

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

October 2, 2020

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FROM: M. T. Sautman and Z. C. McCabe, Resident Inspectors
SUBJECT: Savannah River Site Activity Report for Week Ending October 2, 2020

Solid Waste Management Facility (SWMF): The DOE-SR readiness assessment of the transuranic (TRU) waste characterization activities at SWMF was completed this week. The RA focused on the interface between SWMF and Central Characterization Program personnel. The resident inspector listened to personnel interviews and observed the field evolution including the SWMF personnel support of CCP characterization. Additionally, CCP demonstrated response to abnormal events such as the presence of liquid in a TRU waste drum.

H-Tank Farms: Per the Tank Farms Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) surveillance, Tank Farms personnel sampled the 13H diesel generator fuel oil tank and sent it to an offsite laboratory to determine the amount of particulates in the sample. The results came back over four times the TSR limit for particulates. As such, Tank Farms personnel removed the 13H diesel, a safety significant piece of equipment, from service and entered the applicable limiting condition for operation. During a fact finding meeting, H-Tank Farms personnel stated that they doubted the validity of the sample results considering the unprecedentedly large amount of particulates, but do not believe there was a laboratory error. Rather, they speculated that perhaps the personnel taking the sample may have picked up sediment from the bottom of the fuel tank, or possibly not sampled correctly due to the procedure not being very descriptive of the necessary technique to get a representative sample. H-Tank Farms personnel have sampled the tank again as well as sampled another batch of fuel oil and sent it to the same outside laboratory for analysis.

Salt Waste Processing Facility: A RI observed the Startup Review Board review the status of the startup prerequisites. Some items were still open or will need to be verified immediately prior to startup. A follow-on meeting and the first transfer are scheduled for Monday.

Parsons had two unplanned entries into their limiting conditions for operation (LCO) due to loss of pressure vessel ventilation system header vacuum and the failure of an air pulse agitator due to the loss of vessel differential pressure. Operations tried to swap moisture removal trains (MRT), but the MRT being swapped to had both the inlet and outlet valves closed per a work order. Parsons also had an unplanned entry into 4 process building ventilation system LCO conditions after a flow indicator controller was closed without bypassing air handling unit interlocks.

Emergency Preparedness: The RI observed a virtual tabletop drill for a simulated outside K-Area fire involving a drum of transuranic waste and an injured truck driver. The RI provided feedback to the contractor on a number of tabletop drills that have been observed. Training drills by their nature involve a mixture of mentoring and demonstration. However, at times, the controllers are doing too much of the talking and the coaching ends up with the controllers telling the players what they should be doing rather than allowing the players to demonstrate their response, with some coaching as needed. The RI also encouraged the controllers to elicit more details from players on exactly what they are doing to avoid simple statements of fact.