

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

August 14, 2020

TO: Christopher J. Roscetti, Technical Director
FROM: M. T. Sautman and Z. C. McCabe, Resident Inspectors
SUBJECT: Savannah River Site Activity Report for Week Ending August 14, 2020

Building 235-F: SRNS implemented the revision to the Basis for Interim Operations and Technical Safety Requirements (TSR). This revision no longer credits the sand filter's efficiency.

Saltstone: While working in a permit-required confined space inside Saltstone Disposal Unit 7, a powered industrial truck (PIT) struck another worker's leg and pinned him against the abrasive blast pot he had been filling. SRR declared a near miss because the injury could easily have been worse. Normally, a worker is positioned on the opposite side of the pot, but workers decided to put a second worker on a ladder in front of the PIT. It is not clear why the PIT advanced when the driver says it was in reverse.

Salt Waste Processing Facility: While swapping Process Building Ventilation System (PBVS) fans, the control room received several alarms. Operators entered multiple Limiting Conditions for Operations and the Loss of PBVS abnormal operating procedure. A possible cause for the upset was differences in the time settings for the interlocks.

DOE-SR: DOE-SR completed an assessment of SRR's Crane Operations, Critical Lift Program, and Work Planning and Control. In the assessment, DOE-SR identified more than two dozen findings and drafted a letter of concern. Some of the issues noted include "systemic/programmatic non-compliance with procedural requirements," "ineffective verification of rigging as required by [the safety basis]," "significant safety management program implementation gaps between engineering requirements established by the [safety basis] and implementing procedures/checklists," inconsistencies between the SRR hoisting and rigging manual and the SRS-wide requirements, and an ineffective issues management system. The assessment also identified issues with structural engineering calculations supporting rigging activities, and inadequate technical work documents. SRR is drafting a corrective action plan to address the numerous shortcomings.

Oral Boards: The resident inspector observed two shift technical engineer (STE) oral boards at SRNS nuclear facilities. At one of the boards, the resident inspector noted that when presented with a scenario representing a site area emergency (SAE), the candidate failed to recognize it as such until that information was provided by the questioner. Further, the candidate was not asked to classify, nor did they identify any ORPS (Occurrence Reportable and Processing System) reportable events when presented with them except to say that a SAE was "reportable" in the previous example. Additionally, the resident inspector noted that although several questions were asked regarding the safety basis, the candidate was not asked to recognize a TSR violation. Considering the STE's duty to ensure compliance with the safety basis, the resident inspector believes recognizing a scenario that is a TSR violation is an important ability to demonstrate during an oral board. The resident inspector provided these observations to the board after the grading had been completed.