel have reposted the HAD Tank.

Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF): The resident inspector observed a control room table top drill. The scenario involved responding to an injured person in the warehouse. The overall response was appropriate. The resident inspector noted that the shift operations manager appeared knowledgeable of the required response and demonstrated command and control; however, at times, the SOM took to instructing the rest of the team rather than allowing them to demonstrate their knowledge.