Salt Waste Processing Facility: Last Friday, Parsons transitioned the Central Processing Area to De-Inventoried mode and suspended all non-essential work due to staffing issues as a result of more than four dozen workers being unavailable. In this mode, Limiting Conditions for Operation and Surveillance Requirements are not applicable. The minimum facility shift crew composition in the Technical Safety Requirements are a shift operations manager (SOM) or control room manager (CRM), two control room operators, and two field operators. Parsons was able to maintain this composition despite fifteen workers being unavailable, including five SOMs and a CRM. In addition, two shift technical engineers, two senior supervisory watch personnel, and another manager were unavailable. The staffing situation will significantly improve this weekend. Parsons resumed efforts to remove foreign material from processing equipment and is planning to resume their 3 batch run early next week.

Emergency Preparedness: The resident inspectors participated in training for Emergency Operations Center (EOC) personnel on the use of WebEOC. This program will allow emergency response personnel to remotely participate in an emergency.

H-Canyon: During the installation of a lockout, an operator lost their place in the procedure and performed step 37 rather than the intended step 33. This shut down a different motor control center than what was intended at the time. The operator stopped the procedure after an independent observer noticed the skipped step. The mistake did not cause any problems.

Last week, the resident inspector observed the start-up of the Second Uranium Cycle. The pre-job briefing was well executed, and all involved parties were present in the control room. During the preliminary steps, the resident inspector observed the control room operator use a hand written table from the inside cover of the Second Uranium Cycle Operator log book to inform them on the amount of solvent needed. The table included solvent depletion times for various feed tank levels from a Second Uranium Cycle run in 2016. The resident inspector questioned the use of the table as an informal operator aid and then discussed it with the shift operations manager who informed him that they would look into it. H-Canyon personnel successfully completed the run, which is the last planned run of the Second Uranium Cycle.

Tank Farms: A safety class valve credited for passive containment failed a leak check. The valve is also safety significant for isolation of a transfer path.

Oral Boards: The resident inspector observed two oral boards, one for an initial qualification of a control room manager, and the other for the initial qualification of a shift operations manager. In neither case were the candidates successful. However, in the resident inspector’s opinion, the questioning and grading of candidates was appropriate and reflected previous lessons learned.